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 by creating a work or doing a deed;  
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General introduction 
 
Rest, Self-Generated Thought (SGT), and Default Mode Network (DMN) 
Modern life is usually defined as busy and hectic and little spare time is 
dedicated to rest. Notwithstanding this, it is very common to experience either long or 
short periods of idleness during waking hours. For instance, it often happens that while 
attending a conference presentation our attention drifts away from what the speaker is 
saying towards unrelated topics, such as fantasies, memories, or (un)likely future 
scenarios; or, while reading a doctoral thesis, we might unsurprisingly realize that we 
cannot remember a single word of the last page.  
All these examples underline that our mind is often not focused on the task at 
hand nor on the surrounding environment, but rather it gravitates internally towards 
topics that are not elicited by external stimuli (Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011; 
Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010). Accordingly, both early and recent estimates report 
that we spend 30% up to 50% of waking hours being substantially inattentive to what is 
happening around us (Franklin et al., 2013; Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 
2010; Klinger & Cox, 1987/1988). However, it is highly unlikely that a single 
homogeneous type of thinking is present for such an extensive part of our mental 
activity, rather it has been documented that multiple and only partially similar mental 
activities occur while not being actively engaged in any task (Klinger & Cox, 1987/1988). 
This variety of rest-related mental phenomena has been defined and labeled differently 
throughout the 20th century, with key labels including daydreaming (Smith, 1904; 
Varendock, 1921), stimulus-independent thought (Mason et al., 2007), spontaneous 
thought (Christoff, Ream, & Gabrieli, 2004), task-unrelated thought (Giambra, 1989), 
mindwandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Recently, a process-based term has 
been proposed to group them all, namely self-generated thought (SGT), consisting of 
1 CHAPTER 
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“*…+ thoughts and feelings [that] arise independently of the concurrent perceptual input 
and any external task being performed” (Smallwood, 2013, pp. 519).  
During the last decade, rest (i.e., SGT and its underlying neural substrate) has 
attracted researchers’ attention exponentially (Callard, Smallwood, Golchert, & 
Margulies, 2013). For instance, in 2001 Raichle and colleagues published a 
groundbreaking article where they described a pattern of brain deactivation, called 
Default Mode Network (DMN), occurring in goal-directed tasks compared to passive 
control conditions (see also Shulman, et al., 1997). In other words, it seems that brain 
activity is not only reactive to stimuli, but that some of neural and metabolic brain 
activity is not directly associated with subjects’ performance of a task. As a matter of 
fact, the discovery of DMN has impacted human neuroscience to such an extent that, 
according to Raichle (2009), a paradigm shift is currently occurring in neuroscience, 
from a perspective mainly focusing on task-evoked activity to another oriented to 
brain’s intrinsic activity.    
A similar shift of interest occurred in cognitive psychology too, where mental 
functioning during rest, such as SGT, is now the focus of intense research and debate 
(Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, in press; McVay & Kane, 2012; Schooler, et al., 
2011; Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Not only is SGT extremely 
frequent (Killingworth & Gilbert, 2010) and supported by the DMN (Christoff et al., 
2009; Mason et al., 2007), but it also substantially impacts mental functioning and well-
being, with both pros and cons being reported (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; 
Ottaviani & Couyoumdjian, 2013). 
Several features have been associated with SGT, such as self-centered focus, 
temporality, and emotional impact. First, during off-task thoughts or pure resting state, 
SGT is often focused on the self (Diaz et al., 2013; Klinger, 2009; Northoff et al., 2006). 
For instance, Green (1923) explicitly claimed that “*a+ll the daydreams are ego-centred. 
*…+  Each of the daydreams is like a little play, whose hero is the dreamer himself (pp. 
27-28). This clearly stresses that during SGT self-salient and self-central information is 
actively processed, thus implicating SGT in supporting self-identity and continuity across 
time (Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2011; Song & Wang, 2012). 
Second, a consistent literature shows that SGT is tightly linked to temporal projection. 
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Specifically, in healthy individuals future-related bias is most often reported (Smallwood 
et al., 2011; Song & Wang, 2012;  Stawarczyk, Cassol, D’Argembeau, 2013), although 
under specific circumstances both distant past-related bias or a-temporality have also 
been documented (Jackson, Weinstein, & Balota, 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). 
Third, high frequency of SGT seems to mostly lead to unhappiness and negative mood 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), although some authors raised both theoretical and 
empirical reservations against this point (Franklin et al., 2013; Klinger, 2013; Poerio, 
Totterdell, & Miles, 2013). 
In sum, SGT seems to be a pivotal mechanism, pervasively implicated in both 
mental functioning and well-being (Smallwood, 2013). Nevertheless, even highly 
adaptive mechanisms may sometimes support maladaptive functions, and SGT likely is 
no exception (Klinger, 1996, 2013). Considering its relation with identity, time, and 
emotions, SGT has been linked to major psychopatologies (Andrews-Hanna et al., in 
press; Klinger, 1996, 2009; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Among all the possible 
candidates, depression represents the ideal context where to investigate the 
pathogenic role of SGT, considering that depression has been robustly associated with 
self-debasing thinking (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), aberrant time 
perspective (Jaspers, 1997; Williams et al., 1996), and negative mood (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
 
Depression and Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression 
Major depression is a frequent and severe psychiatric condition characterized by 
negative mood, anhedonia, loss of energy, feelings of guilt or worthlessness, and 
suicidal thoughts (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This results in a high burden 
at personal level (i.e., personal suffering) and life-time prevalence of 15-30% (Kessler et 
al., 2003). Consequently, the negative effects of depression impacts society too, with 
huge costs being documented (Greenberg et al., 2003). For instance, in 2010 in Europe 
about 30 million individuals were estimated to be clinically depressed for a total cost of 
about 92 billion euro to society (Gustavsson et al., 2011). 
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Although effective short-term psychological and pharmacological treatments 
have been established (Gitlin, 2009; Hollon & Dimidjian, 2009), depression tends to 
recur. For instance, the risk of new episodes linearly increases with the number of 
previous episodes (Keller, 2003), so that, after multiple prior episodes of depression, 
even minor stressors can become triggers for new depressive episodes (Monroe & 
Harkness, 2005). This clearly suggests the existence of an underlying vulnerability 
unsuccessfully targeted by current treatments.  
Vulnerability can be considered a trait-like latent endogenous process (i.e., 
genetic, biological, and psychological) reactive to stress (Ingram & Siegle, 2009), that 
facilitates, enhances, and supports the pathogenic process. In depression context, of 
particular importance are the (neuro)cognitive vulnerability factors that have been 
robustly associated with both concurrent and future depressive symptoms (De Raedt 
& Koster, 2010), such as rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), cognitive 
reactivity (Teasdale, 1988), impaired attentional control (De Raedt & Koster, 2010), 
hopelessness (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), and low self-esteem (Ingram, 
1998).   
Although these vulnerability factors have mostly been investigated in relation to 
task performance, there are several reasons to hypothesize that resting state could be 
the ideal context to explore their impact on mental functioning and well-being. First, 
depressed individuals are characterized by lower behavioral activation (Mazzucchelli, 
Kane, & Rees, 2009), that is they spend a noticeable amount of time in idleness where 
there is ample opportunity to engage in SGT (Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 1966; 
Klinger, 2013). Second, clinical reports document that after (long) periods of inactivity 
depressed individuals usually report more negative mood and lower levels of mastery 
and pleasure (Martinsen, 2008). Third, the aforementioned cognitive vulnerability 
factors share many similarities with SGT. For instance, both rumination and low self-
esteem are based on self-focus and so is SGT; hopelessness is markedly characterized 
by an aberrantly negative prospection bias, whereas ruminative thought is more likely 
focused on the past; finally, like SGT, cognitive reactivity is particularly susceptible to 
mild stressors. 
   GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
17 
Notwithstanding these encouraging premises, so far no research has clearly 
addressed the plausible depressogenic role of rest, SGT, and its underlying neural 
substrate, that is DMN. With this thesis, we aim at filling this gap in the literature, by 
adopting a neurocognitive and neurophilosophical approach. 
 
Thesis Outline 
The main aim of this dissertation is to highlight the clinical implications of resting 
brain and SGT on mental health, with particular focus on depression. We will present a 
series of both empirical investigations and theoretical efforts that help clarify how and 
under what circumstances undirected thought and the neurobiological substrate 
contribute to depressive outcomes. In order to shed light on the underlying mechanism, 
we propose a process-based perspective focusing on the contribution of well-
established cognitive risk factors for depression, such as rumination, cognitive 
reactivity, etc. We below report the outline of the doctoral dissertation. 
Chapter 2 starts off reviewing the extant literature on rest-related large-scale 
brain networks, the most representative of which is the Default Mode Network (DMN). 
To do so, we will first describe the anatomical and functional features of the DMN as 
well as the most recent findings about its role in major depression. Then, we will 
propose a theoretical framework that could account for vulnerability to recurrent 
depression. Specifically, we suggest that alterations in the interplay between task 
positive (TP) and task negative (TN) elements of the Default Mode Network (DMN) act 
as a neurobiological risk factor for recurrent depression mediated by cognitive 
mechanisms, such as rumination, cognitive reactivity, and impaired attentional control.  
In Chapter 3, we present an empirical study about the relation between 
mindwandering (i.e., attentional disengagement from a task toward internally-
generated information) and negative thinking. By capitalizing on the theoretical 
perspective presented in chapter 2 and the extant literature associating mindwandering 
with negative mood, we explore whether the intensity of undirected thought could 
support depressogenic outcomes. Specifically, we hypothesize that mindwandering 
could lead to negative mood either by imposing a depressive thinking style or by 
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enhancing the accessibility of negative thoughts. To test these two hypotheses, we use 
a well-established task known be conducive to mindwandering (i.e., the Sustained 
Attention to Response Task, SART) with pseudo-random thoughts probes administered 
during the task itself, while the accessibility of negative thoughts is measured by means 
of the Scrambled Sentences Test (SST). 
In order to be able to capture even little variations of state rumination during 
our rest-related studies, we needed a psychometrically-sound measure for state 
rumination, which is lacking in the literature. The studies contained in Chapter 4 
address this lack. Indeed, we report a series of 5 studies describing the validation 
process of a 6-item self-report questionnaire, the Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus 
Inventory (MRSI). In study 1, 2, and 3, the factorial structure of the MRSI is tested by 
means of both the Exploratory Factorial Analysis and the Confirmatory Factorial 
Analysis. In study 4 and 5, concurrent and criterion validity are evaluated. 
  In Chapter 5, we test at the behavioral level some of the key predictions 
derived from the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. However, compared 
with the study reported in chapter 3, we here focus on pure rest, rather than 
mindwandering during an external task. In more detail, we predict that high levels of 
rest-related internal focus lead to depressive outcomes with the interplay of two 
specific cognitive risk factors, that is rumination and cognitive reactivity. To test this 
hypothesis, we have our participants undergo a validated task of resting state, during 
which pseudo-random thought probes on the intensity of both internal and external 
focus are administered pseudo-randomly. State levels of rumination are measured by 
means of the MRSI.  
Chapter 6 contains a questionnaire study that investigates the relation between 
the habitual tendency to engage in daydreaming and depressive symptoms. By 
capitalizing on the extant literature and the findings reported in chapter 5, we propose 
that daydreaming could account for concurrent levels of depressive symptoms via 
multiple serial mediation of self-focus and rumination. To test this hypothesis, we run a 
cross-sectional study where individual levels of daydreaming are hypothesized to 
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predict depression. A preliminary validation of the Dutch version of the Daydreaming 
Frequency Scale is also presented. 
Taking into account our own findings and the vast literature on SGT, in Chapter 7 
we elaborate a neurocognitive theoretical framework about the depressogenic role of 
daydreaming. We propose that daydreaming leads to both concurrent and future 
depression via interplay of several risk factors, such as rumination, hopelessness, low 
self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity. Concurrent additive effects with regard to 
mindfulness and stress are also presented. Specifically, we propose that in at-risk 
individuals daydreaming could magnify their susceptibility to depression and speed up a 
depressive upward spiral. Finally, some preliminary findings on the relation between 
daydreaming and mania are reported. 
Chapter 8 reports a new neurophilosophical model concerning how the 
representations of the “self” and the “other” interact with each other in supporting 
higher-order functions, such as self-consciousness. By relying on the intersubjective 
theory, as proposed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in 1807, we highlight how tightly 
the self-other dyad is represented in the brain at level of both the Default Mode 
Network and the Mirror Neuron System. Some theory-based hypotheses are derived 
and we present preliminary findings confirming the explanatory power of this new 
model.   
Finally, in Chapter 9 we end this dissertation by proposing an overview on the 
role of daydreaming in depression. Limitations, clinical implications, and future research 
are outlined. 
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The Default Mode Network and recurrent depression: 
A neurobiological model of cognitive risk factors1 
ABSTRACT 
A neurobiological account of cognitive vulnerability for recurrent depression is 
presented based on recent developments of resting state neural networks. We propose 
that alterations in the interplay between task positive (TP) and task negative (TN) 
elements of the Default Mode Network (DMN) act as a neurobiological risk factor for 
recurrent depression mediated by cognitive mechanisms. In the framework, depression 
is characterized by an imbalance between TN-TP components leading to an 
overpowering of TP by TN activity. The TN-TP imbalance is associated with a 
dysfunctional internally-focused cognitive style as well as a failure to attenuate TN 
activity in the transition from rest to task. Thus we propose the TN-TP imbalance as 
overarching neural mechanism involved in crucial cognitive risk factors for recurrent 
depression, namely rumination, impaired attentional control, and cognitive reactivity. 
During remission the TN-TP imbalance persists predisposing to vulnerability of recurrent 
depression. Empirical data to support this model is reviewed. Finally, we specify how 
this framework can guide future research efforts. 
 
                                                 
1
 Based on Marchetti, I., Koster, E. H. W., Sonuga-Barke, E. J., & De Raedt, R. (2012). The Default Mode 
Network and recurrent depression: A neurobiological model of cognitive risk factors. Neuropsychology 
Review, 22(3), 229-251. doi: 10.1007/s11065-012-9199-9.  
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Introduction 
Depression is a severe psychiatric illness that is associated with high levels of 
personal suffering and with substantial costs to society (Gustavsson et al., 2011). Major 
depression has a life-time prevalence of 15-30% (Kessler et al., 2003). Pharmacological 
and psychological interventions show efficacy in the short term. However, there is a 
pressing need for improved long term effectiveness of treatments. This is especially 
true with regard to the prevention of recurrence. Numerous studies indicate that 
remitted patients have a 70% risk of developing new depressive episodes. Moreover, 
the risk of new episodes increases as a function of the number of previous episodes 
(Keller, 2003). After multiple prior episodes of depression even minor stressors can 
become triggers for new depressive episodes (Monroe & Harkness, 2005).  
Understanding risk for recurrent depression in remitted patients is important for 
the development of its effective treatment. The neural correlates of depression are 
increasingly well understood (for reviews, see Davidson et al., 2002; Disner et al., 2011; 
Price & Drevets, 2012). For instance, imaging research has identified the neural circuitry 
involved in emotion-attention interactions as an important focus in the 
pathophysiology of depression. This has led to a conceptualization of depression as a 
failure to recruit top-down control (related to prefrontal regions – e.g., dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, DLPFC) to regulate limbic activity (e.g., amygdala; Davidson et al., 
2002; Mayberg, 1997; Ochsner et al., 2002; Phillips et al. 2003; Phan et al., 2004). A 
crucial structure in this circuitry is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) with the ventral 
ACC processing of emotion-related signals, and the dorsal ACC involved in response 
selection and conflict monitoring signals (Bush et al., 2000). ACC signals to DLPFC to 
alter the direction of attention or to modify the distribution of processing resources 
(Hopfinger et al., 2000). This can inhibit emotion processing in amygdala via 
connections with other frontal regions, such as orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Taylor & 
Fragopanagos, 2005).  
Depression-related disruptions in this circuitry are well established especially 
during tasks involving emotion processing. These neural disruptions correspond to 
specific information-processing characteristics observed in depression (Disner et al., 
2011; De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Depressed individuals are unable to swiftly reallocate 
attention away from negative to positive or task-relevant information (Koster et al., 
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2005; Leyman et al, 2007). Depression-related failures to exercise cognitive control in 
the face of stressful information appear to enhance the tendency towards rumination 
(Koster et al., 2011). A recent fMRI study found that difficulty disengaging attention 
from negative information is related to depressive brooding, and that brooding was 
correlated with DLPFC activity (Vanderhasselt et al., 2011). Moreover, ACC related 
cognitive impairments were found to increase linearly with the number of prior 
depressive episodes illustrating that such effects persist even after remission of 
depression (Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2009). Thus, deficient cognitive control is 
considered an important vulnerability factor for recurrent depressive episodes (for a 
review, see De Raedt & Koster, 2010), a view supported by recent findings that such 
deficits predicts recurrence of symptoms in a sample of patients in remission (Demeyer, 
De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012).   
Alongside this focus on the “task-related” disruption on fronto-limbic circuits 
there is a growing interest in disruptions in “task-independent” resting state neural 
networks in the pathophysiology of depression (Hamilton, Furman, & Gotlib, 2011). In 
the current article we develop a framework of Default Mode Network (DMN) 
dysregulation as a neural substrate of depression. Central to our model is the notion 
that DMN is a system comprised of two tightly locked but anti-correlated 
subcomponents namely the Task Negative (TN) and Task Positive (TP) circuits (Fox et 
al., 2005). DMN dysregulation has been implicated in a range of psychiatric disorders 
(Broyd et al., 2009), such as, for instance, depression and schizophrenia (e.g. Bar, 
2009b; Northoff & Qin, 2011; Northoff et al., 2011; Pizzagalli, 2011; Whitfield-Gabrieli & 
Ford, 2012). Our hypothesis is that dysfunction in the TP and TN components can result 
in an imbalance in the default mode system as a whole leading to deficits in the 
psychological functions subserved by the DMN. These aberrant psychological functions 
are thus thought to embody cognitive deficits that have been specifically linked to 
depression such as rumination and poor attentional control. In particular, we argue that 
DMN dysregulation, mediated by key aspects of depression-related cognitive 
impairment, underpins neurobiological risk for recurrent depression (Figure 1). 
Specifically, we propose that an imbalance between TP and TN circuits in the DMN 
system drives the three well-established components of cognitive vulnerability for 
recurrent depression: (1) rumination, (2) impaired attentional control, and (3) cognitive 
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reactivity. These risk phenomena have been studied and conceptualized independently 
of each other in the past, while here we propose DMN system dysregulation as a 
common underlying mechanism to explain them.  
 
Figure 1.  Theoretical framework – Default Mode Network and cognitive risk factors 
 
The aim of this paper therefore is to explain cognitive and neural processes 
underpinning risk for recurrent depression in terms of our emerging knowledge of the 
resting brain. First, we will describe current understanding of the DMN, its neural 
correlates, and functional significance. Second, the state of art concerning the role of 
the DMN in major depression will be presented, shedding light on specific 
neuropsychological features. Third, we will argue that the TN and TP components of the 
DMN system are core neural hubs underpinning the main cognitive risk factors for 
recurrent depression. We will describe the available data supporting this proposition. 
Finally, future directions for research are described, based upon our new framework 
that allows more specific predictions of the interplay between the TN, the TP and 
cognitive risk factors to be tested. In this way the current paper builds upon previous 
views on DMN in depression (Bar, 2009b; Northoff et al., 2011) and recurrent 
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depression (De Raedt & Koster, 2010) to establish an integrative understanding of 
neural and cognitive risk factors for recurrent depression.  
 
The Default Mode Network (DMN) as system of coordinated “Task-Positive” 
and “Task-Negative” components 
The resting brain exhibits spontaneous patterns of self-organization framed in 
terms of multiple long range neural networks characterized by task independent 
patterns of temporally coherent neural activity (Beckmann et al., 2005; Damoiseaux, et 
al., 2006; De Luca et al., 2006; Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). Perhaps the 
most robust regions considered part of this resting network consists of a series of 
primarily midline regions including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the most 
rostral parts of the anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), the precuneus, the posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), and the retrosplenial cortex (Rsp) along with more lateralized 
regions of the parietal cortex (Raichle & Snyder, 2007) as well as mediolateral temporal 
cortex (MLTC) and hippocampal formation (Buckner et al., 2008) (Figure 2). This 
network shows enhanced functional coherence during rest which parametrically 
attenuates in an event-related fashion during cognitive tasks (McKiernan et al., 2003; 
Singh & Fawcett, 2008). Originally, characterized as underpinning a default mode of 
brain activity, the circuitry in this network has been proposed to subserve internal 
attention (Fox et al., 2005), during which internally-generated information dominates 
and exogenous stimulation is processed only to a limited extent (Chun et al., 2011). It 
has also been linked to other psychological functions, characterized by predominant 
internally-oriented attention. Mindwandering, for instance, is defined as naturally 
occurring mental activity which spontaneously and automatically arises when an 
individual is not engaged in an attention demanding task (Gruberger et al., 2011). 
Mason et al. (2007) manipulated proficiency on a working memory task during 
rehearsal and a novel task. They found a strong positive correlation between  degree of 
mindwandering and BOLD signal changes in the MPFC, PCC, precuneus, superior frontal 
gyrus, rACC, and middle and superior temporal gyrus (see also Christoff et al., 2009). 
Self-related processing is the evaluation of information in relation to an individual’s own 
mental concept of themselves (Christoff et al., 2011). Studies have found  increased 
activity in the MPFC and PCC during self-related processing tasks compared to rest 
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(Fossati et al., 2003; Gusnard et al., 2001; Mitchell et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, empirical data show that different self-related sub-processes involve 
specific brain components. While the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) plays a 
role in identifying stimuli as self-salient (Gusnard et al., 2001; Schmitz and Johnson, 
2007), the PCC, the lateral parietal cortex, and the hippocampal formation are 
considered important for the processing of autobiographical and past self-relevant 
stimuli (Cavanna, 2007). Other neuropsychological functions are also associated with 
activity within these regions, such as autobiographical memory (Addis et al., 2007), 
theory of mind, (Mitchell et al., 2005) and future prospection (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2010; Sonuga-Barke & Fairchild, 2012).  
 
Figure 2.  Spatial distribution of BOLD signal fluctuations at rest, representing major 
areas of the anticorrelated task negative (TN; green-blue) and task positive (TP; yellow-
orange) networks.  MPFC: medioprefrontal cortex; PCC: posterior cingulate cortex; 
MLTC: mediolateral temporal cortex; LPC: lateral parietal cortex; DLPFC: dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex; FEF: frontal eye fields; IPC: inferior parietal cortex; SMAs: 
supplementary motor areas. Reproduced and adjusted with permission from Fox et al. 
(2005) (permissions by Dr. Michael D. Fox and PNAS, copyright 2005, National Academy 
of Sciences, U.S.A.) 
 
Other influential theories have tried to capture the psychological functions of 
the DMN. The Internal Mentation Hypothesis (Buckner et al, 2008) postulates that the 
sorts of mental activities subserved by this resting network (e.g. MPFC, rACC, the 
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precuneus, PCC, Rsp, LPC MLTC, and hippocampal formation) involve the ability to 
project oneself somewhere in time (i.e., past or future) or space (i.e., theory of mind). 
Interestingly, some memory-related brain regions (e.g. MTLC and hippocampus) also 
play an important role in facilitating mental simulation (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). 
Moreover, MTLC, by binding past-related information and providing building blocks for 
future scenarios (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007), subserves the ability to project oneself in 
the future (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), while hippocampus and frontoparietal 
midlines are activated during tasks involving autobiographical memory and future 
prospection (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). Alternatively, Bar et al. (2007) have argued 
that the regions within this network play a key role in associative conditioning which in 
turn is crucial as basic “units of thought”, given their intrinsic nature to connect multiple 
strands of information. Bar et al. define such associations as multimodal links between 
perceptual, conceptual, and emotional representations (e.g. schemata) which are 
formed by a lifetime of extracting repeating patterns and statistical regularities from 
experience. Several studies (Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Bar, 2004; Aminoff et al., 2007) have 
shown that attending to highly inter-associated objects activates the medioparietal 
cortex, MTLC, and MPFC. It is noteworthy that from a theoretical standpoint these 
associative links rely on memory processes, a fact supported also by the contribution of 
the MTLC. Recently, Bar (2009a) suggested that associative conditioning goes beyond 
the simple stimulus-stimulus link – rather it may also be seen as a “mindset” which 
shapes behavior even at the level of sophisticated psychological functions, such as 
motivations and expectations. A mindset is indeed regarded as a “list of needs, goals, 
desires, predictions, context-sensitive conventions and attitudes” (Bar, 2009a, pag. 
1239), that form a specific set of salient memories, attitudes and predictions interacting 
with environmental stimuli. Crucially, in this model the response to stimuli (either 
internal or external) is almost entirely dependent on the specific kind of mindset 
operating (mindset-stimulus interaction specificity).  
Because there is some evidence that internally-oriented attention associated 
with this circuitry in some ways impairs efficient performance on most tasks requiring 
substantial controlled processing (Barron et al., 2011; Braboszcz & Delorme, 2011; 
MacLean et al., 2009; for  a review see Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) and because 
failures to attenuate neural activity in this system have been shown to be linked to 
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attentional lapses (Christoff et al., 2009, Weissman et al., 2006), it has been 
characterized as a task negative (TN) component. Such network is tightly coordinated 
with a second resting brain network (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000, Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002), which shows similar patterns of low frequency (~0.01 - 0.08 Hz) functional 
connectivity (Fox et al., 2005). This second component of the default mode resting 
network consists of regions, such as the DLPFC, the inferior parietal cortex (IPC), the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), frontal eye fields, and extrastriate cortex (Fox et al., 
2005; Fransson, 2006; Figure 2), which are routinely activated during attention 
demanding, goal-directed task performance (Dosenbach et al., 2006; Duncan & Owen, 
2000). For this reason it has been termed the task positive component. During rest the 
TP has been claimed to subserve intermittent “external awareness”, defined as the 
conscious perception through different sensory modalities of one`s surrounding 
environment (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011).  
Crucially, TN and TP activity is thought to be anti-correlated both in rest and task 
periods (Figure 3). Given such tightly anti-correlated and coordinated patterns of neural 
activity, and the complementary nature of the associated psychological functions, the 
TP and TN have been conceptualized as two components of one system regulating 
activity within the brain’s default state (Broyd et al., 2009; Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 
2007). It has indeed been suggested that normal activity during rest within this system 
involves the “toggling” between TN and TP activity (Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005, 
2006). While the TN and TP show a putative antagonism of function, at the 
psychological level this TN-TP interplay has been reframed in terms of a coordinated 
ongoing switching between internally- vs. externally-oriented attention (Fransson, 
2005, 2006; Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007). In a recent study, healthy participants 
were required to simultaneously rate the intensity of their internally- and externally-
oriented attention during rest (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). Consistent with previous 
results, internal and external awareness was found to be anti-correlated (Spearman`s 
rho = -.44), and stronger internal awareness correlated with increased activity in the TN 
regions, such as MPFC, ACC, PCC, precuneus, and parahippocampal cortices, while 
external awareness correlated with TP structures, such as the DLPFC and the IPC. 
Sridharan et al. (2008) identified the right fronto-insular cortex (rFIC), consisting of the 
right VLPFC and the right insula, as a key region in the control of TP-TN interplay – with 
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activation preceding the switch between TN and TP activity (so called salience network; 
Seeley et al., 2007). Moreover, a similar analysis revealed that the TN component exerts 
more influence than the TP in this process (Uddin et al., 2009). In sum, this antithetical 
relation between TN and TP has been proposed by many to constitute a core element 
of  DMN function (Broyd et al., 2009; Fox et al., 2005; Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 
2007).  
 
Figure 3. Intrinsic anticorrelation between task negative (TN) and task positive (TP) 
networks in the brain of a single subject during resting state. Posterior cingulate 
cortex/Precuneus (PCC; yellow) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC, orange) are set as 
TN seed regions, while intraparietal sulcus (IPS; blue) as TP seed region. Both 
correlations (positive values) and anticorrelations (negative values) are shown for single 
run and thresholded at r = 0.3. Reproduced with permission from Fox et al. (2005) 
(permissions by Dr. Michael D. Fox and PNAS, copyright 2005, National Academy of 
Sciences, U.S.A.) 
 
However, the TN-TP anti-correlation is still under debate (Cole at el., 2010; Van 
Dijk et al., 2010). It has been argued that regressing out the mean global signal, a pre-
processing procedure performed to control for unwanted variation in the BOLD signal, 
may artificially introduce spurious anti-correlations between time series (Murphy et al., 
2009). Although previous studies have not reached a consistent conclusion on this issue 
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(Chang & Glover, 2009; Fox et al., 2009; Weissenbacher et al., 2009), improved 
analytical approaches have been recently proposed, such as regressing out time-locked 
cardiac and respiratory artifacts (RETROICOR; Glover et al., 2000) or controlling for non-
neuronal sources of noise (CompCor; Behzadi et al., 2007). Adopting these procedures 
does not extinguish the TN-TP anticorrelation (Chai et al., 2012; Chang & Glover, 2009) 
Function-wise, there are a number of hypotheses concerning the purpose of TN-
TP switching during rest. One suggestion is that dominant internally-focused attention, 
supported by the TN connectivity, is interleaved by periodic and intermittent phases of 
TP increased connectivity, which reflects a general state of vigilance, by which the 
environment is scanned for novel and unexpected stimuli, to increase preparedness 
implicated in response selection, and planning of actions (Fransson, 2005, 2006). The 
possible function of the TP in mitigating the internally-oriented attention is allowing 
external information to be processed more effectively. This would provide a clear 
evolutionary advantage in terms of survival and adaptation to the environment, 
enhancing the likelihood to detect threatening stimuli (Broyd et al., 2009). Alternatively, 
during rest the TN connectivity may reflect the internal generation of different 
predictions and mental simulations about external events, both of which are TN-related 
functions (Bar, 2009a; Buckner et al., 2008). Therefore, during this ongoing internal 
mentation, the TP may allow people to constantly update self-relevant information 
processing, so that individuals can anticipate short and long term outcomes through 
different predictions and simulations (Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007).  
The balance between TP and TN may be disturbed in a number of ways in both 
normal and clinical populations. During rest, one DMN component can temporally 
dominate over the other, leading to an imbalance in related psychological functions. 
Alternatively, TN and TP may become desynchronized so that these two orientations 
enter into a competitive rather than a complementary relationship, or, on the contrary, 
they may show an excessive anti-correlation, resulting in an aberrant antagonism. 
There may be a failure to attenuate sufficiently during the transition to task 
performance in one component compared to another so residual activity within either 
the TP or the TN interferes with task performance and attention. All of these forms of 
disruption are likely to have profound implications for mental functioning and personal 
well-being. Indeed several abnormalities in TN-TP interplay at the level of functional 
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connectivity have been reported to impact on both mental health and behavioral 
performance.  
An exaggerated anti-correlation between the TN and the TP was reported in 
several severe (psycho)pathologies, such as schizophrenia (Zhou et al., 2007) and 
depression (Zhou et al., 2010), whereas a reduced and blurred anti-correlation was 
reported in autism (Kennedy & Courchesne, 2008) and in healthy individuals showing 
less consistent behavioral performance (Kelly et al., 2008, Hampson, et al., 2010). These 
data speak in favor of the existence of an optimal degree of anti-correlation between 
the two networks, above and below which detrimental effects can be observed. Thus, 
the nature of the antithetical relation between the TN and the TP should be considered 
when explaining how resting state activity influences mental health and 
psychopathology.  
More recently, a new approach investigating the imbalance between the TN and 
the TP has been proposed to take into account the temporal perspective, defined as 
“dominance” of one network over the other one (Hamilton et al., 2011a). For instance, 
TN-dominance over the TP is operationalized as the time points where the TN BOLD 
signal is greater than the TP BOLD signal. The increased duration of  TN-dominance over 
the TP is thought to reflect elevated levels of TN functions. This approach, which has 
the clear advantage of not needing to take into account the strength of the anti-
correlation but only the ongoing temporal pattern of the DMN components, provides a 
new and promising index. This index might capture individual differences in thinking 
styles such a rumination, a crucial factor in depression (Berman & Jonides, 2011; 
Hamilton et al., 2011a).  
Finally, rest-to-task transition appears to be important for both the DMN components 
(Northoff et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 2011) and disrupted attenuation or impaired 
activation of DMN system activity should be carefully considered to explain cognitive 
impairment. Previous models have focused on the failure to attenuate spontaneous TN 
neural processes during active task performance as a cause of attentional lapses and 
related cognitive deficits (Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007). A key idea in our model is 
that DMN abnormalities during rest-to-task transitions relating to both TN and TP can 
undermine mental and brain activity in a way that has implications for depression-
related cognitive risks, so that two aberrant non-mutually
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 Figure 4. Rest-to-Task transition in never-depressed and depressed individuals 
exclusive profiles may be proposed (Figure 4). The first relates to a failure to deactivate 
TN when an individual begins to engage in a goal-oriented task and continues to show 
an inappropriate level of spontaneous and intrusive internally-oriented TN activation. 
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We term this TN-persistence. The second relates to a failure to fully engage TP regions 
during rest-to-task transition so that the attention to task-relevant stimuli is reduced. 
This is called TP-deficiency. Interestingly, both TN-persistence and TP-deficiency have 
been reported in mental disorders (Grimm et al., 2009; Hooley et al., 2005; 
Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008; Sheline et al., 2009) as well as in some conditions in 
healthy participants (Polli et al., 2005; Weissman et al., 2006).  
Within our framework we propose specific links between DMN aberrations at 
the level of TN and TP functioning in relation to cognitive risk factors, known to be of 
crucial importance for recurrent depression. We first turn to research on the DMN in 
depression. 
 
The Default Mode Network (DMN) in depression 
Altered functional connectivity and temporal sequencing during rest 
Studies have reported a hyper-connectivity of TN brain regions in depression 
during rest (e.g. Berman et al., 2011, Zhou et al., 2010). Greicius et al. (2007) were the 
first to report increased functional connectivity of the subgenual cingulate cortex 
(SubG), the thalamus, the OFC, and the precuneus in depressed individuals. In particular 
connectivity of the SubG with other TN areas distinguished depressed from healthy 
participants (Cohen`s d = 1.01) and was positively correlated with depression 
refractoriness, as measured by the length in weeks of the current episode. The SubG 
was also functionally connected with thalamus during rest, which led the authors to 
conclude that “*…+ in depressed subjects, activity in medial thalamus is excessively 
coupled to activity in the ‘affective’ subgenual cingulate, at the cost of reduced 
connectivity to the ‘cognitive’ dorsal anterior cingulate” (Greicius et al., 2007; pp 435). 
Consistent with this, non-refractory depression was associated with reduced fronto-
limbic connectivity - a finding congruent with reduced inhibitory control (of the PFC) 
over the limbic system activity seen in depression (Dannlowski et al., 2009). Moreover, 
refractory depression has been related to diminished thalamo-frontal connectivity (Lui 
et al., 2011). These results suggest a possible differential role of the thalamus in the 
various resting state functional connectivity profiles among depression-related 
subtypes. This latter finding provides an initial justification to consider the specificity of 
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TN activity in recurrent vs. non refractory depression. Note that the findings relating to 
this are not fully consistent as Bluhm et al., (2009) reported increased connectivity 
between the PCC/precuneus and caudate nucleus in healthy controls, whereas 
medication-free depressed individuals did not show enhancement of connectivity in the 
areas reported by Greicius et al. (2007). These authors suggested that, given the role of 
the caudate nucleus in reward processing (Yacubian et al., 2006), this connectivity 
pattern may be related to anhedonia in depression. While these inconsistent results 
may simply be due to the use of different methods of analysis (Hasler & Northoff, 
2011), they could also be linked to different stages of the depressive illness (e.g. 
strengthened vs. decoupled links between emotion, cognition and bodily sensations), 
whereby early (or first onset) and recurrent (or chronically) depressed individuals may 
show different connectivity patterns. This latter idea is in line with our proposal to 
investigate the specificity of the DMN components after remission, to focus on “scars” 
of former episodes. Indeed it has been proposed that neurobiological abnormalities in 
depression increase with each new episode, thereby increasing individual vulnerability 
(for a review, see De Raedt & Koster, 2010).  
Recently, the specific temporal order of activation in DMN related regions in 
depression has been investigated using Granger Causality Analysis (Hamilton at al., 
2010). Increased activity in the hippocampus predicted subsequent activation of the 
SubG, which in turn showed a reciprocal augmentation with the MPFC. Additionally, 
SubG activity seemed to inhibit the dorsal medioprefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the PCC 
and the DLPFC. Interestingly, increased hippocampal activation also preceded reduced 
activation of the DLPFC - suggesting that hippocampus hyperactivity may contribute in 
important ways to resting state abnormalities in depression. Other recent connectivity 
data also supports the idea that the hippocampus plays an important role in depression. 
For instance, increased hippocampus functional connectivity with thalamus, frontal and 
posterior cingulate regions has been reported in an elderly depressed population 
(Goveas et al., 2011). Therefore, even though the hippocampus was not consistently 
detected as part of the TN in earlier studies, this area and its functions, such as 
contextual memory retrieval, are increasingly considered important. This region seems 
to contribute to TN functional connectivity both in healthy and depressed subjects 
(Buckner, 2010; Hamilton et al., 2010; Perry et al., 2011).  
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An important question about aberrant DMN is the extent to which increased 
functional connectivity could be due to well-known anatomical abnormalities in 
depression (e.g. Davidson et al., 2002). Although functional and structural connectivity 
(i.e. Diffusion Tensor Imaging, DTI) can be highly overlapping, nevertheless they do not 
map onto each other one-to-one in healthy subjects (Greicius et al., 2009). A recent 
review indeed indicates that strong functional connectivity can be present even among 
anatomically unrelated structures (Honey et al., 2010). Unfortunately no studies have 
investigated this issue in depressed patients thus far, but it has been proposed that the 
divergence between structural and functional connectivity might be strong in mood 
disorders, perhaps mediated by neurochemical imbalance (Hasler & Northoff, 2011). 
This provides an interesting area of research, since functional connectivity research in 
depression could capture specific pathological features above and beyond existing 
anatomical models (e.g. Price & Drevets, 2012). 
 
DMN rest-to-task transition in depression: TN-persistence vs. TP-deficiency. 
 Given the partial overlap between DMN regions and emotion regulation 
structures (e.g. Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004), recent studies have 
investigated how these regions respond to emotional stimuli in depression, and 
specifically whether rest-to-task transition in emotional contexts is affected by TN-
persistence and TP-deficiency (Figure 4).  
Several recent studies report failures of depressed individuals to deactivate TN 
regions during task engagement (Grimm et al., 2009; Sheline et al., 2009). Grimm et al. 
(2009) reported reduced rest-to-task attenuation of the rACC, VMPFC, and dorsal PCC 
activity to the presentation of emotional pictures by participants with major depression 
compared with healthy participants. Amongst the depressed individuals reduced 
deactivation in VMPFC was highly correlated with feelings of hopelessness, whereas 
reduced deactivation in the dorsal PCC was correlated with depressive symptoms. In 
another study, depressed participants failed to show a reduction of BOLD signal in the 
rACC, VMPFC, lateral temporal cortex (LTC), and lateral parietal cortex (LPC) during both 
passive viewing and active reappraisal of emotional stimuli (Sheline et al., 2009). 
Depressed individuals also displayed greater activation in response to negative 
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compared with neutral pictures in left parahippocampus, right hippocampus, and left 
amygdala during a passive viewing task suggesting that both automatic and effortful 
processing of emotional stimuli is influenced by aberrant TN-persistence. 
Important for our framework, currently depressed patients show TP-deficiency 
during rest-to-affective task transition, underlining that not only is TN less effectively 
suppressed, but also that TP brain regions are less efficiently activated in depression. 
Despite a lack of activation studies which take into account the whole TP network, 
several studies report that a key TP region, that is the DLPFC, shows deficient activation 
patterns during rest-to-affective task transitions (Fales et al., 2008, 2009; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008; Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008; Siegle et al., 2007). Depressed 
individuals exhibited less recruitment of the DPLFC compared with healthy individuals in 
a modified emotional Stroop task (Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008). Depressed patients 
also show less right DLPFC recruitment when required to ignore negative stimuli in an 
attentional interference task with emotional material (Fales et al., 2008). Moreover, 
increasing brain activity by multiple sessions of repetitive Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (rTMS) over the left DLPFC normalized the inhibition of negative emotional 
stimuli in treatment resistant depressed patients, which was correlated with a decrease 
in depressive symptoms (Leyman et al., 2011). These results are indicative of difficulties 
that depressed patients have in activating TP components so as to appropriately 
execute cognitive control during affective tasks.   
A recent meta-analysis reported the effects of pharmacotherapy (e.g. mainly 
SSRIs) on emotion processing in major depression, supporting abnormal rest-to-
affective task transition as specific feature of depression and, in turn, a target for 
therapeutic interventions (Delaveau et al., 2011). Several findings are in line with the 
hypothesis that pharmacological treatments effectively targeted both TN-persistence 
and TP-deficiency: after several weeks of treatment depressed participants displayed 
reduced activation in SubG, dorsal PCC, and precuneus and increased activation in 
DLPFC and VLPFC during emotional tasks. An interesting hypothesis to pursue is that 
antidepressant medication may work by rebalancing TN and TP during rest-to-task 
transitions. 
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Altered TN-TP anti-correlation in depression 
 Zhou et al. (2010) detected an increased degree of anti-correlation between TN 
and TP in depression using both the PCC/precuneus (TN) and the right DLPFC (TP) as 
seed regions. This was interpreted as an exaggerated antagonism between these two 
components, which, the authors argued, may be involved in biased processing of 
information in depression. For instance, during spontaneous low frequency oscillations, 
the TP, comprising areas which are known to subserve attention and emotion 
regulation (e.g. bilateral DLPFC and IPL), might represent active attempts to regulate 
emotions and deploy attention even without current external stimulation. On the other 
hand, the fluctuations of the TN (e.g. MPFC, SubG, and PCC/precuneus) may be the 
neurobiological underpinning of enhanced memory for negative emotional experiences 
and increased maladaptive self-focus. While the optimal attunement between TN and 
TP is thought to reflect efficient intrinsic brain organization (Fox et al., 2005), such an 
exaggerated TN-TP antagonism might reduce the integration between different strands 
of information (e.g. “internal” vs. “external”), potentially resulting in attention and 
memory biases. Recently, a study demonstrated a differential role of the rFIC in 
switching activation between the TN and TP connectivity in depression (Hamilton et al., 
2011a). That is, during the ongoing anti-correlated TN-TP fluctuations in rest, an 
increased activity of the rFIC was detected when TN showed a peak in activation while 
the opposite pattern was found in healthy participants, who showed increased activity 
of the rFIC when TP activity peaked. The authors suggested that the rFIC plays an 
affective regulatory function, so that when the negative state subserved by the TN in 
depression reaches its peak, the rFIC induces an increased activation in the TP to 
counterbalance this undesired state.  
 
Blurred boundaries among neural networks during rest: the “Dorsal Nexus”  
So far, we have delineated specific DMN dysfunctions which occur during rest or 
in transition to task. Nevertheless, a broader perspective could be fruitful in shedding 
light on how the TN and TP activity are related to each other and to other neural 
networks. Recently, Epstein et al. (2011) demonstrated that when exposed to 
emotional material healthy people show a clear segregation between the TN (e.g. 
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PCC/Precuneus and MPFC) and emotional processing networks (e.g. insula, amygdala, 
and ventral striatum). In contrast, in depressed patients these networks are not clearly 
disentangled but partially overlapping. These results are in line with another study 
showing that in depression the TN leads the organization of the whole brain during rest, 
resulting in a perturbation of other neural networks (Zhang et al., 2011). Such 
problematic failures to clearly segregate networks in depression appear to occur not 
only interneurally, but also intraneurally within the DMN components. In fact, the TN-
TP imbalance in depression may also take the form of an abnormal overlap between TN 
and TP as this could undermine the attunement between the two resting networks. 
Sheline et al. (2010) compared connectivity maps of three different resting state 
networks in depressed and healthy participants. The three networks were the TN 
(precuneus seed), the TP (DLPFC seed), and the affective network (SubG seed). DMPFC, 
defined by the authors as the “dorsal nexus” to stress the hub role played by this 
region, was the sole region which distinguished depressed from never depressed 
participants and was found to be part of all three networks. Moreover, this area was 
functionally connected with brain regions shown to be crucial in depressive 
pathophysiology (e.g., DLPFC, VMPFC, superior DMPFC, rACC, PCC, and precuneus). 
DMPFC activation was also highly correlated with depressive symptoms. DMPFC 
dysregulation was hypothesized to be the key driver of depression-related impairments, 
such as attentional problems, increased autonomic responding, and enhanced negative 
self-focus. The crucial role of this hub area is confirmed by a recent study which shows 
that SSRIs target the DMPFC by reducing its connectivity to the hippocampus during 
rest (McCabe et al., 2011). 
 
The DMN as a depression vulnerability marker in at-risk subjects 
Even though research has mainly investigated the role of the DMN in currently 
depressed patients, some preliminary pieces of evidence suggest that dysfunctions at 
level of default brain could precede the clinical episode. One approach is to examine 
close biological relatives, such as non-affected offspring of depressed parents, as 
depression in parents is associated with a higher risk of major depression in the 
offspring (Hammen, Burge, & Adrian, 1991). Norbury, Mannie, and Cowen (2011) report 
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that people who have never personally suffered from major depression but have a 
biological parent with a history of depression show increased TN functional connectivity 
during rest (e.g. DMPFC and middle temporal gyrus) compared with offspring of non-
depressed parents. Beyond the TN hyperconnectivity, other evidence supports the 
presence of DMN dysfunctions among vulnerable individuals. Confirming the heuristic 
utility of what we termed as rest-to-affective task transition, Di Simplicio, Norbury, and 
Harmer (2011) reported the efficacy of SSRIs in normalizing such transition in at-risk 
subjects. The researchers administered either placebo or citalopram (i.e. SSRI) for 7 
days to people with high levels of neuroticism, a personality trait reported to strongly 
predict the onset of major depression (Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & Pedersen, 2006). 
Afterwards, both groups underwent an experiment requiring subjects to classify 
negative and positive self-descriptors. The analyses revealed that, compared with 
placebo, citalopram administration significantly decreased activation of the VMPFC and 
rACC in response to negative self-referred stimuli. This confirms the presence in at-risk 
subjects of TN-persistence which can be ameliorated by SSRI medication, as reported in 
currently depressed individuals (Delaveau et al., 2011).  
Although more research is recommended, some speculation on DMN in relation 
to the course of depression is warranted. First, it seems that at-risk individuals could 
show similar DMN aberrations but to a milder degree, both in rest period and in rest-to-
task transition phase. Such a notion has been supported in the context of 
schizophrenia, another clinical syndrome which demonstrates notable genetic influence 
and inheritability (for a review, Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). For instance, 
unaffected siblings of schizophrenic patients show TN hyperconnectivity during rest to a 
lesser extent than a clinical group, but still greater than healthy controls. Moreover, TP 
connectivity clearly differentiates clinically affected from unaffected siblings (Liu et al., 
2012). These results suggest that it is also possible in depression that at-risk individuals 
may be characterized by a neurobiological profile that partially mirrors aberrations 
observed in clinical depression. Second, such research in at-risk populations suggests 
that DMN dysfunctions might predict future clinical episodes. In other words, the 
aberrations within the DMN might precede the onset of major depression. However, it 
is still a matter of debate by what mechanism the transition from non-symptomatic 
phases to the first depressive episode occurs. In this context, both theoretical models 
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and empirical research (i.e. longitudinal studies) are needed (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 
2012). Third, given the specific cognitive signature of recurrent depression (marked 
attentional problems, high levels of rumination, and cognitive reactivity), we argue that 
DMN aberrations, likely present to a milder extent even before the first clinical episode, 
become more pronounced with increasing episodes and are associated with recurrence 
in remitted depressed samples. This proposal is described in detail in the next sections. 
 
The DMN in depression: Theoretical advances 
Several recent attempts have been made to relate different facets of depressive 
phenomenology to DMN (Hasler & Northoff, 2011; Pizzagalli, 2011). Among others, 
Northoff et al. (2011) proposed a DMN system theory of depression, focusing on 
underlying mechanisms of symptoms. They proposed neural hyperactivity during rest as 
one of the endophenotypes for unipolar mood disorder. In this model aberrant resting 
brain performance is thus seen as a ‘neural predisposition’ or susceptibility marker with 
abnormal rest-stimulus transitions as the final cause of depression. They propose that 
specific subcortico-cortical systems play distinct roles in the depressive 
phenomenology. For instance, the rest-related hyperactivity of the rACC, VMPFC, 
DMPFC, amygdala, and hippocampus is hypothesized to be responsible for sustained 
negative mood, while decreased TN performance during rest-to-task transition could 
account for the abnormally high levels of sadness (e.g. Sheline et al., 2009). The deviant 
perception of subjective time in depressed individuals would be due to an increased 
rest-related activity of VMPFC, DMPFC, and rACC, whereas hopelessness, which appears 
closely related to prospection abilities, is linked to reduced rest-stimulus interaction 
(e.g. Grimm et al., 2009). Finally, the rest-related hyperactivity of rACC, VMPFC, DMPFC, 
peri-aqueductal gray, and the dorsomedial thalamus could be responsible for 
depressive self-focus and rumination (e.g. Berman et al., 2011; Greicius et al., 2007). 
It is noteworthy that, despite the increasing efforts to highlight the role of the 
DMN in depression, the issue of remitted depression is virtually uncovered in literature. 
Unfortunately, the absence of a theoretical roadmap has so far impeded a systematic 
and fruitful investigation of the links between DMN and recurrent depression.    
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The DMN in depression: Summary 
 A number of depression-related DMN abnormalities have been reported both 
during rest and rest-to-task transition. These include (i) increased TN functional 
connectivity during rest between the MPFC, the PCC, and the SubG (Berman et al., 
2011; Greicius et al., 2007, Zhang et al., 2011) with a promising role for areas not 
universally reported to be part of the TN, such as the hippocampus (Goveas et al., 2011, 
Zhang et al., 2011) and the thalamus (Lui et al., 2011); (ii) evidence of both TN-
persistence (Grimm et al., 2009; Sheline et al., 2009) and TP-deficiency 
(Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008; Leyman et al., 2011) following rest-to-affective task 
transitions with these effects leading to poor attentional control during task involving 
emotional material. Importantly, these problems with transition from rest seemed to be 
ameliorated by pharmacotherapy (Delaveau et al., 2011); (iii) an increased level of TN-
TP anti-correlation during rest (Zhou et al., 2010); (iv) an altered pattern of TN-to-TP 
switching with the brain regions thought to drive switching (e.g. rFIC) functioning 
differently in depressed compared with healthy subjects (Hamilton et al., 2010); (v) less 
segregation between TP, TN and other resting state networks (Epstein et al., 2011; 
Zhang et al., 2011) and a strong role for the DMPFC across these networks in depression 
(Sheline et al., 2010); (vi) at-risk individuals seem to show a depression-like DMN 
pattern (Di Simplicio et al., 2011; Norbury et al., 2011). Recently, several theoretical 
models try to account for different aspects of current depression in relation to DMN 
(Hasler & Northoff, 2011; Northoff et al., 2011; Pizzagalli, 2011). 
 
Cognitive Risk for Recurrent Depression and the DMN 
 In this section we focus specifically on recurrence of depression in remitted 
patients, reviewing the literature on cognitive vulnerability factors and describing how 
default mode dysregulation can provide a unifying explanation of these deficits 
(Figure.1). As we have described, major depression is characterized by DMN 
abnormalities. Our model of recurrence is built on the idea that remitted depressed 
individuals, especially after a history with several depressive episodes, still show most 
of the DMN aberrations, albeit probably to a lesser extent than in the acute symptom 
phase. In this sense, the DMN disruptions can be defined as a “depressive scar” 
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(Lewinsohn et al., 1981) and as such are predicted to be influenced by the number and 
duration of previous depressive episodes (Wichers et al., 2010). Crucially, we suggest 
that this neurobiological scar is manifest primarily in terms of dysregulation in the 
pattern of synchronized switching between internally- and externally-oriented attention 
which marks the normal interplay between TN and TP components of the DMN system. 
In turn this dysregulation leads to specific and well established cognitive deficits 
considered as risk factors for recurrent depression; (i) rumination, (ii) impaired 
attention control, and (iii) cognitive reactivity.  
 
Rumination and TN-dominance over TP 
Rumination has been defined as “behaviors and thoughts that focus one’s 
attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of those symptoms” 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). The response style theory of depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) proposes that individuals differ in their reaction to negative mood 
states and that rumination is a trait-like response style to distress. Individuals engage in 
depressive rumination because they believe that ruminating about their mood and 
symptoms will lead to greater self-understanding. However, rather than leading to 
increased self-understanding, depressive rumination augments sad mood and negative 
thinking by focusing attention on current mood (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1995). The harmful effects of rumination may not stem from attention to distress per 
se, but from internally-oriented attention that is negative, evaluative, and judgmental 
(Rude et al., 2007).  
To assess individual differences in the tendency to ruminate, Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Morrow (1991) developed the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS). This scale has high 
internal consistency and acceptable convergent validity (Butler and Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1994; Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991). Factor analysis of the RRS has identified 
two distinct subtypes of rumination (Treynor et al., 2003). The first, reflective 
pondering, is a more adaptive form of rumination and reflects the degree to which 
individuals engage in cognitive problem solving to try to improve their mood. The 
second, depressive brooding, - the degree to which individuals passively focus on 
symptoms of distress and the meaning of those symptoms - is a more maladaptive form 
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of rumination. Rumination in response to negative mood increases vulnerability to 
depression. Numerous studies have demonstrated that rumination is associated with 
depressive symptoms (Treynor et al., 2003) and prospectively with the onset (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000), severity (Just and Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991) 
and duration (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) of depression. The ability to control ruminative 
thought is associated with recovery from depression (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; 
Schmaling et al., 2002). Rumination is also associated with cognitive reactivity, one of 
the crucial predictors of recurrent depression, even when depression levels were 
statistically controlled (Moulds et al., 2008).  
Here we argue that rumination is related to a tendency toward enhanced TN 
connectivity and TN-dominance over the TP component of the DMN system. In fact, Zhu 
et al. (2011) reported that in unmedicated individuals with major depression, increased 
MPFC and SubG connectivity correlated with rumination, measured with the Cognition 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ, Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001). In line 
with this, Berman et al. (2011) found increased TN-SubG connectivity in depressed 
patients during rest periods of a cognitively demanding task. Levels of connectivity 
between the SubG and the PCC were highly correlated with rumination scores in both 
clinical and non-clinical sub-samples. The maladaptive ruminative response (i.e. 
brooding) was correlated with SubG-PCC connectivity across all sub-samples. While 
healthy participants did not differ in the SubG-PCC connectivity between rest and task-
related blocks, depressed patients showed hyperactive connectivity during rest phases 
and hypoactive connectivity during active blocks. On one hand, these results suggest 
that when depressed people are left to themselves they are more prone to experience 
maladaptive internally-oriented rumination. On the other hand, it is possible that 
during active task periods the enhanced activation of the TP counteracts the TN, which 
may provide temporary relief from rumination. Moreover, this can result in an 
abnormal activation of the SubG, implicated, for instance, in reduced likelihood of 
recovery from depression (Siegle et al., 2006) and an increase in the risk of depression 
as a consequence of adolescent peer rejection (Masten et al., 2011).  
Hamilton et al. (2011a) examined the association between TN-TP interplay and 
rumination using a new approach to data analysis to measure the dominance of one 
network over the other one. This new index quantifies the number of time periods 
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when the TN BOLD signal is greater than the TP BOLD signal. This allows an estimate of 
the increased duration of TN-dominance over the TP and an assessment of whether this 
is reflected by elevated levels of TN functions. Comparing the TN-dominance level in 
depressed patients and controls, the study reported that this positively correlated with 
the depression subscale – another RRS subscale which along with the brooding subscale 
measures cognitions characterized by “a passive comparison of one’s current situation 
with some unachieved standard” (Treynor et al., 2003, p.256) – and negatively 
correlated with the adaptive reflective pondering subscale of the RRS in the depressed 
group. This pattern held also after controlling for brooding and depressive symptoms 
measured with the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck et al., 1996). Interestingly, 
current findings support this association between rumination and TN connectivity or 
dominance only during rest, exactly when task specific regions are intrinsically less 
activated (Berman & Jonides, 2011). Here we argue that the neurobiological dynamics 
of rumination (see also Pizzagalli, 2011) are represented by a specific psychological 
mechanism, namely an aberrant attentional switching in depressed patients which 
leads to excessive internally-oriented attention (i.e. maladaptive self-focus), a 
phenomenon subserved by TN hyperactivity. This in turn leads to a failure to use 
external stimuli to distract from rumination (Disner et al., 2011; De Raedt & Koster, 
2010). Increased TP activity to compensate this TN activity could indeed provide 
environmental stimulation necessary for distraction, efficacious to counterbalance 
rumination (Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). Here we 
propose that this tendency towards TN dominance over TP persists in individuals with a 
history of depression after recovery from the acute symptoms phase, leaving them 
vulnerable to rumination during future difficult or stressful times. We predict that 
remitted depressed individuals, compared with healthy participants, will display an; (i) 
increased TN functional connectivity during rest, with the SubG being expected to play a 
major role; (ii) increased TN-dominance over TP during rest; (iii) increased internally-
oriented attention during rest. Moreover we propose that (iv) these DMN connectivity 
indexes and internal attention preference during rest are both correlated with 
rumination and that (v) connectivity indexes predict, partially mediated by rumination, 
future depressive relapse in remitted depressed individuals.  
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Impaired attentional control, TN persistence, and TP-deficiency in rest-to-task 
transitions  
Attention deficits and impairments in concentration are important diagnostic 
criteria for depressive episodes (APA, 2000). It has been proposed that impairments in 
general attentional control functions involved in working memory might drive both 
these deficits (e.g., concentration) and more specific emotion-related cognitive biases, 
such as mood-congruent interpretation biases, memory biases, and attentional biases 
(Joormann, 2005). There is some neuropsychological evidence suggesting that 
depression is associated with general impairments (valence unspecific) in cognitive 
control but typically the findings are mixed (for a review, see Joormann et al., 2007b), 
with marked general impairments most often being present in severe depression 
(Kaiser et al., 2003). Given these inconsistent findings it has been argued that 
attentional control is particularly hampered in relation to the processing of negative, 
mood-congruent information (Joormann et al., 2007b). Indeed, depression is associated 
with difficulties in inhibitory processing of task-irrelevant negative material (Goeleven 
et al., 2006; Joormann, 2004), as well as problematic trial-by-trial updating of negative 
information in working memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Levens & Gotlib, 2010). 
Recently, attentional control has been related to specific cognitive vulnerability factors 
for depression, such as a rumination (for a review, see Koster et al., 2011) and emotion 
regulation (for a review, see Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010). Research indicates that 
rumination is related to impaired attentional control during the processing of both non-
emotional (Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; De Lissnyder et al., 2010) and emotional 
information (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Lau et al., 2007). 
Depressive brooding in particular seems strongly related to impaired attentional 
control. Current research suggests that impaired attentional control plays an important 
role in depression vulnerability rather than just representing a simple correlate of a 
depressed state. A number of prospective studies suggest that attentional biases are 
associated with emotional reactivity and precede the development of anxiety and 
depression (Beevers & Carver, 2003; MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). In the context of 
depression, Beevers and Carver (2003) demonstrated that such biases interact with 
intervening life stresses to predict higher scores on depression seven weeks later. 
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Mood-congruent attentional bias has also been demonstrated after negative mood 
induction in never depressed offspring at risk for the development of depression 
(Joormann et al., 2007a). Importantly for the current argument, attentional control is 
reduced during recurrent depressive episodes and this persists even during remission. 
Electrophysiological markers of cognitive control (N450) have been shown to decrease 
linearly with more frequent occurrences of depressive episodes in remitted patients 
(Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2009).  
DMN system dysregulation is probably implicated in poor attentional control 
during task performance. In particular it has been argued that attentional lapses occur 
when TN activity is not sufficiently attenuated during the transition from rest-to-task 
and so interferes with task-related activations in TP regions (Sonuga-Barke & 
Castellanos, 2007). This default mode interference is said to occur when TN activation 
exceeds a threshold under which attentional failures are not apparent, but above which 
the interference could effectively impact on the task. Supporting this hypothesis, Prado 
and Weissman (2011) demonstrated that during a multimodal selective attention task 
increased current-trial connectivity between the PCC and the left DLPFC was associated 
with worse performance (e.g. longer RTs). Moreover, extending the default-mode 
interference hypothesis, the PCC/left DLPFC connectivity could also predict better 
performance (e.g. faster RTs) in the next trail, suggesting that current task-unrelated 
preparatory mental activity can enhance performance of an upcoming task at the cost 
of worse current performance. Consistent with this, in non-clinical participants longer 
RTs on a selective attention task were associated with both decreased activation of TP 
structures, such the right DLPFC, and increased activation of PCC, precuneus, and MTLC, 
key TN brain regions (Weissman et al., 2006). In a similar way, Polli et al. (2005) found 
that errors during an antisaccade task were characterized by a failure to deactivate PCC, 
left superior temporal gyrus, rACC, and DMPFC. Li et al (2007) reported that errors in a 
stop signal task were preceded by an increased activation of, among other regions, the 
PCC and precuneus. Interestingly, a recent study stressed that the PCC seems to 
precede TN-related attentional lapses in that reduced TN deactivation during a speeded 
Eriksen flanker task predicted errors up to 30s before the error actually occurred 
(Eichele et al., 2008).These pieces of evidence support a crucial role of TN-persistence in 
attentional lapses, mainly driven by PCC. In addition, Castellanos et al. (2005) reported 
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that subjects affected by ADHD compared with controls showed an increased Intra-
Individual Variability (IIV), defined as very long and relatively infrequent RTs, which 
temporally mirrored the typical DMN low-frequency pattern (~0.01 - 0.08 Hz). In 
keeping with this, Kelly et al. (2008) reported that in healthy subjects asked to attend an 
Eriksen flanker task the IIV, here defined as coefficient of variation (CV), was negatively 
correlated with the magnitude of the anti-correlation of the DMN components, that is 
the less the TN and TP were tuned and anti-correlated, the less congruent and 
consistent the performance was (e.g. increased CV). An increased IIV has been also 
reported to characterize several clinical syndromes, including depression, and this 
suggests its possible role as pathological marker (Kaiser et al., 2008). In sum, a wealth of 
research has indicated that the DMN is associated with impaired attentional control. In 
particular TN-persistence, TP-deficiency, and reduced TN-TP anti-correlation producing 
spontaneous fluctuations in performance during task have all been found to be 
remarkably good predictors of attentional lapses.  
Building on the default mode interference hypothesis (Sonuga-Barke & 
Castellanos, 2007) we argue that reduced attentional control in remitted depressed 
patients is the result of a failure to properly attenuate the TN network during rest-to-
task transitions leading to a disruption of task-related activity in TP regions. We see this 
pattern of TN-persistence as being due to depression-related alterations during rest, 
especially TN dominance and increased coherence. This pattern of DMN activity makes 
it more difficult to effectively switch from rest to task, while at the same time making 
interference by the TN activity into task-related activity more likely. We therefore 
predict that remitted depressed individuals, compared with healthy controls, will (i) 
display TN-persistence in rest-to-task transition, mainly led by the PCC; (ii) show TP-
deficiency, mainly at the level of the DLPFC, in attention demanding tasks using non-
emotional material; (iii) that TN-persistence during tasks will be predicted by TN-
dominance and increased TN functional connectivity during rest, linking excessive 
rumination with poor attentional control; and (iv)  that DMN-related attentional 
impairments in remitted depressed individuals can predict future depressive relapse.  
To date no studies have directly investigated the role of the TN over TP 
persistence in depressed patients performing an attentional task. There is some 
evidence underpinning the TP component on attention demanding task performance 
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using non-emotional material. Halari et al. (2009) found depression-related decreases in 
right DLPFC, using selective attention paradigms (Simon task) and attention switching 
tasks. A single session of rTMS over the left DLPFC in depressed patients improved 
performance in an attention-demanding task (task switching) although mood remained 
stable (Vanderhasselt et al., 2009). This preliminary evidence suggests that currently 
depressed individuals might show TP-deficiency during rest-to-task transition, even 
when using non-emotional material. Moreover, remitted depressed individuals showed 
TP-deficiency, namely reduced left DLPFC activation, after remission (Aizenstein et al., 
2009). Nevertheless, there is also some preliminary evidence that in depression and 
recovery individuals show a similar pattern in attention demanding tasks using 
emotional material. For instance, multiple sessions of rTMS over the left DLPFC in 
depressed patients resulted in increased inhibition of negative information (Leyman et 
al., 2009). Finally, a recent prospective study showed that remitted depressed 
individuals had impaired cognitive control while switching from angry to neutral faces 
which predicted rumination as well as depressive symptoms a year later (Demeyer et 
al., 2012). In conclusion, DMN dysfunction during rest-to-affective task transition 
appears to be worth deeper consideration, given its possible role in efficiently adjusting 
to tasks and predicting future depressive relapse.  
 
Cognitive Reactivity, increased TN connectivity and rest-to-affective task 
transition 
Research on information-processing in emotional disorders has been guided 
predominantly by Beck’s cognitive schema theory (Beck, 1967; Clark et al., 1999) and 
Bower’s associative network theory (Bower, 1981). Beck and colleagues argued that 
information-processing is guided by schemata, defined as memory structures which, 
built from previous experiences, contain and organize information about the self, the 
world, and the future. Depression is characterized by negative schemata involving loss 
and failure which are thought to bias encoding of information. Specific information 
processing biases at the level of attention, interpretation, and memory mediate 
incoming information processing and subjective (emotional) experience. A fundamental 
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aspect of Beck’s cognitive model of depression is that cognitive structures or schemata 
remain latent until activated by relevant stimuli.   
Although broad and general, this notion lies at the roots of the concept of 
cognitive reactivity, which has been central to the understanding of cognitive 
vulnerability factors for depression. Cognitive reactivity relates to fluctuations in 
negative self-attitudes in response to daily (stressful) events (Butler et al., 1994). The 
crucial question is why certain individuals are or become more reactive to stressors 
than others. Teasdale (1988) proposed the differential activation hypothesis (DAH) to 
account for this observation. This hypothesis assumes that, after each depressive 
episode, the link between low mood and negative thinking is strengthened. Therefore, 
a depressive mood, which can be induced by daily stressors or experimental 
manipulation, re-activates the negative thinking patterns more easily after multiple 
depressive episodes. Proposing an association-based mechanism, the DAH can explain 
the often reported phenomenon that after several depressive episodes even minor 
hassles can evoke strong depressive symptoms, and a downward spiral of negative 
thoughts. 
Support for this theory comes from studies showing that people who have 
experienced depression in the past, as compared to never depressed individuals, report 
more dysfunctional attitudes, negative cognitive biases, and decreased positive biases 
after negative mood induction (for a review, see Scher et al., 2005). Moreover, some 
longitudinal studies have shown that the interaction between cognitive reactivity and 
stress is a significant predictor of the onset of depressive episodes (e.g. Hankin et al., 
2004; but see Barnett & Gotlib, 1990). An influential study which supports the role of 
cognitive reactivity in relapse of depression in remitted individuals found that mood-
induced cognitive reactivity significantly predicted relapse over a 18-months interval 
(Segal et al., 2006). This evidence clearly supports the existence of latent vulnerability 
factors in at-risk individuals which are not detected during euthymic phases, but easily 
activated by stressors.  
How is the concept of cognitive reactivity linked to DMN activity? Although 
direct research on DMN activity in relation to cognitive reactivity is lacking, a relation 
can be inferred from several lines of research. Cognitive reactivity has been mainly 
conceptualized as an associative processing between the self, negative mood and 
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negative thinking (Bower, 1981; Teasdale, 1988). Interestingly, the TN circuit overlaps 
with the brain regions activated during associative conditioning (Bar et al., 2007) and 
the strength of the association elicited by a stimulus has been shown to be related to 
the TN activation (Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Bar, 2004; Aminoff et al., 2007). In particular, 
MPFC, PCC and MTLC (e.g. hippocampus and parahippocampus) play a fundamental 
role in both basic as well as more complex associative processes (Aminoff et al., 2007; 
Bar, 2004; Eichenbaum, 2000).  
Bar (2009b) proposed a link between aberrations in TN-related associative 
processing and negative mood (as well as depression). This hypothesis encompasses a 
bidirectional influence between broad associative thinking and mood. Broad associative 
thinking is linked to positive affect whereas narrow associative processing is related to 
negative mood. While the former phenomenon seems to be important in relation to 
protective factors (cf. the “broaden-and-build theory” of resilience; Fredrickson, 2004), 
the latter has been applied to depression and related risk factors especially rumination. 
Bar speculates that during rest MPFC hyperactivity, comprising also the SubG, (see 
Drevets et al., 2002; Greicius et al., 2007) could dramatically limit activation linked to 
associative processing in the MTLC. The main psychological outcome of this constraint is 
both a narrowed associative network and rumination, causing negative mood which in 
turn reduces the likelihood to broaden the associative links afterwards. Preliminary 
evidence supporting this hypothesis is provided by an fMRI study that showed 
enhanced connectivity in the MPFC and MTLC in depression (Berman et al., 2011). 
Supporting the link between DMN and cognitive reactivity, the MPFC, the PCC, 
and the MTLC are all areas involved, albeit to different degrees, in memory and self-
related processing (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Cavanna, 2007; Gusnard et al., 2001), 
functions which are both related to the concept of self-schemata (Beck, 1967). In line 
with literature showing negative self-evaluation after recovery (Dozois & Dobson, 2001; 
Seeds & Dozois, 2010), we propose that remitted depressed patients still possess latent 
negative self-schemata (e.g. negative mindset), the neural substrate of which is 
represented by increased levels of  TN functional connectivity during rest. Interestingly, 
our proposition is partially in line with a recent theory, in which the MPFC, ACC, 
amygdala and other sub-cortical regions are explicitly invoked to support negative self-
schemata in current depression (Disner et al., 2011). 
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There are many similarities between proposed functions of the DMN, 
association-based mindset (Bar, 2009a), internal mentation (Buckner et al., 2008) and 
cognitive reactivity. Not only is cognitive reactivity related to negative evaluation of the 
self but also to problematic beliefs about the future (i.e., hopelessness; Alloy et al., 
1997; Antypa et al., 2010; Barnhofer & Chittka, 2010). According to the Internal 
Mentation Hypothesis, the TN plays a role in several functions in which mental 
simulation is required (Buckner et al., 2008), such as temporal self-projection. 
Interestingly, a recent study shows that currently depressed individuals report a specific 
impairment in generating episodic details concerning future events (King et al., 2011). 
Likewise, in remitted depressed and never depressed subjects, hopelessness, an 
important facet of the cognitive reactivity construct (Van der Does, 2002), predicts 
lower positive future fluency after negative mood induction (Williams et al., 2008). Note 
that hopelessness is involved in one`s ability to project oneself in the future and this 
may be associated with TN abnormalities both in depressed (Grimm et al., 2009) and 
healthy individuals (Wiebking et al., 2011). 
Despite important differences between the internal mentation (Buckner et al., 
2008) and association-based mindset hypothesis (Bar et al., 2007), we suggest common 
underlying mechanisms. Given the need for past information to both create associative 
links and mentally simulate new scenarios, it can be argued that both theories rely on 
memory and memory-related brain regions, such as the MTLC and hippocampus 
(Buckner, 2010; Perry et al., 2011). Therefore, the TN which may also implicate the 
hippocampus (Buckner et al., 2008), could provide an overarching influence on these 
associated functions. An increasing amount of data highlights the role of the 
hippocampus and memory for TN functional connectivity in the context of depression 
(Goveas et al., 2011, Hamilton et al., 2010), so that the same pattern can be expected 
even after recovery. Indeed, as remitted depressed patients continue to show 
impairments in most of the domains supposed to be embedded in this network, it is 
plausible that abnormal resting state functional connectivity in the TN plays a crucial 
role in this specific population.  
Providing some evidence for our position, a recent study investigated resting 
state TN functional connectivity in late-life depression before and after 12 weeks of 
pharmacotherapy (Wu et al., 2011). Contrary to the findings from a study on mid-life 
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depression (Greicius et al., 2007), this research reported decreased SubG-PCC 
connectivity in currently depressed patients. This inconsistency with previous research 
could be due to different data collection and data analysis approaches, as well as to 
cerebrovascular peculiarities of late-life depression (Alexopoulos et al., 1997). Crucial to 
our proposal, pharmacological treatment improved SubG-PCC connectivity but fully 
remitted depressed individuals continued to differ from healthy participants. Despite 
differences in the direction of connectivity, this clearly supports  the notion that even 
after gaining recovery remitted depressed individuals display abnormal TN functional 
connectivity during rest.  
As mentioned above, remitted depressed patients, characterized by high levels 
of cognitive reactivity, do not usually show negative thinking unless they encounter 
stress in everyday life or undergo negative mood induction in the laboratory (Scher et 
al., 2005). A manipulation involving negative mood (e.g. listening to a sad music) or self-
reference (e.g. recalling a sad autobiographical memory) appears to successfully 
activate latent schemata as evidenced by depressotypic negative biases (Phillips et al., 
2010). Therefore, rest-to-affective task transition is the ideal context to investigate 
whether individuals, with high levels of cognitive reactivity, are able to (de)activate the 
DMN. Mirroring the depression-related TN-persistence during rest-to- affective task 
transition (Grimm et al., 2009; Sheline et al., 2010) and the mindset-stimulus interaction 
specificity (Bar, 2009a), remitted depressed individuals are supposed to show both TN-
persistence and TP-deficiency. In a recent study, remitted depressed individuals (with 
three or more major depression episodes) and healthy controls underwent a blocked 
design fMRI study where sad or neutral video clips were shown (Farb et al., 2011). A 
remitted depressed subgroup, consisting of patients who relapsed within the following 
18 months, showed a statistically significant activation of the VMPFC in response to sad 
stimuli in comparison with controls. Patients who stayed in remission could not be 
distinguished from controls in terms of activation in TN. Crucial for our proposal, 
VMPFC-persistence was found to predict relapse. Moreover, Hooley et al. (2005) 
reported that, compared with healthy individuals, remitted depressed individuals 
displayed substantially reduced DLPFC activation, when confronted with negative 
information (maternal critical remarks). This is in line with the idea that, as for currently 
depressed individuals (Fales et al., 2008, 2009; Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2008; 
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Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008; Siegle et al., 2007),  remitted depressed individuals also 
still show TP-deficiency when challenged by negative emotions. 
Finally, there is emerging evidence showing that specific therapies for recurrent 
depression, such as Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), may elicit 
therapeutic effects through their influences on the DMN. In this context mindfulness 
refers to a particular way of focusing on the present moment characterized by full 
attention to internal and external contexts, non-judgment and openness to current 
experience, increased acceptance, and lower experiential avoidance. There is evidence 
for the value of this treatment as a prophylaxis for recurrent depression (Chiesa et al., 
2011). Specifically, MBCT is designed to target the strong associative links between the 
self and negative thoughts and feelings (e.g. cognitive reactivity) in order to prevent 
relapse (Segal et al., 2002). Indeed after MBCT, the relapse rate in remitted patients at 
high risk for recurrence has been shown to decrease dramatically (Ma & Teasdale, 
2004). Two recent studies have found that mindfulness disposition is negatively 
correlated with cognitive reactivity and that MBCT can directly influence this risk factor 
reducing its level or deactivating its potential toxic effects on mental activity (Kuyken et 
al., 2010; Raes et al., 2009). A recent fMRI study found that resting state mindfulness 
disposition was negatively correlated with TN activation in the MPFC, PCC, temporal 
cortex, as well as subcortical areas, such as amygdala, hippocampus, and thalamus in 
healthy participants (Way et al., 2010). Interestingly, the authors suggest that lower TN 
activation in people with higher levels of mindfulness may reflect weakened links 
between thoughts, feelings, and the self, supposed to be crucial in dormant negative 
schemata. After mindfulness training, there appears to be a mindfulness-linked 
improvement in TN-TP balance in response to sadness provocation (Farb et al., 2010). 
Following mindfulness training vs. no training, participants displayed increased 
activation in the DLPFC and SubG as well as increased deactivation in the PCC, left PFC 
and IFG. Thus, not only does mindfulness seem capable of targeting TN components by 
reducing its rest-related activation but also by ameliorating aberrations during rest-to-
affective task transitions. 
 In sum, there are several findings consistent with our proposal linking cognitive 
reactivity with the DMN. First, remitted depressed individuals reporting high levels of 
cognitive reactivity show negative self-views as well as reduced positive future 
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prospection. Both concepts of self-schemata and future self-projection have been 
attributed to resting state TN activity (Bar, 2009a; Buckner et al., 2008). This leads to 
the proposal that remitted depressed individuals show increased TN functional 
connectivity similar to currently depressed patients. On the basis of this notion we 
propose that remitted depressed individuals will display increased TN connectivity 
during rest, which supports the idea of latent negative self-schemata, given the role of 
TN in internally-oriented attention (Fox et al., 2005), self-related processing (Gusnard et 
al. 2001), and associative processing (Bar et al., 2007). Additionally, decreased TP 
connectivity during rest and related reduced externally-oriented attention might fail to 
provide exogenous information which may disconfirm and update negative self-
schemata. Second, mirroring the mindset-stimulus interaction specificity, remitted 
depressed individuals are predicted to resemble currently depressed individuals in 
showing aberrant rest-to-affective task transition. Both TN-persistence and TP-
deficiency after emotional challenge have been reported in comparison with healthy 
people, supporting our proposal that depression-like DMN impairments clearly persist 
even after recovering. Third, mindfulness-based interventions appear capable of both 
reducing TN regions activity in rest and improve rest-to-affective task imbalance. 
In addition to our previous predictions about (i) enhanced TN functional 
connectivity during rest, (ii) increased TN-dominance over TP during rest, (iii) increased 
TN-persistence and (iv) TP-deficiency, we predict that (v) these patterns will be 
positively correlated with cognitive reactivity measures (as well as rumination and 
attentional impairment) and (vi) that this abnormal DMN activity will predict, partially 
via increased cognitive reactivity, future depressive relapse. 
 
Conclusion and Future research 
In this paper, we introduced a framework which integrates cognitive and 
neurobiological factors involved in recurrent depression. In particular we propose that 
specific forms of DMN system dysregulation lead to cognitive deficits that make 
remitted individuals more vulnerable to the onset of future episodes of depression. We 
argue that three well-established cognitive risk factors – rumination, poor attentional 
control, and cognitive reactivity, which have been studied in isolation, have their roots 
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in the TN dominance and hyper-connectivity. These TN features are associated with 
excessive and maladaptive self-focus and subsequent difficulties in both switching to an 
extrospective perspective during rest and effectively transitioning into tasks, impairing 
TP functioning. We suggest that remitted depressed individuals still show aberrant 
DMN, and that DMN dysfunction may represent a residual neural “depressive scar”, 
which is linearly influenced by the amount and severity of previous depressive episodes 
(Wichers, et al., 2010). At the same time the DMN is proposed to be a good predictor of 
recovery-related cognitive risk factors as well as future depressive recurrence. Although 
much more research is needed, initial support for our model comes from a number of 
sources. First, rumination has been connected in healthy and depressed subjects to 
increased TN connectivity and TN-dominance over the TP during rest (Berman et al., 
2011; Hamilton et al., 2011a, Zhu et al., 2011). More specifically, midline structures, 
such as MPFC, SubG and PCC, play a crucial role in problematic self-related processing 
such as rumination. Second, attentional control failures, considered to be crucial in 
depression recurrence (De Raedt & Koster, 2010), are linked to inappropriate DMN rest-
to-task transitioning (i.e. TN-persistence and TP-deficiency), mainly guided by the PCC 
(Eichele et al., 2008), which might be related to the internal-external switch of our 
attention resources. Third, cognitive reactivity, defined as the ease with which negative 
latent schemata are activated by appropriate triggers, is thought to be neurobiologically 
subserved by abnormally increased rest-related TN connectivity (particularly between 
the MPFC, the PCC and the hippocampus/parahippocampus) as well as by an aberrant 
DMN rest-to-task transition in the emotional context.  
As some of the predictions are quite tentative, we now note several general 
restrictions that apply to our framework. First, it is noteworthy that there still is ongoing 
debate about different ways to conceptualize and analyze rest-related task-
independent activity. A clear taxonomy of different approaches to investigate resting 
state is still lacking and a clear consensus on the best way to analyze resting state has 
not been reached. For instance, studies concerning resting brain activation, rest-related 
functional connectivity, as well as rest-stimulus interaction, sometimes give 
inconsistent results likely due to methodological differences (Hasler & Northoff, 2011; 
Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). Second, the TN-TP anti-correlation is still a topic of 
debate (Cole et al., 2010). For instance, some authors have argued that apparent 
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antagonism between DMN subcomponents is a technical and methodological artifact 
(Murphy et al., 2009), whereas most of studies support the idea that there actually is 
antagonism of function between these two DMN sub-systems (e.g. Chai et al., 2012; Fox 
et al., 2009; Liang et al., 2012; Kelly et al., 2008; Margulies et al., 2007). However, the 
situation is fluid and views may change due to emerging knowledge on TN-TP switching. 
Third, based on new general developments as well as specific research in depression, 
future understanding of the DMN in recurrent depression can provide more specific 
links of different cognitive vulnerability factors to some aspects of this network. Finally, 
it is important to acknowledge that depression is a complex disorder that can be the 
outcome of a wide variety of biological, psychological, and environmental factors and 
the same obviously holds for recurrent depression (Monroe & Harkness, 2011). For 
example, in most patients increased emotional reactivity is observed, leading to the so 
called depressive interlock loop (Teasdale & Barnard, 1995), characterized by increased 
coupling between negative thoughts, emotion, bodily sensations and behavior, whereas 
other patients show blunted affect and decreased reactivity (see DSM-IV-TR, APA, 
2000). Therefore, we argue that specific symptom clusters should be taken into account 
in future research. 
In keeping with this, a change from a syndrome-driven towards a process-based 
perspective in conceptualizing mental disorders may provide substantial progress in the 
development of our understanding of psychopathology (Borsboom et al., 2011). For 
instance, despite notable differences, both depression and schizophrenia share similar 
DMN aberrations, such as TN hyperconnectivity, TN-persistence, and TN-TP abnormal 
interplay (for a review Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). This clearly raises the question 
about how specific these default brain aberrations may be for each single disorder. It 
may be that at a general level TN and TP subserve respectively internal and external 
focus, as we propose in our model, so that mentally-affected individuals showing DMN 
aberrations are actually characterized by sub-optimal capability of switching between 
different attentional focuses. However, what still remains unclear is the process 
through which different forms of psychopathology showing partially similar 
neurobiological patterns are characterized by different symptom profiles related to the 
same basic processes, such as dominant internally-oriented attention (e.g. self-focus in 
depression vs. paranoid ideation in schizophrenia). Arguably, a dimensional approach 
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could overcome such problem in that certain psychological processes could be fruitfully 
investigated per se, both in clinical and non-clinical samples (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 
2012). Investigating more basic processes one by one, rather than taking into account 
an entire and complex syndrome, could indeed enhance understanding of the 
mechanisms that are crucial in pathological phenotypes, such as the interplay with 
other networks (Hamilton, Chen, & Gotlib, 2013; Menon, 2011). 
Although initial evidence for our framework is promising, more systematic 
research is required. Below we provide an agenda for future research goals derived 
from  the current framework. The very core of our framework is that remitted 
depressed individuals still show most depression-related DMN aberrations, which can 
account for residual symptoms during recovery as well as future depressive recurrence. 
Hence, the ideal context to test our predictions is by comparing DMN system activity in 
(medication-free) currently depressed, never depressed and remitted depressed 
individuals (reporting a different amount of past depressive episodes). To do this, both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies are required. Therefore, as a first step, we 
provide an overview of important theoretical predictions (Table 1). Afterwards, 
longitudinal studies which, taking into account all three risk factors at the same time, 
investigate the potential role of the DMN in predicting future depressive recurrence 
appear to be the most appropriate further step. In such studies remitted depressed and 
never depressed individuals are suggested to be recruited and assessed at baseline and 
follow-ups either with self-report questionnaires and clinician-based interviews. DMN 
aberrations are thus expected to predict future major depression in the clinical group, 
partially via cognitive risk factors, whereas this pattern is predicted not to emerge in 
never depressed individuals. Moreover, we speculate that the DMN contribution to 
explaining future recurrence might be an overarching predictor which significantly 
reduces the unique predictive power which each risk factor has singularly. Additionally, 
the proposed links between cognitive risk factors and DMN may be organized in a 
hierarchical way so that vulnerability factors do not all predict future recurrent 
depression to the same degree. Rumination could be the main output of dysfunctional 
DMN with both cognitive reactivity and impaired attention control as byproducts of 
such maladaptive self-focus; but attentional process might also be the core vulnerability 
factor. Consequently, mediation models appear to be the most appropriate way to map 
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the neural pattern (DMN), psychological functioning (internally-oriented attention) and 
cognitive deficits (risk factors) in a consistent frame capable of explaining recurrence in 
depression. 
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In conclusion, the current analysis motivates a focus on interrelated networks 
and resting state activity instead of BOLD signal in specific brain structures per se. This 
could indeed be a paradigmatic shift that enhances our insight in the relationship 
between depression vulnerability and psychological processes, because this relationship 
implies an interplay between many different brain functions. Therefore, an approach 
taking into account the associative nature of mental processes and brain functioning 
provides a promising avenue for future research on inter-individual differences in 
vulnerability and resilience. 
 
Addendum 
Since the publication of our theoretical framework (Marchetti, Koster, Sonuga-
Barke, & De Raedt, 2012), two independent research groups have tested and 
substantially confirmed our hypothesis. We here report these two studies in detail. 
Nixon et al., (2014) recruited 20 remitted depressed individuals and 20 matched 
healthy controls and had them undergo a slow-paced Go/NoGo task. By adopting 
bilateral precuneus as seed regions, task-based whole-brain functional connectivity 
analysis was performed. Importantly, compared to healthy controls, the clinical groups 
reported an increased connectivity between both the right and left precuneus and the 
right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (rDMPFC; BA 9). Moreover, considering the 
important role played by antidepressant in normalizing the rest-to-task transition 
(Delaveu et al., 2011), the authors also explored the possible impact of 
pharmacotherapy on the reported DMN hyperconnectivity. Unmedicated remitted 
depressed individuals still showed increased precuneus-rDMPFC, whereas medicated 
remitted depressed individuals were not distinguishable from healthy controls. 
Additionally analysis confirmed the role of DMPFC, and specifically the “dorsal nexus” 
(Sheline et al., 2010). By means of a region of interest (ROI) analysis, the authors 
confirmed the existence of hyperconnectivity between the bilateral dorsal nexus and 
bilateral precuneus in remitted depressed compared to healthy controls. 
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Zamoscik, Huffziger, Ebner-Priemer, Kuehner, and Kirsch (2014) recruited 29 
remitted depressed and 29 matched healthy controls, and had them undergo negative 
mood induction in the context of fMRI data acquisition. Within the framework of 
cognitive reactivity (i.e., recalling sad autobiographical memories while listening to sad 
music; Scher et al., 2005), the clinical group showed increased connectivity between the 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the parahippocampal gyri (PHG), when compared 
with healthy controls. Importantly, the authors also reported informative associations 
of this neurobiological index with variables mapping on vulnerability to depression. 
First, the strength of the PCC-PHC during sad provocation correlated with the number 
of previous episodes (R2 = .29, p < .003). Second, the reported DMN hyperconnectivity 
was positively associated with sadder mood and more ruminative thinking in daily life, 
as measured with ambulatory assessment method, in the clinical group (R2 = .24, p < 
.019 for negative mood; R2 = .28, p < .004), but not in healthy controls. This finding held 
even after controlling for the number of previous episodes and depressive score, 
measured at the time of fRMI data acquisition. Third, in remitted depressed individuals 
the PCC-PHG connectivity explained future depressive symptoms (R2 = .13, p < .015) and 
habitual brooding (R2 = .07, p < .005), but not habitual reflective pondering in a 6-month 
follow-up. This result held even after controlling for depressive and ruminative scores at 
the baseline.  
These studies provide preliminary, but important, evidence supporting our 
hypothesis. Both studies indeed confirm our main prediction, that is the DMN is 
functionally hyperconnected in the remitted depressed individual compared to healthy 
controls. However, it is important to stress that different neurological loci have been 
reported, so future studies should highlight the specific contribution of these areas and 
maybe ascertain the existence of different DMN sub-networks in this clinical group 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010).  
Importantly, the study carried out by Zamoscik and colleagues (2014) provided 
support to many aspects of our theoretical framework. For instance, increased DMN 
connectivity was detected in the context of cognitive reactivity (i.e., activation of 
present but dormant negative schemata by priming negative mood and negative self-
referential thoughts), a major cognitive risk factors that we theoretically linked the 
DMN. Moreover, confirming the association between DMN hyperconnectivity and 
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rumination, a positive relation between has reported between the PCC-PHG 
connectivity in remitted depressed individuals and state rumination, as measured 10 
times a day per 2 days. Finally, the authors supported out hypothesis that not only 
aberrantly highly connected DMN in remitted depressed could represent a “scar” due 
to previous depressive episodes, but also that it could have a specific role in predicting 
future depressive symptoms. In keeping with this, PCC-PHG hyperconnectivity during 
sad provocation has been significantly associated with the number of previous episodes 
and future depressive symptoms and tendency to engage in depressive brooding (but 
not in reflective pondering) in remitted depressed individuals. However, at the moment 
it is not possible to exclude a pre-existing, perhaps genetic, vulnerability to DMN 
aberrations, so that it is hard to clarify the timing between DMN aberrations and past 
depressive symptoms. 
Confirming the explicatory power of our rest-to-transition construct, Nixon and 
colleagues (2014) reported that, compared to healthy controls, remitted depressed 
showed an increased precuneus-rDMPFC during task engagement, although no 
behavioral differences were reported in the attention-demanding task. Moreover, in 
line with our hypothesis and previous evidence (Delaveu et al., 2011), antidepressant 
medication seems able to normalize DMN-related aberrations. Unmedicated remitted 
depressed individuals were statistically distinguishable from healthy controls, whereas 
this was not the case for  medicated remitted depressed individuals. 
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Mindwandering heightens the accessibility  
of negative relative to positive thought1 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Mindwandering (MW) is associated with both positive and negative outcomes. 
Among the latter, negative mood and negative cognitions have been reported. 
However, the underlying mechanisms linking mindwandering to negative mood and 
cognition are still unclear. We hypothesized that MW could either directly enhance 
negative thinking or indirectly heighten the accessibility of negative thoughts. In an 
undergraduate sample (n = 79) we measured emotional thoughts during the Sustained 
Attention on Response Task (SART) which induces MW, and accessibility of negative 
cognitions by means of the Scrambled Sentences Task (SST) after the task. We also 
measured depressive symptoms and rumination. Results show that in individuals with 
elevated levels of depressive symptoms MW during SART predicts higher accessibility of 
negative thoughts after the task, rather than negative thinking during the task. These 
findings contribute to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of MW and 
provide insight into the relationship between task-involvement and affect. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Based on Marchetti, I., Koster, E. H. W., & De Raedt, R. (2012). Mindwandering heightens the 
accessibility of negative relative to positive thought. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(3), 1517-1525. doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2012.05.013    
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“The mind wanders, not just away from where we aim it,  
but also toward what we forbid it to explore” 
- Daniel M. Wegner (1997, p.304) 
Introduction 
A typical feature of the human mind is its tendency to spontaneously generate 
thoughts and to freely wander despite the external environment (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006). With the exception of several early studies (e.g. Antrobus, 1968; 
Singer, 1966), this phenomenon has only recently been systematically investigated (see 
Gruberger, Ben-Simon, Lvkovitz, Zangen, & Hendler, 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). Because of the elusive nature of the wandering mind, several terms for this 
construct have been used, such as “mindwandering” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), 
“stimulus independent thought” (Mason et al., 2007), “daydreaming” (Mar, Mason, & 
Litvack, 2012; Singer, 1966), and “task unrelated thought” (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). Despite subtle conceptual differences (Christoff, 2012), a core characteristic is a 
state of decoupled attention when the mind wanders, where attention is detached 
from external toward internal processing (e.g. personal goals and current concerns) 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Here, we adopt the umbrella term of mindwandering 
(hereafter MW) to define this phenomenon. 
MW is considered a ubiquitous phenomenon with high intra-individual stability 
across short and long time periods (Giambra, 1995; Kane et al., 2007). Recently, 
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) showed, using an experience sampling approach, that 
MW occurs during almost every activity in everyday life. Moreover, Kane et al. (2007) 
estimated that we spend between 10% and 30% of our daily live experiencing MW. In 
light of such pervasive occurrence, it has been suggested that MW has several 
advantageous functions (Baars, 2010). For example, future planning is considered to be 
one of the most beneficial outcomes of MW (Schooler et al., 2011). Smallwood, Nind 
and O'Connor (2009) reported that MW involved thinking about the future, rather than 
about the present or past. Moreover, such future-oriented thought is enhanced by self-
reflection (Smallwood et al., 2011) and by priming of personal goals (Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D'Argembeau, 2011), while it is reduced by negative 
mood (Smallwood & O'Connor, 2011). The clear advantage of MW here is to predict 
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possible future events, to achieve better adaptation to the environment, and 
proactively reduce upcoming distress (Bar, 2009). In keeping with this, MW may also 
facilitate personally relevant problem solving by manipulating semantic information 
acquired during external processing (Binder et al., 1999). In other words, during MW it 
is possible to systemize information which could not be organized and analyzed during 
stimulus presentation. Finally, creativity (Sio & Ormerod, 2009) and coping (Greenwald 
& Harder, 1995) have also been linked to MW.  
Nevertheless, MW comes also with several downsides which should be taken 
into account. First, according to the definition of a state of decoupled attention from 
external stimulation (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), MW is consistently associated with 
impaired performance when one is required to accomplish a demanding task (Schooler 
et al., 2011). For instance, MW leads to reduced reading comprehension (Smallwood, 
McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008) and attentional failures (Christoff et al., 2009). 
Interestingly, a recent ERP study demonstrated that during off-task periods both task-
related information as well as novel distractors are elaborated to a lesser extent 
(Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011). This supports the notion that during MW, 
attention is not drawn by external interfering stimuli but is actually turned inwards. 
Moreover, MW is often associated with reduced executive control (Schooler et al., 
2011), reflecting either a phenomenon demanding executive resources (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006) or an executive failure (McVay & Kane, 2010). Second, MW is 
associated with detrimental effects on mood. A recent experience sampling study in 
2250 healthy people showed that MW at initial sampling predicted lower mood at 
subsequent sampling (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). However, it is not clear whether 
this happened by reducing positive mood, enhancing negative mood, or both. In turn, 
negative mood induction heightens MW levels (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 
2009). The latter data suggest a reciprocal influence between MW and mood 
fluctuations. Third, some evidence supports a specific link between MW and depressive 
cognitions. In their seminal study, Golding and Singer (1983) reported that MW 
substantially explained variance in depressive attitudes, namely self-criticism, 
dependency, and inefficacy. In line with this, clinically and subclinically depressed 
samples show higher levels of MW (Smallwood, O'Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 
2007; Watts, MacLeod, & Morris, 1988). Fourth, at the level of individual differences, 
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depressive symptoms as well as rumination are worth mentioning. Individual levels of 
depressive symptoms have been reported to be consistently associated with MW 
(Smallwood et al., 2003, Study 2, 3) and capable of predicting off-task thinking during a 
task (Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2006). Whereas, rumination, defined as “behaviors 
and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the 
implications of those symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569), has generally been 
reported not to predict MW (Smallwood et al., 2003, 2006). Although rumination has 
been associated theoretically with MW as another form of repetitive thinking (Watkins, 
2008), rumination induction compared to distraction did not lead dysphorics to 
experience increased levels of MW (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Keri Zehm, 2003).  
So far no studies have explicitly investigated the link between MW and negative 
cognition. Indeed, most of the available data is correlational where it is difficult to make 
a directional inference. Interestingly, a specific link between MW and negative thinking 
can be proposed. As MW is associated with internally-oriented focus (Baird, Smallwood, 
& Schooler, 2011; Barron et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2011), it can heighten self-
focus, which has been reliably associated with negative mood (Mor & Winquist, 2002). 
Moreover, a consistent line of research stressed that during spontaneous thought 
personal priorities and goals are actively processed (Giambra 1995; Levinson, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), so that personal concerns 
may emerge and impact on thinking.      
In keeping with this, MW can potentially have either direct or indirect effects on 
cognition that may explain its mood dampening effects. That is, it could be that when 
people’s minds wander they are inclined to think in a self-critical and negative way, with 
MW being directly associated with increased negative cognitions. Alternatively, MW can 
also have an indirect effect on negative cognitions through other cognitive mechanisms 
such as self-focused attention. In this case there would be an increased accessibility of 
negative cognitions, without an immediate detrimental effect on thinking. To our best 
knowledge, these after-effects on cognitions have never been investigated.  
In the current experiment, MW, operationalized as “a shift of attention away 
from a primary task toward internal information” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, p. 946), 
was induced and measured using a slow-paced Go/NoGo paradigm, the Sustained 
Attention on Response Task (SART, Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 
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1997). The execution of the task was pseudo-randomly interleaved by thought probes 
to determine the presence of mindwandering (MW, from being completely on-task to 
completely off-task) and the valence of cognitions (from negative to positive) during the 
task, the latter allowing to test the direct effect of MW on cognition. Previous research 
has extensively shown that SART performance is related to attentional failures in 
everyday life (ecological validity; Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010) and induces MW 
(Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Alternatively to literature which conceptualizes MW as a 
categorical phenomenon (Christoff et al., 2009), we adopted a dimensional approach 
for two reasons. First, capitalizing on the variance at the level of each thought probe by 
using a Likert scale can provide substantially more information. Second, previous 
studies found that the neurobiological substrate of MW, namely the Default Mode 
Network (Gruberger et al., 2011), parametrically interferes with being completely 
engaged in a task rather than in an “all-or-none” fashion (i.e., Weissman, Roberts, 
Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006). Consistent with our new approach, recently Prado and 
Weissman (2011, pp.2281) claimed that: “*…+ in addition to theorizing about discrete 
on- and off-task states (Smallwood et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009), it may be fruitful 
to conceptualize default-mode interference along a continuum”. For these reasons, we 
decide to adopt a continuous measure rather than a categorical approach.  
To examine the indirect effect of MW, we examined the accessibility of negative 
thoughts using a Scrambled Sentences Task (SST, Van der Does, 2005; Wenzlaff & Bates, 
1998) before and after MW. This task requires participants to unscramble sentences to 
form grammatically correct and meaningful statements using five of six displayed 
words. By reporting the unscrambled sentence that first comes to mind, every sentence 
is resolved in either a positive or negative manner. In depression-related research, this 
task has been used extensively and found to be sensitive to fluctuations in the 
accessibility of negative cognitions (Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010; Wenzlaff & 
Bates, 1998). Unlike the standard paradigm, we did not tax participants’ executive 
resources by means of cognitive load (i.e. retaining a six digit number), because we 
expected that MW would impair mental resources necessary to regulate negative 
thinking (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Finally, depressive symptoms and ruminative 
thinking were both considered in the analysis in order to investigate the potential effect 
of individual differences in predicting negative cognitions.  
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Method 
Participants  
Eighty undergraduates from Ghent University participated in this study for 
course credits. One case constituting an outlier (standardized residuals > 3) was 
dropped, as recommended by Meyers, Gamst, and Guarino (2006), leaving 79 
individuals (mean age = 20.3 years, SD = 2.6, 75.9% female). All participants signed 
informed consent. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee at Ghent 
University.  
 
Materials  
Questionnaires. Individual differences in subclinical depressive symptoms and 
thinking style were considered in this study. Dysphoria and rumination were assessed 
respectively by the Beck Depression Inventory – 2nd Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996) and Ruminative Response Scale - Revised (RRS-R; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991). As measure of current mood state, we used the Positive Affect Negative 
Affect Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Scrambled Sentences Test (SST). The SST is a paper-and-pencil test which 
evaluates the activation of negative relative to positive cognitions and includes 3 sets of 
20 scrambled sentences (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Each scrambled sentence comprises 
of six words randomly ordered in an ungrammatical form. Five of the six words from 
each sentence must be chosen and ordered to form one of two possible sentences. One 
sentence has a positive outcome and the other has a negative resolution. Participants 
had to complete each set within 2.5 minutes. All participants completed one sentence 
set before and one sentence set after the mindwandering phase, and the order of the 
sets was fully counterbalanced. The main outcome is the ratio of negative sentences to 
all the total grammatically correct sentences. Although the SST cannot compute 
statistically independent indexes for negative and positive cognitions, the vast majority 
of the literature relies on the SST to measure negative cognitions (Phillips et al., 2010). 
Thus, in relation to the SST we hereafter refer to “negative cognitions”, though being 
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aware of the limitations above mentioned. A validated Dutch version of the SST was 
used (Van der Does, 2005). 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART). The SART is a Go/No-Go paradigm 
explicitly aimed to facilitate mindwandering or off-task thought (Robertson et al., 1997; 
Christoff et al., 2009). Two different kinds of stimuli appeared on the screen. 
Participants had to respond (pressing a button) to a non-target (e.g. letter “O” – Go 
stimulus) and withhold the response (not pressing) to a target (e.g. letter “Q” – NoGo 
stimulus). The SART session consisted of 40 targets (5.5%) and 720 non-targets. 
Stimulus presentation time and interstimulus interval were both 1250ms. This rate of 
stimulus presentation was based on previous studies indicating that slow stimulus 
presentation rate yields greater off-task thought (Jackson & Balota, 2012; Smallwood et 
al., 2004). Moreover, pseudo-randomly 40 probes consisting of two questions were 
presented. Participants had to report if either the thought preceding the probe was 
fully focused on the task or they were experiencing mindwandering (MW), and then to 
rate the valence of these thoughts (Valence of the Cognitions). Both questions were 
answered on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = on-task to 7 = off-task for the first, 
and from 1 = extremely negative to 7 = extremely positive for the second probe. The 
whole task lasted about 35 minutes. 
 
Design 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were required to fill in current 
mood state measures (PANAS T1), followed by a measure of the accessibility of negative 
cognitions (SST T1). Then, individuals underwent the MW phase (SART), after which 
changes in the accessibility of negative cognitions were assessed again (SST T2). Finally, 
mood state measures (PANAS T2) and individual differences scales (BDI-II and RRS-R) 
were administered. Except for specific characteristics, such design mirrors other studies 
investigating the impact of MW on self-referential thinking (Smallwood et al., 2011, 
Study 2).   
 
Data-analytic strategy 
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We first checked the efficacy of our manipulation in inducing MW in participants 
(MW thought probes and commission errors). To ascertain the effect of time on the 
distribution of commission errors and responses to the thought probes, we obtained 
two halves from the SART, both consisting of the same amount of (non-)targets and 
thought probes (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). We then performed a paired Student’s t-test 
between the first and second half both for MW thought probes and commission errors.  
After this manipulation check, we evaluated changes in affect and affective 
cognitions during the experiment. We first analyzed mood changes (PANAS scales) 
before and after the SART by means of 2x2 ANOVA (Time and Valence as within-subject 
factors). Then, we conducted a paired Student’s t-test to investigate whether cognitions 
became more negative (second thought probe) in the second half compared with the 
first of the SART. We also investigated, by means of a paired Student’s t-test, whether 
there was a change in the accessibility of negative cognitions before and after the SART.  
Finally, we ran two multiple linear regression models2 aiming to investigate 
whether (i) MW and individual differences could explain the valence of cognitions 
during the SART (direct effect), after controlling for mood changes; (ii) MW and 
individual differences (BDI-II and RRS-R) could predict the increase of negative 
cognitions (SST) after SART (indirect effect), after controlling for mood changes. We also 
incorporated into the models the interactions between significant predictors. To do so, 
we used the Hayes and Matthes’ (2009) MODPROBE computational procedures for 
probing interactions. The MODPROBE macro produces the usual regression output as 
well as estimates of the effect of the focal predictor variables at values of the 
moderator variable (for details, see Hayes & Matthes, 2009). According to Cohen, 
Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), the predictor variables are mean-centered prior 
calculating the interaction term. To visualize statistically significant interactions the 
MODPROBE provides the conditional effects of or simple slopes for the focal predictor 
at low (one SD below the mean), moderate (sample mean), and high (one SD above the 
mean) values of the moderator, resulting in three groups of participants. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The same results reported below were obtained, without dropping the outlying case, by means of 
robust regression (M-estimation with Huber weighting). 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics and means are provided in Table 1. 
 
 
Mindwandering: manipulation check  
To ascertain the efficacy of our manipulation, we conducted two paired 
Student’s t-tests between the first and second half of the SART. First, concerning the 
MW probes, analysis revealed a significant increase of MW, t(78) = 4.95, p < .001, d = 
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.55, with individuals’ thoughts being more off-task in the second half (M = 4.64, SD = 
1.21) than in the first (M = 4.09, SD = 0.94). Moreover, the number of commission 
errors was significantly different across time, t(78) = 4.46, p < .001, d = .50, with the 
second half being characterized by more errors (M = 8.16, SD = 4.00) than the first (M = 
6.21, SD = 3.86). These results confirmed the efficacy of the experimental manipulation, 
in that being off-task and committing errors increased with time, whereas being fully 
on-task decreased. 
 
Overall Mood State Changes 
To investigate mood changes, a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was run on 
PANAS, with Time (pre vs. post) and Valence (positive vs. negative) as within-subject 
factors. The analyses revealed main effects of Time, F(1, 78) = 81.68, p < .001, η2p = .51, 
and Valence, F(1, 78) = 311.36, p < .001, η2p = .80. Also a significant Time x Valence 
interaction was found, F(1, 78) = 49.71, p < .001, η2p = .39, qualified by a significant 
reduction of positive mood, t(78) = 9.45, p < .001, d  = 1.05, whereas no significant 
change in negative mood was detected, t(78) = 0.60, p = ns., d = 0.07. 
 
Overall Changes in Affective Cognitions 
To assess negative cognitions during SART, analyses were performed on two 
halves of paradigm. A paired Student’s t-test was performed on the Valence of 
Cognitions probe, reporting a significant difference across two SART parts, t(78) = 3.14, 
p < .002, d = 0.35, with cognitions being more negative/less positive in the second half  
(M = 3.74, SD = 0.79) than in the first half (M = 3.97, SD = 0.57). To assess the 
accessibility of negative cognitions after MW, a paired Student’s t-test was run on the 
SST negative index (percentage of the ratio between negatively interpreted scenarios 
and total number of scenarios) before and after SART paradigm. The analysis revealed a 
significantly increased accessibility of negative cognitions after the MW-related phase, 
t(78) = 3.11, p < .01, d = 0.35. 
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Does mindwandering predict increased negative cognitions (direct effect)? 
The possible direct effect of MW in enhancing negative cognitions was explored 
by adopting a regression approach (for zero-order correlations, see Table 2).  
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The mean Valence of Cognitions served as dependent variable, while individual 
differences (BDI-II and RRS-R) and changes in negative and positive mood (Δ PANAS T2-
T1) were entered as predictors in the first step. In the second step, the mean MW probe 
scores served as predictor3. Variance-inflation-factors were all around 1, showing that 
multicollinearity was not a problem. Analyses revealed that the enhanced level of 
negative cognitions during MW was not significantly predicted  by the model, nor by 
single predictors (see Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The amount of commission errors was not included in the analysis since this variable was correlated 
neither with the dependent variable nor with other predictors. 
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Does mindwandering predict enhanced accessibility of negative cognitions 
(indirect effect)? 
To explore the relation between MW, changes in mood, and accessibility of 
negative cognitions, we ran a hierarchical regression to investigate whether the 
magnitude of MW predicts enhanced accessibility of negative cognitions (see Table 4; 
for zero order-correlations, see Table 2). 
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The increase of SST negative index after MW (post minus pre measure of the 
ratio between negatively interpreted scenarios and total number of scenarios; Δ SST 
Negative Index T2-T1) served as dependent variable. In the first step, individual 
differences measures (BDI-II and RRS-R) as well as changes in positive and negative 
mood (Δ PANAS T2-T1) after MW were entered. Then, in the second step, the mean 
MW thought probe scores were entered4, while in the third step, the interaction 
between MW thought probe and BDI-II was entered. Variance-inflation-factors were all 
around 1, indicating that multicollinearity was not a problem.  
Importantly, the analysis evidenced a significant interaction between MW 
thought probe and depressive symptoms (Step 3) with respect to the increase 
accessibility of negative cognitions (b = .01, t(72) = 2.42, p < .02). This interaction is 
represented in Figure 1. The strength of positive relation between being off-task (MW) 
and increased accessibility of negative cognitions (Δ SST Negative Index T2-T1) was 
stronger among those participants with high levels (above 1 SD) of depressive 
symptoms (b = .08, SE b = .02, t(72) = 3.90, p < .001, 95% CI = .04; .12) than in 
individuals with a moderate level (mean) of depressive symptoms (b = .04, SE b = .01, 
t(72) = 2.68, p < .01, 95% CI = .02; .07). Such relation was absent in participants with low 
levels (below 1 SD) of depressive symptoms (b = .001, SE b = .02, t(72) = .02, p = ns., 
95% CI = -.04; .05). It should be noted that, given the presence of a significant 
interaction, MW and depressive symptoms (BDI-II) cannot be interpreted as main 
effects because these are conditional effects (Cohen et al., 2003; Hayes & Matthes, 
2009).  
                                                 
4
 Similar results were obtained by adopting a categorical approach. In this case MW probe responses 
were dichotomized by classifying scores between 1 and 3 as “on-task thought” and scores between 5 and 
7 as “off-task thought”. Responses scored in the midpoint were excluded (Christoff et al., 2009). Both 
reduction of on-task thoughts and increase of off-task thoughts emerged as significant predictors for the 
“indirect effect” on negative cognitions. 
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Figure 1. Effect of the MW on the predicted increase of accessibility of negative 
cognitions (Δ SST Negative Index T2-T1) at low (below 1 SD), moderate (mean) and high 
(above 1 SD) levels of depressive symptoms (all the predictors variables were centered 
prior the analysis).  
 
Discussion 
Research has shown that we spend a great part of our mental life experiencing 
MW (Kane et al., 2007; Singer, 1966). Interestingly, higher levels of MW are associated 
with lower mood (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and negative thinking (Golding & 
Singer, 1983; Smallwood et al., 2007). We sought to examine the association between 
MW and negative cognitions, distinguishing between possible direct and indirect 
effects. To do so, we measured both negative cognitions during a MW-related paradigm 
and accessibility of negative thinking afterwards. 
In our study, MW predicted heightened accessibility of negative cognition 
afterwards (indirect effect), but only in those with moderate (mean) or high levels (1 SD 
above the mean) of depression. Interestingly, such toxic impact of MW did not emerge 
in individuals with low levels (1 SD below the mean) of depressive symptoms. On the 
contrary, neither MW nor the level of depressive symptoms had immediate effects on 
negative cognition (direct effect). Interestingly, none of these effects was due to mood 
changes. These findings are important in understanding the mechanisms through which 
MW is associated with lower mood and negative cognition in daily life (Golding & 
Singer, 1983; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Mar et al., 2012) and bear interesting 
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implications for our understanding of such associations. Several non-mutual exclusive 
explanations can be proposed for these results. 
Recent perspectives claim that during MW (i) attention is mainly focused 
internally (Baird et al., 2011; Barron et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2011) and (ii) 
personal goals/priorities are actively processed (Levinson et al., 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 
2011). On the one hand, internal focus may enhance access to self-focus and self-
immersed thinking about one’s future or past, which have both been shown to elicit 
negative thoughts (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Mor & Winquist, 2002). On the other 
hand, the fact that MW negatively impacted on cognitions only in people with 
significant levels of depression provides preliminary support for a role of personal 
concerns. Indeed, research has shown that dysphoria is characterized by an elevated 
level of current concerns (Ruehlman, 1985; Salmela-Aro & Nurmi, 1996).  
In light of our results, some broader implications can be derived with regard to 
the impact of MW on mental life. Consistent with the literature, it seems that MW is 
not a negative phenomenon per se. MW indeed did not impact on thinking directly 
during off-task thoughts. Moreover, although MW enhanced subsequent accessibility of 
negative thinking, we have been able to clarify specific conditions in which this 
detrimental effect occurred. In our study, both elevated levels of depression and being 
exposed to ambiguous stimuli which can be negatively framed (SST) were necessary to 
detect the negative effect of MW. We also replicated previous findings showing that 
rumination is not related with MW (Smallwood et al., 2003, 2006).   
Our findings might also be interpreted from a different point of view. That is, the 
presented results indicate that being fully engaged into a task helps to prevent negative 
thoughts and promote positive cognitions in individuals with significant levels of 
depression. This alternative interpretation can be explained in light of theories of mood 
and well-being, where it is often believed that being concentrated in a task and 
mindfully attentive to the present moment has positive effects on mood and well-being 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982; Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011). Moreover, several 
therapeutic interventions have dysphoric and depressed individuals fully engage in 
tasks in everyday life in order to distract them from the typical depressive repetitive 
thinking (Duckworth, Steen, & Seligman, 2005; Hopko, Lejuez, Ruggier, & Eifert, 2003). 
In keeping with this, the present data indicate that the ability to remain on-task indeed 
MINDWANDERING AND NEGATIVE COGNITIONS 
 
 
107 
helps to prevent negative thoughts and promote positive cognitions in at-risk 
individuals.  
This study has several limitations. Obviously, it remains to be seen whether 
these findings in the lab generalize to more naturalistic settings, even if the SART has a 
good ecological validity (Smilek et al, 2010). Moreover, in our study the amount of 
commission errors were related neither with the level of MW nor with the other 
variables implicated in explaining the increase of negative cognitions. Despite the fact 
the commission errors during SART have been generally reported to be associated with 
a more direct measure of MW (amount of off-task thoughts; Hu, He, & Xu, 2012; McVay 
& Kane, 2009), alternative indices of MW during the SART (e.g., RTs) have been 
proposed as well. It is worth mentioning that sometimes subjective and behavioral 
markers of MW appeared to be independent while preceding behavioral (e.g. RTs) and 
neural activity resulted to be correlated (Smallwood et al., 2004, 2008). Such data 
suggests that both MW-related self-reports and commission errors can be considered 
markers of MW, with there being a need to further understand when which measures 
are optimal (Smallwood et al., 2008). In keeping with this limitation, it could be that our 
definition and operationalization of MW is related to different kinds of undirected 
thought, even though in real life most of these phenomena tend to overlap (Christoff, 
2012). Finally, the procedure we chose to measure the accessibility of negative 
cognitions (SST) cannot provide orthogonal scores for negative and positive cognitions 
in that the ratio between both cognitions is mostly used. Thus, it is unclear whether an 
increased negative ratio indicates enhanced accessibility of negative thoughts or 
reduced accessibility of positive thoughts. However, it is noteworthy that previous 
literature adopted the SST as a measure of negative cognitions (Phillips et al., 2010).    
In sum, the past years have witnessed increased research interest in examining 
mental operations of individuals whose attention is decoupled from the surrounding 
environment (Gruberger et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). The present 
findings indicate that there is a reciprocal relation between MW and negative 
cognitions as previous data suggested (Golding & Singer, 1983; Smallwood et al., 2006, 
2007). We now observe that MW shows specificity in heightening accessibility to 
negative cognitions, and that such relation is mediated by the individual level of 
depression. As we spend so much time wandering off even when we are required to be 
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engaged, understanding the underlying mechanisms and possible affective 
consequences of MW may provide important clues about what happens during a 
substantial part of our daily life. 
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The Momentary Self-Focus Inventory (MRSI): 
Validation and psychometric evaluation1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Ruminative self-focus is a common emotion regulation strategy that is 
considered a major risk factor for depression and a number of other emotional 
disorders. Although measures of trait dispositions to engage in rumination are well-
validated, a state measure of ruminative self-focus is lacking. We report on the 
development and validation of a new self-report measure, the Momentary Ruminative 
Self-Focus Inventory (MRSI). In five studies, we examined the psychometric properties 
of the MRSI. In Studies 1, 2, and 3, we report the results of exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis, demonstrating that the 6-item MRSI consists of two 
related factors. In Study 4 we examined the concurrent validity of the MRSI, showing 
that scores on the MRSI were positively but modestly related to measures of trait 
rumination and self-focus. Finally, in Study 5, we provide further validation of the MRSI 
by demonstrating its sensitivity to an experimental manipulation of ruminative self--
focus. Taken together, these findings provide support for the psychometric properties 
of the MRSI as well as its construct and concurrent validity.  
                                                 
1
 Based on Mor, N., Marchetti, I., & Koster, E. H. (2013). The Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory 
(MRSI): Validation and Psychometric Evaluation. Manuscript submitted to publication. 
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Introduction 
Our unique human ability to reflect on our lives, our behavior and ourselves has 
important value in learning from failures, making sense of the world and imagining 
future scenarios. Affect plays an important role in eliciting reflective thinking, as it has 
been argued that positive affect provides feedback about goal attainment, and negative 
affect points to a discrepancy between desired and achieved goals (Carver & Scheier, 
1998). Negative affect, in particular, enhances reflective thinking in an attempt to 
understand failures to attain goals or to make satisfactory progress toward them. This 
understanding is crucial for subsequent behavioral change that would enable goal 
progress. Despite clear advantages of engaging in reflection, research has indicated that 
excessive engagement in self-focused thinking can have negative consequences (Mor & 
Winquist, 2002; Watkins, 2008).  
A particularly maladaptive form of self-focus is rumination (Mor & Winquist, 
2002; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Rumination is defined as 
“behaviors and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and 
on the implications of those symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). Rather than 
leading to improved self-understanding or problem solving, depressive rumination 
augments sad mood and negative thinking by focusing attention on current symptoms 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). The harmful effects of rumination seem to 
stem from its evaluative and judgmental nature, rather than from the focus on 
distress per se (Rude, Maestas, & Neff, 2007).  
Different approaches have been used in conceptualizing and measuring 
rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema’s seminal work (1991) has demonstrated that individuals 
show stable differences in their reactions to negative mood states, and that rumination 
can be construed as a trait-like response style to distress. Following this work, several 
questionnaires have been developed to measure trait rumination. The most commonly 
used measure is the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991), a 22-item scale that assesses typical responses to sad mood that has high 
internal consistency and acceptable concurrent validity (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1994; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Recent factorial examinations of the RRS 
have identified two distinct subtypes of rumination (e.g., Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003; Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 2010; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2011). Reflective 
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pondering is a relatively adaptive form of rumination that denotes the degree to which 
individuals engage in cognitive problem solving to improve their mood, whereas 
brooding is maladaptive and denotes the degree to which individuals passively focus on 
symptoms of distress and on the meaning of those symptoms.  
Other approaches have focused on the repetitive and perseverative aspects of 
rumination and demonstrated that rumination serves as a transdiagnostic risk factor for 
a variety of disorders (e.g., Watkins, 2008). Consistent with these new approaches, the 
Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (Mahoney, McEvoy, & Moulds, 2012) and the 
Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (Ehring et al., 2011), examine repetitive thinking 
across disorders. Although these questionnaires do not assess a specific time frame, 
they have demonstrated good test-retest reliability suggesting that they also tap 
relatively stable ruminative tendencies.  
Some alternative views have suggested that rumination is stress-reactive and 
may fluctuate from moment to moment (for reviews, see Martin & Tesser, 1996; Smith 
& Alloy, 2009). Therefore, in addition to measuring stable ruminative thinking, it is also 
important to examine temporary fluctuations in ruminative self-focus. Whereas trait 
rumination refers to a habitual and structured maladaptive thinking style, momentary 
ruminative self-focus refers to a temporary maladaptive cognitive response pattern that 
is highly dependent on situational cues. Numerous lab-based studies have examined 
causal effects of ruminative self-focus, demonstrating its negative effects on mood, 
thought processes, problem solving and goal-oriented behavior, and psychopathology 
(for a review, see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Recent studies have 
demonstrated meaningful differences between state and trait rumination. For example, 
Moberly and Watkins (2008), found that momentary rumination (assessed via two 
items that inquire about the extent to which participants are currently focused on their 
feelings and problems), predicted subsequent negative affect independently from the 
prediction of trait rumination. Other studies found interactive effects of momentary 
and trait rumination. For example, momentary rumination was related to impaired 
cardiovascular recovery from emotional stress, but only among those who are low in 
trait rumination (e.g., Key, Campbell, Bacon, & Gerin, 2008). Moreover, some studies 
have demonstrated poor stability across time of trait rumination (e.g., Kasch, Klein, & 
Lara, 2001), and recent diary studies have shown significant variation in rumination 
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across days and even hours of the day (e.g., Genet & Siemer, 2012; Takano & Tanno, 
2011). Taken together, these findings support the notion of rumination as a transient 
process that is separate from trait rumination, and underscore the need for a 
momentary measure of rumination.  
Despite increased interest in state rumination, a solid measure of ruminative 
self-focus, that can assess variations in ruminative responses to experimental 
inductions of rumination, has not been developed. Such a measure is also important in 
assessing contextual factors that may contribute to rumination, such as stress (e.g., 
Zoccola, Dickerson, & Lam, 2012). In early work, Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues 
created a daily measure of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 
1993). Later measures of ruminative self-focus address very specific forms of 
rumination, such rumination following an interpersonal offense (Hatzenbuehler, Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Dovidio, 2009; McCullough, Bono, & Root, 2007; Wade, Vogel, Liao, & 
Goldman, 2008), or have been used in the context of experience sampling and 
therefore often include a single item or very few items with unknown psychometric 
properties (Genet & Siemer, 2012; Huffziger, Ebner-Priemer, Zamoscik, Reinhard, 
Kirsch, & Kuehner, 2013; Moberly & Watkins, 2010; Mor et al., 2010; Roberts, Watkins, 
& Wills, 2013; Takano, & Tanno, 2011).  
The current paper reports on the development and validation of the Momentary 
Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory (MRSI). The MRSI consists of 6 items measured on a 7-
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Items on the MRSI were 
designed based on two available tools, the Situational Self-Awareness Scales (SSAS; 
Govern & Marsch, 2001), and the lab experimental induction of rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). The goal in combining items in this way was to capture the 
main features of momentary ruminative thinking: repetitive and reflective self-focus on 
one’s symptoms and the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1987, 1991). Because self-focus is a main component of rumination, we 
included items that assess momentary self-focus. The SSAS is the only questionnaire 
that assesses spontaneously occurring fluctuations in self-focus (Morin, 2011). It is a 9-
item Likert scale that forms three factors: private self-awareness, public self-awareness, 
and attention to the situation. To create the MRSI, we included the three items that 
form the private self-awareness subscale. These three items assess one’s current focus 
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on feelings and thoughts as well as momentary reflection on one’s life. We designed 
three additional items by rephrasing as questions items on the rumination induction 
procedure, which were designed to apply to momentary ruminative thinking. Items on 
the rumination induction were originally designed to focus one’s attention on current 
feelings and on personal characteristics (Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993) and therefore we found them more appropriate as a basis for items on the MRSI 
than items on trait measures of rumination. We selected items that referred to current 
focus on feelings and their consequences. We designed the MRSI to be applicable 
broadly in order to examine momentary ruminative self-focused responses to a variety 
of events (e.g., stress, criticism, anger, etc.). The last consideration in item selection was 
to keep the MRSI short, to allow for repeated administration.  
We report five studies. In the first study we describe psychometric properties 
and exploratory factor analysis. In the second and third studies we report confirmatory 
factor analysis. In the fourth study, we examined the concurrent validity of the MRSI in 
relation to a number of rumination and self-focus questionnaires. In the final study, 
construct validity and specificity of the questionnaire were tested by comparing 
changes in the MRSI following a ruminative versus a non-ruminative self-focus 
induction.  
 
Study 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
In this study we examined the factorial structure of the MRSI using Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA).  
Method 
Participants and Procedure.  
We recruited 234 students at Ghent University (19.77 ± 1.9 years; range 19 – 40; 
87.6% female). The MRSI was completed in a group setting.  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and item correlations for the MRSI items are presented in 
Table 1.  
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Factor Structure and Internal Consistency. A Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) was 
conducted on the 6 items using oblique rotation (Oblimin). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure verified the excellent sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = .81 (Field, 
2009). KMO values for the individual items were all above .70 (range .76 .83) and are 
considered good/excellent. Bartletts’s test of sphericity (χ²[15] = 447.27, p < .001) 
indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for the PAF. An initial 
analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each factor in the data. In order to get a 
threshold above which single eigenvalues were considered significant, we ran a Monte 
Carlo simulation for Parallel Analysis (PA; 6 variables, n = 234, 1000 replications). Six 
random eigenvalues from this PA (1.22, 1.11, 1.03, 0.95, 0.88, 0.78) were compared to 
raw eigenvalues produced by the PAF (3.10, 0.99, 0.60, 0.53, 0.41, 0.34). Based on the 
results of the PA and the scree plot test (Figure 1), a single factor emerged as 
meaningfully interpretable.  
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Figure 1. Scree plot showing the eigenvalues derived from both the Principal Axis 
Factoring and the Parallel Analysis.   
 
Table 2 shows the saturations, eigenvalue, explained variance, and Cronbach’s 
alpha associated with the one-factor solution. In keeping with Stevens (2002), if the 
sample size is larger than 200, only loadings greater than .364 should be interpreted. 
Thus, in the EFA all of the items of the MRSI loaded significantly on the proposed factor.  
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Study 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
In Study 2, we further examined the stability of the MRSI’s unifactorial structure 
using a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Because the MRSI was comprised of items 
that were designed to tap into both self-focus and rumination, we compared three 
theoretically-driven models: the unifactorial model that emerged in Study 1 and a two-
factor model in which items derived from the SSAS (items 1, 2 and 3) and items derived 
from the rumination induction (items 4, 5, and 6) form either related or unrelated 
factors.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure.  
We recruited 100 new students at Ghent University (21.68 ± 1 years; range 20 – 
27; 93% female). Again, the MRSI was completed in a group setting.  
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Data Analysis. 
To examine the stability of the single-factor solution derived from EFA, we 
conducted a CFA on the MRSI using AMOS 7.0 (Arbuckle, 2006). The goodness of fit of 
tested models was evaluated using the following criteria recommended by 
Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, and Müller (2003): the ratio between the chi square 
and degrees of freedom (χ
2
/d.f.) ≤ 3, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.08, comparative fit index (CFI) ≥ 0.95, and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) ≥ 0.95. 
Moreover, we also computed both the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC). Rather than serve to test models, in the sense of 
hypothesis testing, these indexes are used for model selection. Both BIC and AIC are 
indeed characterized by combining absolute fit with model parsimony, in that they tend 
to penalize for adding unnecessary parameters to the model. By comparing BIC and AIC 
for all the models estimated, the model with the lowest index was selected (Maydeu-
Olivares & García-Forero, 2010).  
 
Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis.  
Table 3 reports the goodness-of-fit statistics for the three models that were 
compared. As can be seen in the Table, the two unrelated factors model (2) did not 
meet the adopted criteria and did not provide an adequate fit for the data and was 
excluded. Therefore, the unifactorial (1) and the two related factors model (3) were 
compared. Although, the latter model seemed to better fit the data based on all of the 
goodness-of-fit indexes, there were several causes for concern. First, the goodness-of-
fit indexes suggested that the model over-fitted and artificially represented the data by 
adding unnecessary parameters at the cost of parsimony and validity. Specifically, the 
TLI index was above the threshold of 1, and the normed chisquare (χ2/d.f.) was smaller 
than 1. Both conditions are considered cause for concern (Kline, 1998). Moreover, the 
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two related factors proposed by model (3) were highly correlated (r = .81)2, suggesting 
that the possible contribution of one factor above and beyond the other factor was 
negligible given their substantial overlap.  
 
 
 
Study 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis – Further Investigation 
Given the lack of clarity regarding the optimal factorial solution, we further 
investigated the MRSI structure in another independent sample. The aim of this study 
was to reevaluate the internal structure of the instrument and replicate Study 2, using a 
larger independent sample. Thus, we compared the same three models: the unifactorial 
model (1), the two unrelated factors model (2), and the two related factors model (3).  
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure.  
We recruited 215 new students at Ghent University (21.29 ± 2.9 years; range 17 
– 38; 77.7% female). Again, the MRSI was completed in a group setting.  
 
Data Analysis.  
We adopted the same analytical strategy and criteria used in Study 2.  
 
Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis.  
Table 4 reports the goodness-of-fit statistics for the three models that were 
compared. The analysis clearly supported the two related factors solution (3) as the 
                                                 
2
 The correlation between latent variables is error-attenuated, that is it has been purged from 
measurement error of the indicators, modeled as error variance 
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best option, in that it statistically fitted the data as well as it appeared to be the most 
parsimonious. Moreover, although to a lesser extent than in the previous study, the 
two factors were still highly correlated (r = .63)3. The first factor seems to capture state 
fluctuations in self-focus (we termed it “Self-focus”, MRSI-SF) and reported 
good/excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .78). The second factor seems 
to measure state ruminative processing (we termed it “Ruminative Processing”, MRSI-
RP) and showed excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .81). Given the 
statistical and conceptual link between the factors, we summed up the two subscales to 
obtain a total score (i.e. “Ruminative Self-focus”, MRSI), that showed excellent internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .82).  
 
 
Discussion: Study 1, 2, and 3 
In Study 1, we investigated the factorial structure underlying the six items of the 
MRSI using an EFA. Our findings provided strong evidence for a unifactorial solution. In 
Study 2, when adopting a CFA approach, this structure was not fully confirmed in a 
different sample. Both the unifactorial and the two related factors solutions were found 
suitable to reflect the factorial structure of the instrument. Finally, in Study 3, CFA that 
was run in another independent sample confirmed that the two related factors solution 
provided the best fit for the data and was the most parsimonious model.  
Contrary to our initial hypothesis, we found that the MRSI was not unifactorial. 
This raised the question whether it is possible to disentangle state fluctuations in self-
focus from ruminative processing. Theoretically, as ruminative processing is a 
judgmental and negative form of self-focus (e.g., Watkins, 2008), it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to disentangle one from the other one. This was confirmed by both our CFA 
                                                 
3 see Note 1 
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analyses where the strength of the relation between the factors suggested substantial 
overlap (i.e. .81 and .63). As our measure is designed to be used for state measurement 
which entails manipulating rumination, in most instances both self-focus and 
ruminative processing will be affected by state. Therefore, in most situations the total 
score of the MRSI would be the appropriate choice. For these reasons, we advocate the 
use of the total score, as a sum of both factors. Nevertheless, in an exploratory fashion 
in the following studies we report statistical analyses for the total score as well as for 
both subscales.  
 
Study 4: Concurrent Validity 
The aim of Study 4 was to investigate the concurrent validity of the MRSI. To this 
end, we examined the correlations between scores on the MRSI and scores on other 
measures of rumination and self-focus. We predicted that positive but moderate 
correlations would emerge between scores on the MRSI and questionnaires that assess 
trait-like rumination and habitual self-focus. Moreover, following previous findings 
(Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002) and in line with the maladaptive role of ruminative 
self-focus (Mor & Winquist, 2002), we expected that ruminative self-focus would not be 
positively associated with a measure of insight that denotes the clarity of understanding 
of one’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure.  
Most participants from Study 1 (93.6%) were included in this study and were 
asked to complete additional questionnaires for the purpose of the current study. The 
sample included 219, but 2 individuals constituting outliers (z score > |3|) on the 
Private Self-Consciousness Scale or the Insight Scale were excluded, leaving 217 
individuals (19.79 ± 1.9 years; range 19 – 40; 87.6% female).  
 
Data Analysis.  
In order to examine whether the MRSI total score was correlated with other 
measures of the same nomological network, such as trait self-consciousness and trait 
rumination, we ran several Pearson’s correlations. Only among variables that 
significantly correlated with the MRSI total score, we tested whether there were 
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significant differences in the strength of correlations using the standard t-test 
(Williams, 1959) implemented in the DEPCOR program (Silver, Hittner, & May, 2006). 
We also examined the correlations between the MRSI subscales and the same 
constructs, and whether these correlations were significantly different for the MRSI-SF 
and MRSI-RP subscales of the MRSI.  
 
Materials.  
Momentary State Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory (MRSI). In the current 
study MRSI total score reported excellent levels of internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .81). The Self-focus (MRSI-SF) and the Ruminative Processing (MRSI-RP) 
subscales showed good internal reliability (.76 and .72 respectively).  
Ruminative Responses Scale. (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003). The RRS is a 22item 
self-report questionnaire that assesses trait rumination and consists of items that 
describe responses to a depressed mood that are focused on the self, symptoms, or 
consequences of the mood. Participants indicate how often they engage in such 
responses using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost 
always). Total RRS scores and subscale scores for reflection and depressive brooding 
were calculated. The RRS has shown high reliability and validity and has good 
psychometric properties (Treynor et al., 2003). Internal consistency of the RRS and its 
subscales in the current study was good to excellent (Cronbach’s α = .92 for the total 
score; α = .79 for the brooding subscale; α = .79 for the reflection subscale).  
Private Self-Consciousness Scale. (PrSCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). The 
PrSCS is a 10-item questionnaire that measures stable individual differences in private 
self-focus. Participants rate each item on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (extremely 
uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic). The PrSCS has shown satisfactory 
reliability, temporal consistency, and factor structure (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Vleeming 
& Engelse, 1981). In the current study, the internal consistency of the PrSCS was good 
(Cronbach’s α = .85).  
Self-Reflection and Insight Scale. (SRIS, Grant et al., 2002). The SRIS is a 20-item 
self-report scale. It consists of two separate subscales, the Self-Reflection subscale 
(SRIS-SR) and the Insight subscale (SRIS-IN). The SRIS-SR scale includes 12 items that 
assess the tendency to think about thoughts, actions, and feelings and evaluate them, 
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whereas the SRISIN includes 8 items that evaluate clarity of experience and self-
knowledge. Each item is rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The SRIS has high internal consistency and internal 
validity (Grant et al., 2002; Roberts & Stark, 2008). In the current sample, the SRIS-SR 
and SRIS-IN showed moderate to excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .91 for 
SRISSR; α = .78 for SRISIN).  
 
Results 
Table 5 depicts descriptive statistics and correlations between the RRS, PrSCS, 
SRIS and the MRSI. Scores on the MRSI were positively and moderately correlated with 
scores on both the reflection and the brooding subscales of the RRS and with scores on 
the PrSCS and the self-reflection subscale of the SRIS. As predicted, the MRSI was 
unrelated to the insight subscale of the SRIS. Unexpectedly, the analysis also revealed 
that the MRSI was more strongly correlated with the PrSCS than with brooding 
(Williams’ t = 1.99, p < .05). No other significant differences emerged between the 
correlations (p = ns).  
 
 
In line with the previous studies, the MRSI-SF (M = 12.73, SD = 3.53) and the 
MRSI-RP (M = 10.68, SD = 3.80) subscales were significantly correlated (r = .54, p < 
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.001)4. Table 6 displays the correlations between the subscales and the other trait 
measures as well as the Williams’ standard t-test for dependent correlations. Whereas 
the correlations between the MRSI subscales and self-consciousness and self-reflection 
did not differ significantly, they did show different patterns of correlations with positive 
and negative aspects of self-focus. Thus, the MRSI-SF was more strongly correlated with 
the SRIS Insight subscale than was the MRSI-RP. In contrast, the MRSI-RP correlated 
more strongly than the MRSI-SF with negative aspects of self-focus, such as trait 
rumination, ruminative reflection and depressive brooding.  
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we investigated the concurrent validity of the MRSI as a state 
measure of ruminative self-focus. The analyses revealed that, in line with our 
hypotheses, the MRSI was related to stable individual differences in both self-focus and 
rumination. These correlations were of modest magnitude, supporting the notion that 
the MRSI measures momentary rumination that only partially mirrors trait disposition. 
This speaks in favor of considering MRSI as a valuable source of information when 
                                                 
4
 Please note that this correlation was not estimated in the context of structural equation modeling, so 
that error measurement was not controlled. Estimated error-attenuated correlation between latent 
variables was .72. 
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examining state fluctuations in ruminative self-focus, beyond trait measures. It is also 
noteworthy that the MRSI was not linked to the clarity of internal experience, an 
observation that is in line with research that suggests that ruminative self-focus is not 
associated with beneficial outcomes (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004).  
We also found preliminary evidence that the MRSI subscales capture different 
aspects of ruminative self-focus. In line with the previous factorial analyses, both 
subscales were equally enrooted in the same overarching construct of self-focus, as 
measured by the Private Self-Consciousness Scale and the Self-Reflection Scale. Beyond 
this, the Self-focus subscale seemed also capable of capturing the positive outcomes of 
self-focus, such as increased clarity of understanding of one’s own inner life. In contrast, 
the Ruminative Processing subscale was consistently more correlated than the self-
focus subscale with trait rumination as well as with ruminative reflection and 
depressive brooding, that have consistently shown detrimental effects on mental health 
(Treynor et al., 2003).  
Two limitations of study 4 were addressed in study 5. First, we found, 
unexpectedly, that the MRSI correlated more strongly with PrSCS than with the 
brooding subscale of the RRS. This pattern of correlations might indicate that the MRSI 
is not specific to ruminative thinking but rather assesses the broader concept of self-
focus. To rule out this possibility, we designed a study in which we manipulated state 
rumination in one condition and non-ruminative self-focus in another condition. We 
predicted that if the MRSI is specific to ruminative thinking there would be a significant 
increase in scores on the MRSI following the rumination condition but not following the 
non-ruminative self-focus condition. Moreover, in study 4 we did not assess depressive 
symptoms, a shortcoming that we amended in study 5.  
 
Study 5: Criterion Validity 
In the final study, we tested the criterion validity of the MRSI, and examined 
whether the instrument is sensitive enough to capture experimentally induced 
momentary fluctuations in ruminative self-focus. To this end, we administered the MRSI 
prior to and following a rumination induction. To ascertain that the MRSI taps 
specifically into state rumination rather than self-focus in general, we compared scores 
on the MRSI when following a ruminative self-focus versus a non-ruminative self-focus 
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control condition. We used the standard rumination induction developed by Nolen-
Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). The non-ruminative self-focus was designed to capture 
one’s typical thoughts about day to day self-related topics, but in a non-reflective, 
repetitive or ruminative manner. Therefore, in this condition participants were asked to 
focus on daily activities they perform, but not on their emotions or thoughts, and were 
not asked to reflect on their lives. We expected scores on the MRSI to increase 
following the ruminative self-focus induction but not following the non-ruminative self-
focus induction.  
 
Method 
Participants.  
We recruited 38 students of Ghent University (21.86 ± 4.1 years; range 18 – 38; 
89.5% female). Participants completed the experiment individually.  
 
Measures.  
Momentary State Ruminative Self-focus Inventory (MRSI). In both 
administrations (pre and post experimental manipulation), MRSI Ruminative Self-focus 
total scores showed good to excellent internal consistency (α = .73 and α = .91, 
respectively). Acceptable to excellent levels of internal coherence were shown before 
and after the experimental manipulations in both the Self-focus (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha = 
.63 and .85, respectively) and Ruminative Processing subscale (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha = 
.62 and .84, respectively).  
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
State positive and negative mood were measured using the PANAS, which consists of 20 
items, half of which measure positive and half, negative mood. Participants rate the 
extent to which they experience each mood state in that specific moment, using a 5-
point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (very much). The PANAS is 
reported to have excellent psychometric properties (Watson et al., 1988), and in the 
current study it showed good to excellent levels of internal consistency (positive mood 
Cronbach’s α = .88 and .92; negative mood Cronbach’s α = .87 and .87).  
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck at el., 1996). Depression was assessed 
using the BDI-II, a 21-item self-report questionnaire that assesses the severity of a 
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range of affective, somatic and cognitive symptoms. Individuals rate each symptom on 
a scale ranging from 0 to 3. The reliability and validity of the BDI-II have been well 
documented (Beck et al., 1996). Internal consistency of the BDI-II in the current study 
was excellent (Cronbach’s α = .91).  
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Rumination was assessed using the RRS. Reliability of the RRS and its subscales in the 
current study was moderate to excellent (Cronbach’s α = .92 for the total score; α = .87 
for the brooding subscale; α = .71 for the reflection subscale).  
 
Procedure.  
Upon arrival at the lab, participants completed the trait and state 
questionnaires. They were then randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
conditions. Participants in the ruminative self-focus condition underwent the standard 
rumination induction developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). They were 
asked to focus their attention on a series of 45 emotion-focused, symptom-focused and 
self-focused phrases, each presented on the computer monitor for 15 seconds, for a 
total of approximately 11 minutes. For example, participants were asked to think about 
“what your feelings might mean,” and “why you react the way you do.”  
The non-ruminative self-related thinking condition was developed for the 
purpose of the current study. Participants in this condition were asked to focus on 45 
self-related but non-ruminative or emotional phrases, presented on the computer one 
at a time, for 15 sec each for a total of about 11 minutes. For example, participants 
were asked to think about “what you had for breakfast", and “the books on your 
bookshelf.”  
Immediately following the experimental manipulation, participants completed 
again the MRSI and the PANAS. Participants were then debriefed about the goals of the 
study and were paid and thanked for their participation.  
 
Results 
Mean scores on the MRSI were subjected to a mixed-design ANOVA with 
Condition (ruminative self-focus vs. non-ruminative self-related thinking) as between-
subject predictor and Time (pre-vs. post-induction) as a within-subject predictor. The 
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analysis revealed a significant main effect of both Condition (F[1, 36] = 10.08, p < .005, 
η2p = .22) and Time (F[1, 36] = 15.34, p < .001, η
2
p = .30), with the former indicative of 
higher scores on the MRSI in the ruminative compared to the non-ruminative self-focus 
condition and the latter being indicative of an overall increase in MRSI scores (M = 
22.36, SD = 6.07 for Time 1, and M = 26.15, SD = 8.25 for Time 2). As predicted, these 
main effects were qualified by a significant Time X Condition interaction (F[1, 36] = 
18.94, p < .001, η2p = .34, see Figure 2). Follow-up paired samples t-tests indicated that 
MRSI scores increased following the ruminative self-focus induction (t[18] = 5.38, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.20; M = 23.15, SD = 6.45 for Time 1, and M = 31.15, SD = 5.08 for 
Time 2), but not following the non-ruminative self-related thinking induction (t[18] = 
.34, p = ns, Cohen’s d = .07; M =21.57, SD = 5.73 for Time 1, and M = 21.15, SD = 7.84 for 
Time 2). When BDI-II, Brooding, and increase in negative mood scores (PANAS Negative 
affect subscale) were entered as covariates, the Time X Condition interaction remained 
significant (F[1, 33] = 17.77, p =.000, η2p = .35).  
 
Figure 2. Mean scores and standard errors for MRSI pre and post conditions (ruminative 
vs. non-ruminative self-focus induction). 
 
 
We also tested whether our inductions led to any significant fluctuations in 
negative mood. To do so, we performed a mixed-design ANOVA on the mean scores of 
the negative mood subscale of PANAS, with Condition serving as between-subject 
predictor and Time as a within-subject predictor. The analysis revealed neither a 
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significant main effect of Time (F[1, 36] = 1.95, p = ns, η
2
p = .05), nor a significant main 
effect of Condition (F [1, 36] = .27, p = ns, η2p = .01), with the former indicative of no 
change after both manipulations and the latter being indicative of no overall difference 
in negative mood between conditions. The Time x Condition interaction was also non-
significant (F[1, 36] = 1.13, p = ns, η2p = .03). This pattern of null findings held when 
controlling for BDI-II and brooding (F[1, 34] = 1.29, p = ns, η2p = .04). These results 
confirmed that our manipulation selectively induced increased ruminative self-focus 
without interfering with negative mood.  
Finally, we investigated in an exploratory fashion whether the MRSI subscale 
scores were differentially affected by the manipulations. To do so, we ran a mixed-
design ANOVA with Time (pre- vs. post-induction) and Type of processing (self-focus vs. 
ruminative processing) as within-subject factors and condition (ruminative self-focus vs. 
non-ruminative self-related thinking) as a between-subject factor. The analysis revealed 
that the Time X Type of processing X Condition interaction was marginally significant 
(F[1, 36] = 3.16, p =.084, η2p = .08). However, when BDI-II, brooding, and increase in 
negative mood scores were included in the model as covariates, the interaction was 
fully significant (F[1, 33] = 5.12, p =.05, η2p = .13). In order to probe this three-way 
interaction, we entered the MRSI-SF and MRSI-RP into two separate mixed-design 
ANCOVAs, with Time as a within-subject factor and Condition as a between-subject 
factor and with the above mentioned covariates.  
When predicting MRSI-SF, the analysis did not reveal a significant main effect of 
Time (F[1, 33] = 1.42, p = ns, η2p = .04). Moreover, although the Time X Condition 
interaction was significant (F[1, 33] = 7.74, p =.01, η2p = .19), follow-up repeated 
measures ANCOVAs indicated that MRSI-SF scores did not increase following either the 
ruminative self-focus induction (F[1, 15] = 2.74, p = ns, η2p = .15), or the non-ruminative 
self-related thinking induction (F[1, 15] = .04, p = ns, η2p = .01).  
In contrast, when the same analysis was conducted on mean MRSI-RP scores, it 
revealed a significant main effect of Time (F[1, 33] = 7.22, p =.01, η2p = .18), indicative of 
an overall increase in MRSI-RP scores (adjusted M = 9.58, StEr = .56 for Time 1, and 
adjusted M = 11.76, StEr = .53 for Time 2). More importantly, this main effect was 
significantly qualified by the expected Time X Condition interaction (F[1, 33] = 19.91, p 
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=.001, η2p = .37). Follow-up repeated measures ANCOVAs indicated that MRSI-RP scores 
increased following the ruminative self-focus induction (F[1, 15] = 7.97, p = .01, η2p = 
.37; adjusted M = 9.89, StEr = .90 for Time 1, and adjusted M = 14.68, StEr = .59 for 
Time 2), but not following the non-ruminative self-focus induction (F[1, 15] = .04, p = ns, 
η2p = .01; adjusted M = 9.26, StEr = .69 for Time 1, and adjusted M = 8.84, StEr = .84 for 
Time 2).  
Additionally, we explored if and to what extent MRSI and the related subscales 
at baseline (i.e. before any induction) were significantly correlated with BDI-II scores. 
The analysis revealed that BDI-II score was correlated with both the MRSI total score (r 
= .33, p < .05) and the MRSI-RP score (r = .36, p < .05), but not with the MRSI-SF (r = .21, 
p = ns).  
Discussion 
This study examined the construct validity of the MRSI by testing fluctuations in 
scores related to a rumination induction as compared to a control condition. Results 
indicated that scores on the MRSI fluctuated only in response to the rumination 
induction but not the non-ruminative self-focus control condition. Scores in the control 
conditions stayed highly stable. Importantly, we showed that our experimental 
manipulations selectively induced ruminative processing, rather than negative mood, 
and were more prominent for scores on the ruminative processing subscale of the 
MRSI. This pattern of response suggests that the MRSI can be used as a specific tool for 
assessment of state ruminative self-focus. Furthermore, these observations indicate 
that the MRSI is suitable for repeated administration and is specifically sensitive to 
fluctuations in ruminative self-focus. By capitalizing on the previous study, we also 
explored whether the MRSI subscales differently captured self-focus fluctuations in 
response to our experimental manipulation. The analysis revealed that ruminative self-
focus induction led to significant increase only in the MRSI-RP and not in MRSI-SF. This 
pattern of results was also confirmed by the differential correlational profile. 
Depressive symptoms were significantly correlated with the MRSI Ruminative Self-focus 
total score and the Ruminative Processing subscale, but not with the Self-focus 
subscale.  
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General Discussion 
The aim of this series of studies was to develop and validate a measure of state 
ruminative thinking. To this end, we designed the MRSI based on items from a well-
established measure of state self-awareness and the standard rumination induction. 
Studies 1, 2 and 3 examined the factorial structure of the MRSI. These studies 
demonstrated that a two related factors solution provides a good fit for the data, and 
that the use of the total score and the subscale scores can be considered adequate. 
Study 4 provided further support for the utility of the MRSI by demonstrating that it 
correlates modestly with trait measures of self-focus and rumination. Study 4 also 
provided further evidence that the two subscales, Self-focus and Ruminative 
Processing, capture different aspects of momentary ruminative thinking. Whereas the 
Self-focus subscale was related to increased clarity of understanding of one’s own 
inner life, the Ruminative Processing subscale was more strongly associated with 
negative aspects of ruminative thinking, such as depressive brooding. Finally, Study 5 
demonstrated the sensitivity of the MRSI to experimental manipulations of ruminative 
thinking. Taken together these findings demonstrate the usefulness of the MRSI as a 
state measure of ruminative self-focus.  
Ruminative self-focus is an important construct that plays a central role in 
theories of self and affect regulation (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Martin & 
Tesser, 2006; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Ruminative thinking in response to a stressful event 
or in response to negative mood is thought to contribute to the development or 
maintenance of various forms of psychopathology (Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011; 
Smith & Alloy, 2009). However, a psychometrically sound measure that allows to assess 
fluctuations in ruminative self-focus and that differentiates between state and trait 
rumination, has been lacking. Until now, measures have either focused on specific and 
narrow forms of state rumination (e.g., McCullough et al., 2007; Wade et al., 2008), or 
have used a very limited number of items (e.g., Genet & Siemer, 2012; Moberly & 
Watkins, 2010; Takano & Tanno, 2012). Initial evidence, gleaned from experience 
sampling research suggests that dispositional ruminative tendencies are associated with 
momentary levels of ruminative thinking. The findings we report in Study 4 add to this 
work, indicating that trait rumination and momentary ruminative self-focus are 
interlinked, but are not the same. It may be argued that the small sizes of the 
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correlations between the MRSI and the RRS may raise concerns for the conceptual 
validity of the MRSI. However, the magnitude of these correlations is similar to that 
found between the RRS and momentary rumination measured in experience sampling 
designs (e.g., Huffziger et al., 2013; Moberly & Watkins, 2010). Similarly, the MRSI 
correlated more strongly with the Private Self-Consciousness scale than with the 
Brooding rumination subscale, but the findings of Study 5 confirm that the MRSI is 
uniquely responsive to ruminative thinking rather than reflective self-focus. Together, 
these findings further differentiate between state and trait rumination, and 
substantiate the specificity of the MRSI to momentary ruminative thinking.  
Although prior work has clearly differentiated between subtypes of trait 
rumination (Treynor et al., 2003), this distinction was not applied to designing the MRSI. 
The reason for this is that at brief durations it is more difficult to disentangle more and 
less adaptive aspects of rumination. Instead, we included items related to both self-
focus and ruminative processing. The findings regarding the distinctiveness of subtypes 
of state rumination are mixed across our five studies. On the one hand, whereas the 
correlation between the reflection and brooding subtypes of trait rumination is 
generally modest, the correlation between the two subtypes comprising the MRSI is so 
high that it is difficult to disentangle one from the other. On the other hand, despite the 
strong correlation between the two factors of the MRSI, they did show differential 
correlation patterns with positive and negative aspects of trait rumination and with 
depression, and they responded differentially to a rumination induction. In sum, given 
this lack of clarity, we spur for further investigations to highlight the specific features of 
state self-focus and state rumination from both the methodological and conceptual 
point of view.  
The MRSI is also important because it can allow researchers to test causal links 
between rumination and factors that are either thought to lead to ruminative thinking 
or are considered outcomes of rumination. As the results of Study 5 indicate, the MRSI 
can be used as an effective manipulation check, allowing researchers to assess reliably 
the effects of experimental manipulations of rumination. Moreover, recent theories of 
rumination suggest that cognitive factors, particularly biases and deficits in executive 
functions, have a causal role in rumination (e.g., Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De 
Raedt, 2011). However, empirical evidence for these models often relies on 
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correlational designs that assess the link between trait rumination and cognitive 
biases (e.g., Bernblum & Mor, 2010; De Lissnyder, Derakshan, De Raedt, & Koster, 
2011). Alternatively, some researchers have pointed to the cognitive consequences of 
rumination (e.g., Philippot & Brutoux, 2008; Watkins & Brown, 2002). Thus, the MRSI 
can serve as an important tool in establishing the causal direction of the link between 
cognitive biases and ruminative thinking.  
Recent research has attempted to elucidate contextual factors that can heighten 
or reduce rumination. For example, studies demonstrated that a critical and evaluative 
social environment was associated with increased rumination (Zoccola et al., 2012), 
whereas activating a mental representation of an attachment figure following recall of 
upsetting memories reduced rumination (Selcuk, Zayas, Günaydin, Hazan & Kross, 
2012). In these studies, rumination was assessed using thought records and adhoc 
measures. Using a standard selfreport measure can assist in understanding the 
conditions that foster or inhibit rumination.  
Although we believe that the studies described here provide good empirical 
support for the use of the MRSI, we acknowledge several limitations of this research. 
First, the relative lack of diversity in our samples may temper the generalizability of the 
findings. Therefore, future research should examine the MRSI in additional samples, 
and particularly in clinical samples. Second, we did not assess test-retest reliability for 
the MRSI. Given significant within-day and across-day fluctuations in ruminative self-
focus (e.g., Moberly & Watkins, 2008), it is important that future research assess the 
temporal stability of the MRSI. Third, although we assessed the convergent validity of 
the MRSI by examining its correlations with similar constructs, our assessment of links 
between the MRSI and psychopathology was limited to depression (as measured by the 
BDIII). Future research should broaden the assessment of correlates of the MRSI as well 
as assess discriminant validity by investigating its links with purportedly unrelated 
constructs. Finally, we did not assess links between changes in mood and scores on the 
MRSI. Because rumination both increases negative mood and is elicited by negative 
mood, future research should assess the effects of a mood induction on ruminative 
thinking as measured by the MRSI. In sum, the results of the studies described here, 
provide preliminary evidence for the utility of the MRSI as a measure of momentary 
ruminative self-focus. The MRSI may be useful in studies that assess causal links 
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between rumination and associated factors and contextual factors that affect 
rumination, in experience sampling research that examines within person fluctuations 
in rumination, and in research on the interplay of stable trait tendencies and situational 
factors that affect negative thinking in psychopathology.  
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Rest-related dynamics of risk and  
protective factors for depression:  
A behavioral study1 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Resting state provides an important condition to study depressogenic cognition 
as neuropsychological studies have associated rest with heightened self-related 
processing. We examined outside the fMRI scanner relationships between rest-related 
internal focus, cognitive reactivity (vs. mindfulness), rumination, and negative mood in 
an undergraduate sample (N=80). We tested a theory-based (Marchetti et al., 2012) 
effect by which, in presence of cognitive risk (vs. protective) factors, internal focus 
lowers mood via ruminative self-focus. Such effect was detected in individuals with high 
cognitive reactivity, whereas brooding only showed an incremental effect. On the 
contrary, this dynamic was not significant in individuals with low cognitive reactivity, 
despite the level of brooding, or high mindfulness. These results provide an important 
window on risk for depressogenic thought during resting state. 
  
                                                 
1
 Based on Marchetti, I., Koster, E. H. W., & De Raedt, R. (2013). Rest-related dynamics of risk and 
protective factors for depression: A behavioral study. Clinical Psychological Science, 1(4), 443-451. 
doi:10.1177/2167702613489668 
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“A mind quite vacant is a mind distress’d” 
- William Cowper (1731 – 1800) 
Introduction 
Resting state is defined as a state of relaxed wakefulness during which one is not 
actively engaged in any task, but one’s mind is free to wander off. Despite such 
apparent idleness, our mind is constantly active and tends to gravitate towards 
internally-originated scenarios (e.g. daydreaming, involuntary autobiographical 
memories, etc.). In recent years, neurobiological research has confirmed such notion, 
highlighting that several large-scale neural networks intensively perpetuate their 
activation during rest (Broyd et al., 2009). Neuroimaging studies indicate that resting 
state (i.e. people quietly lie in the scanner with eyes closed) is associated with a neural 
network which shows a tight temporally synchronized co-activation of brain areas (Fox 
et al., 2005), the so-called Default Mode Network (DMN; Raichle et al., 2001). The DMN 
consists of two highly linked sub-networks showing anticorrelated activation, namely 
the Task Negative Network (TN) and the Task Positive Network (TP) (Broyd et al., 2009). 
TN is comprised of brain areas that are typically active during rest, such as 
medioprefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate (Raichle et al., 2001).  
Interestingly, several psychological functions have been proposed to be 
embedded in the TN, such as autobiographical recalling, future prospection, self-
referential thinking, and associative processing (Buckner et al., 2008). Broadly speaking, 
TN is thought to subserve internal focus, during which internally-generated information 
dominates (Fox et al., 2005) and self-related processing occurs (Northoff, 2012). TP 
consists of brain areas (e.g. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal cortex) 
that are particularly active during non-specific task engagement, such as attention 
demanding tasks (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). For these reasons, TP is the putative 
neural substrate of external attentional focus (Fox et al., 2005). In sum, the DMN is a 
resting state network comprising highly anticorrelated oscillations between internal and 
external focus. Given the pivotal role of the DMN in both self-related internal focus and 
task-related engagement, DMN aberrations could play a major role in psychopathology 
(Broyd et al., 2009). For instance, increased TN activation during rest is found in 
depression and schizophrenia (for a review see, Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). In 
depression, there is emerging data on the association between TN and maladaptive 
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self-related processing, such as rumination (Berman et al., 2011). However, to date 
resting state studies have mostly examined isolated risk factors. Recently a 
comprehensive theoretical framework has been proposed relating various cognitive risk 
factors for depression to the DMN (Marchetti, Koster, Sonuga-Barke, & De Raedt, 
2012). The authors proposed that impaired attentional control, rumination, and 
cognitive reactivity are outcomes of DMN dysfunctions. The present study examines 
resting state in relation to rumination and cognitive reactivity at the behavioral level2.  
Rumination has been defined as “repetitively focusing on the fact that one is 
depressed; on one's symptoms of depression; and on the causes, meanings, and 
consequences of depressive symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p.569). The 
deleterious impact of rumination may not derive from attention to distress per se, but 
from internally-oriented attention that is negative, evaluative, and judgmental (Rude, 
Maestas, & Neff, 2007). Indeed, recent literature shows rumination to have its neural 
roots in increased TN activation during rest (Hamilton et al., 2011). Mainly, brooding -
the most maladaptive form of rumination (i.e. passively focusing on the presence and 
meaning of symptoms of distress; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003)-, is 
related to TN during rest (Berman et al., 2011). On the contrary, reflection (i.e. the 
degree to which individuals engage in problem solving to improve mood), considered as 
the more adaptive form of rumination, is negatively associated with temporal 
dominance of TN over TP (Hamilton et al., 2011). In sum, Marchetti et al. (2012) 
proposed that during rest increased TN activity is specifically associated with higher 
levels of maladaptive rumination (i.e. brooding). 
The second rest-related risk factor is cognitive reactivity, namely fluctuations in 
the activation of negative self-attitudes in response to stressors (Butler, Hokanson, & 
Flynn, 1994). The ease by which negative self-related thinking is triggered is accounted 
for by the Differential Activation Hypothesis (DAH; Teasdale, 1988). In brief, the DAH 
postulates that depressive episodes strengthen associative links between negative self-
schemata, negative mood, and negative thinking, so that even mild stressors can 
activate a negative cascade in self-attitudes, depressive thinking, and related behavioral 
outcomes (e.g., depressive withdrawal). However, cognitive reactivity has been recently 
                                                 
2
 Impaired attentional control will not be considered here as it is proposed to specifically occur in the 
transition between rest and task. 
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conceptualized as a process which can be observed also in at-risk individuals who never 
suffered from clinical depression (Moulds et al., 2008). Crucial for our study, the 
construct of cognitive reactivity assumes the existence of negative self-schemata, which 
are “latent but reactive” (Segal & Shaw, 1986). Once activated negative schemata can 
bias self-related processing in a maladaptive way. In keeping with this, Marchetti et al. 
(2012) hypothesized that during rest increased TN activity could neurobiologically 
support such “latent but reactive” negative self-schemata. Although there is some 
overlap between brooding and cognitive reactivity, brooding is considered part of 
stable tendency to ruminate (Treynor et al., 2003) whereas cognitive reactivity is clearly 
defined in relation to the encounter of stress (Teasdale, 1988).  
Related to the association between TN and cognitive reactivity, Marchetti et al. 
(2012) also proposed an inversed relation between mindfulness and TN. Mindfulness is 
a mindset characterized by weak connections between the self and negative thoughts 
and feelings (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), associative connections that are the 
very core of the construct of cognitive reactivity. Recent studies confirmed this notion, 
showing that mindfulness and cognitive reactivity are negatively correlated and that 
after a mindfulness training  negative effects of cognitive reactivity decrease (e.g. 
Kuyken et al., 2010). Moreover, high levels of dispositional mindfulness have been 
associated with decreased rest-related activation (Way, Creswell, Eisenberger, & 
Lieberman, 2010). In sum, individuals with high level of mindfulness may, during rest, 
have a reduced likelihood for self-attitudes and negative feelings and thoughts to occur, 
which mirrors the process of cognitive reactivity in a protective manner.  
In our study, we aimed to investigate depression-related cognitive processes 
that are subserved by the DMN through a behavioral resting state paradigm. It has been 
argued by Broyd et al. (2009) that DMN research is crucial in discerning the 
pathogenesis of psychiatric disorders and that the DMN may become valuable in 
differential diagnosis. Moreover, insight into maladaptive cognitive processes during 
rest can provide new opportunities for clinical interventions. We opted for a behavioral 
resting state approach as, compared to fMRI research, it has larger ecological validity. 
That is, fMRI scanner background noise impacts on cognitive control (Hommel, Fischer, 
Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Cellini, 2012), and suppresses TN activation in a 
nonlinear way (Gaab, Gabrieli, & Glover, 2008), making any conclusion potentially 
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confounded in a non-controllable fashion. To overcome these limitations, we used a 
validated behavioral paradigm which allows making inferences on the underlying neural 
activity (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). Specifically, we asked participants to rest for 
about 25 minutes, keep their eyes closed, and avoid any structured thinking. They were 
then pseudo-randomly probed during this resting state about the level of internal and 
external focus. Crucially, in this paradigm event-related higher levels of internal focus 
have been mirrored by higher activation of TN brain areas, such as medioprefrontal 
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex, while more externally-oriented focus has been 
related to increased activation at level of TP (i.e. inferior frontal gyrus and inferior 
parietal cortex). Moreover, internal and external focus showed the anticorrelated 
pattern typically occurring at the neurobiological level between TN and TP. Also the 
frequency of the switching internal-external focus has been reported to be in the same 
range (<0.1Hz) of DMN fluctuations (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). Compared with 
standard fRMI studies, our paradigm has the advantage to be noise-free and in turn 
immune from the biasing effect of constant auditory stimulation. The resting periods in 
between thought probes (mean ~19 sec), were chosen to be sufficient to elicit 
consistent DMN activation (Gaab et al., 2008) and for participants to experience 
wandering thoughts (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 2000).   
We hypothesized that during rest increased levels of internal focus would be the 
ideal condition for rumination-like analytical process to occur and, in turn, detrimentally 
impact on mood. In other words, given the tendency of internal focus towards self-
related content, higher accessibility of self-salient information could facilitate 
comparative and judgmental processing (Teasdale, 1999), which elicits negative mood 
(Mor & Winquist, 2002). In accord with our neurobiological framework (Marchetti et al., 
2012), we expected that negative effects of internal focus on mood via contribution of 
ruminative self-focus would occur only in individuals with high levels of habitual 
brooding tendencies and/or cognitive reactivity. In keeping with this, we also predicted 
the absence of this effect in individuals who adopt a mindful perspective towards their 
thoughts. Moreover, we hypothesized that internal focus would only lead to lower 
mood when self-related information was processed in a ruminative way. Otherwise self-
related internal focus was not expected per se to lower mood.  
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Method 
Participants  
Eighty-two undergraduates participated in this study. Two cases constituting an 
outlier (z point > 3) were dropped, leaving 80 individuals (mean age=20.5 years, SD=4.5, 
80% female). The study was approved by the local Ethical Committee.  
 
Materials  
Trait and state questionnaires  
Depressive symptoms level was measured by the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd 
Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), whereas trait rumination was assessed by 
the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003). Then cognitive reactivity 
and mindfulness levels were measured respectively by the Leiden Index of Depression 
Sensitivity – Revised (LEIDS-R; Van der Does & Williams, 2003) and the Mindful 
Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003).  
Two state measures were acquired. Specifically, state mood was assessed by the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale - State (PANAS – State; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988), whereas state levels of ruminative self-focus were evaluated by the recently 
validated 6-item Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Items (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & 
Koster, in preparation). Ruminative self-focus is defined as a temporary maladaptive 
analytical process, characterized by “thinking about” experience (Teasdale, 1999).  
 
Resting state paradigm 
Attentional dynamics during rest were studied by means of a validated paradigm 
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). At the start of the procedure, participants received the 
following instruction: “During the next 25 minutes, we ask you to keep your eyes closed 
and to avoid prolonged structured thinking, such as counting or singing. When you hear 
a beep, please use the keyboard to communicate the intensity of ‘external awareness’ 
and ‘internal awareness’ ongoing prior to the beep. ‘External’ is here defined as the 
perception of environmental sensory stimuli (e.g. auditory, visual, olfactory, or 
somesthetic). ‘Internal’ here refers to all environmental stimuli independent thoughts 
(e.g. inner speech, autobiographical memories, or wandering thoughts)”. All participants 
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were instructed to respond by using button presses from 1 = absent to 7 = maximal. 
After a training phase of 11 attention probes, the experiment phase consisted of 66 
attention probes. Interstimulus interval was randomized between 11.3 and 26.8 sec. 
This paradigm generates two main variables, “internal focus” (i.e. “internal 
awareness”) and “external focus” (i.e. “external awareness”). For both internal and 
external focus, the mean scores across 66 attention probes were computed. Notably, in 
our study internal and external focus were significantly anticorrelated (r=-.42, p<.001). 
 
Design 
Participants filled in current mood state measures (PANAS-t0), followed by the 
state measure of ruminative self-focus (MRSI-t0). Then, individuals underwent the 
resting state phase, after which both measures of ruminative self-focus and mood were 
re-administered (respectively MRSI-t1 and PANAS-t1). Finally, questionnaires for 
individual differences in depressive symptoms, rumination, cognitive reactivity, and 
mindfulness (BDI-II, RRS, LEIDS-R, and MAAS) were administered.  
 
Data-analytic strategy 
We tested the hypothesis that higher levels of internal focus (focal predictor) 
could predict increased ruminative self-focus (intervening variable) after the 
experimental paradigm which in turn could explain higher levels of negative mood 
(outcome variable) (Figure 1B, C). Note that we had theoretical reasons to hypothesize 
neither total (path c, Figure 1A) nor direct (path c’ Figure 1B, C) contribution of the focal 
predictor on the outcome variable. This type of statistical model is defined as indirect 
effect model (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). Additionally, we expected the indirect effect to 
vary across different levels of moderator(s), namely either cognitive reactivity and 
habitual brooding (Figure 1B) or mindfulness (Figure 1C). To test such conditional 
indirect effect, we performed all the analyses with Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS macro for 
SPSS (for more details see the Supplemental Online Material). 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized conditional indirect effect models. 1A represents the total effect 
of internal focus in predicting increased negative mood (path c). 1B represents the 
model for cognitive risk factors, that is both the direct effect (path c’) and conditional 
indirect effect per different levels cognitive reactivity and brooding (path axb) are 
depicted. 1C represents the model for protective factor, that is both the direct effect 
(path c’) and conditional indirect effect per different levels of mindfulness (path axb) are 
shown.  
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Results 
Descriptive statistics, Pearson’s correlations, and Cronbach’s alphas are provided 
in Table 1. 
First, we tested the significance of the indirect effect of internal focus (focal 
predictor) on increase of negative mood (outcome variable) through contribution of 
increased ruminative self-focus (intervening variable), across different levels of 
cognitive risk factors, namely cognitive reactivity and trait brooding (Figure 1B). In order 
to remove noise variance unrelated to the focal predictor, we included individual scores 
on dispositional mindfulness, reflection, depressive symptoms, and external focus 
during the task as covariates3.  
Table 2 (upper part) shows that the investigated indirect effect is always 
significant (i.e. bootstrap CIs do not contain zero), with the only exception of low levels 
of cognitive reactivity. Moreover, inspection of the conditional indirect effect 
coefficients allows inferring that brooding has a smaller impact compared with 
cognitive reactivity; nevertheless given a certain level of cognitive reactivity, higher 
levels of brooding contribute to a stronger indirect path. Furthermore, the conditional 
effect of internal focus per either cognitive reactivity or brooding (path a) positively 
predicts increased ruminative self-focus (respectively β=.28 and β=.05), which in turn 
(path b) positively explains the increase of negative mood (β=.24) (see Table S1 in 
Supplemental Material). On the contrary, the total effect of internal focus in predicting 
increased negative mood (Figure 1A, path c), after controlling for the variables 
implicated in the previous model, is not significant (see lower part Table S1); neither is 
the direct effect (Figure 1B, path c’) (middle part Table S1). To summarize, higher levels  
                                                 
3
 Mindfulness is considered to negatively mirror cognitive reactivity as it also emerged in the 
correlational analysis (r=-.42). By controlling for mindfulness, we were able to estimate the particular 
effect of cognitive reactivity above and beyond mindfulness. For the same reason, we included reflection. 
Despite their positive relation, reflection and brooding have been reported to show an opposite 
relationship in relation to the TN at neurobiological level (Berman et al., 2011; Hamilton et al., 2011). This 
observation was confirmed by the opposite role of both reflection and brooding in predicting the 
increase of ruminative self-focus (see upper part Table S1). Moreover, individual level of dysphoria was 
included given its well-established contribution to rumination and negative mood. Importantly, none of 
the covariates, except for external focus (r=-.42), was significantly correlated with the focal predictor, a 
condition which makes such statistical controlling fully appropriate (Miller & Chapman, 2001). External 
focus was included as covariate to ensure that findings obtained for internal focus were not due to 
dynamics related to external focus of attention. 
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of internal focus during rest predict increased levels of negative mood via contribution 
of increased ruminative self-focus. This condition holds only for moderate and high 
levels of cognitive reactivity, whereas the contribution of brooding, although still in line 
with our hypothesis, is smaller. 
 
Second, we tested the significance of the indirect effect of internal focus (focal 
predictor) on the increase of negative mood (outcome variable) through contribution of 
increased ruminative self-focus (intervening variable), across different levels of 
mindfulness as protective factor (Figure 1C). Here we included the following covariates: 
external focus, depressive symptoms, brooding, reflection, and cognitive reactivity. 
Table 2 (lower part) shows that the investigated indirect effect is always significant, 
with the exception of high levels of mindfulness. As hypothesized, the conditional effect 
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of internal focus moderated by mindfulness (path a) negatively predicts increased 
ruminative self-focus (β=-.18), which in turns (path b) positively explains the increase of 
negative mood (β=.30) (see Table S3). On the contrary, neither the total effect (path c) 
nor the direct effect (path c’) of internal focus significantly predicted increased negative 
mood, after controlling for variables included in the conditional indirect effect model 
(see middle and lower part Table S3). To summarize, higher levels of internal focus 
during rest positively predict increased levels of negative mood via contribution of 
increased ruminative self-focus. This condition does not hold for individuals showing 
high levels of dispositional mindfulness. 
 
Discussion 
Rest is increasingly being the focus of intense research and several 
neurobiological abnormalities have been reported during resting state in 
psychopathology (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). Resting state provides an interesting 
condition to study depressive cognitive risk factors and protective factors (Marchetti et 
al., 2012) as behavioral and neuropsychological studies have associated rest with 
heightened levels of self-related processing (Northoff, 2012). Nevertheless, little is 
known about depressogenic cognitive processes during rest. Therefore, we adopted a 
behavioral noise-free paradigm to study cognitive processes that influence mood during 
resting state. The main finding of our study is that there is an indirect effect of internal 
focus on negative mood through ruminative self-focus when individuals have moderate 
to high cognitive reactivity, whereas brooding seems to have only an incremental 
effect. This indirect path is not significant in individuals with low cognitive reactivity 
(regardless of brooding levels), or high mindfulness levels.  
The significant indirect path indicates that internally focused attention is a 
condition that can facilitate judgmental and analytical thinking, which subsequently 
heightens negative mood. This is in line with theories relating self-focused attention to 
negative mood and depression (Ingram, 1990). It is noteworthy that internal focus 
during rest did not overlap with state ruminative self-focus, as these two variables were 
only moderately correlated.  
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Crucially, our data strongly indicates that there are individual differences in the 
affective consequences of being internally focused during rest (i.e. conditional indirect 
effect). On the one hand, cognitive reactivity levels strongly determined the strength by 
which internal focus predicted worsening in mood via ruminative self-focus. On the 
other hand, brooding appears to have only an incremental effect in that, given a certain 
level of cognitive reactivity, brooding augmented the indirect effect without actually 
influencing individuals with low levels of cognitive reactivity. It is noteworthy that we 
have been able to specify the contribution of cognitive reactivity above and beyond 
maladaptive rumination, as shown in previous research (Moulds et al., 2008). Although 
being highly correlated (r=.60), these two constructs show a hierarchical asymmetry in 
moderating the indirect effect, with cognitive reactivity dominating over brooding.  
Our study also shows individual difference variables that have a protective effect 
in such contexts. Individuals with high levels of mindfulness did not experience a 
worsening in mood. The construct of mindfulness is thought to represent weakened 
links between the self, (negative) thinking, and (negative) feelings (Way et al., 2010), 
and in turn to conceptually oppose cognitive reactivity (Marchetti et al., 2012, Raes et 
al., 2009). Correlational analysis confirms this hypothesis, showing that mindfulness 
negatively correlates only with cognitive reactivity, but not with brooding4. A possible 
explanation for this result is that, despite the emergence of self-related material during 
rest, mindful individuals are capable of not engaging in a self-judgmental loop.  
Why is this study of resting state of theoretical and clinical importance? Typically 
during rest when there is time for self-reflection, individuals experience the most 
negative thoughts. However, such conditions have so far rarely been investigated in lab 
contexts. The current paradigm used is highly promising to further study rest-related 
phenomena in psychopathology, with a strong link to rapidly advancing DMN research 
(Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). Although the current paradigm is less informative 
about the neural mechanisms, it is noteworthy that resting state as studied through this 
behavioral paradigm has a larger ecological validity than studies using fMRI. By 
capitalizing on this, we aimed to bridge the extant gap between clinical theories and 
                                                 
4
 This pattern holds even after controlling for brooding (rp=-.382, p<.001), on the contrary the relation 
between brooding and mindfulness is reduced to zero after controlling for cognitive reactivity (rp=.07, 
p=ns). 
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basic neuroscience. Second, our findings provide evidence for interplay between 
cognitive risk as well as protective factors. In line with a recent proposal (Marchetti et 
al., 2012), we could relate different aspects of depression risk to resting state and DMN. 
Especially observing these relations in a sample of healthy, non-depressed participants 
suggests that there are strong relations between resting state, negative thinking, and 
negative mood which can turn toxic even in individuals with limited levels of 
psychopathology. Therefore, it is conceivable that clinically depressed individuals during 
rest might show stronger effects. Our findings can also account for the clinical 
observation that task engagement can lift negative mood (Hopko, Lejuez, Ruggiero, & 
Eifert, 2003). Finally, in relation to clinical interventions, mindfulness has promising 
effects in decreasing cognitive risk factors (Ma & Teasdale, 2004). Given the high 
frequency of (short) resting state phases in everyday life, it appears important for at-
risk individuals (e.g., remitted depressed individuals) to develop mindful skills which can 
protect them from negative consequences associated with rest.  
Our study has limitations. First, despite a strong link has been established 
between internal/external focus and the DMN activity during rest (Vanhaudenhuyse et 
al., 2011), in our study we can only indirectly relate our results to activity of underlying 
neural mechanisms. Second, our study is correlational in nature so no conclusions can 
be drawn regarding causal relationships. Therefore, future studies should further 
investigate the reported effects by directly manipulating the degree of internal focus 
during rest. Third, the presence of probes during the task might have influenced the 
investigated phenomenon. However, previous research on mindwandering has shown 
that assessment of mindwandering using thought probes generates similar results as 
and, sometimes, better than retrospective reports (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987).  
To conclude, we found that internal focus has a detrimental effect on negative 
mood through ruminative self-focus only when individuals have moderate to high 
cognitive reactivity, whereas this is not the case in low cognitive reactivity or high levels 
of mindfulness. Resting state clearly is a pivotal moment where negative cognitions can 
creep up on individuals. Our study attempted to bridge the literature on cognitive and 
neural mechanisms involved in resting state, which increases our understanding of risk 
as well as protective influences. 
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Supplemental Material 
Data-analytic strategy 
In our study, we aimed at testing a specific statistical model where only the 
indirect effect (axb) is expected to be significant, neither the total (c) nor the direct 
effect (c’) is expected to be significant. Indirect effect model is a term which has been 
proposed to differentiate from full and partial meditational models where significant 
either total or direct effects are expected (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In keeping with the 
guidelines proposed by Mathieu and Taylor (2006), we first tested the statistical 
significance of the indirect effect, operationalized as the product of path a and b. We 
then tested the null total effect of the focal predictor on the outcome variable without 
taking into account the contribution of the intervening variable (Figure 1A). We also 
tested the null effect of the direct path (c’), namely the contribution of the focal 
predictor on the outcome after controlling for the intervening variable. When these 
three conditions were satisfied, we could test whether the relation between the focal 
predictor and the outcome is due to an indirect effect through the contribution of the 
intervening variable (Hayes, 2009; Hayes, Preacher, & Myers, 2011; Mathieu & Taylor, 
2006). Nevertheless, the test of the indirect effect model was performed on data that 
were only partially structured to be temporally consistent with the proposed underlying 
process, with the intervening variable (increased ruminative self-focus) and the 
outcome variable (increased negative mood) being measured at the same time. In order 
to control for the alternative indirect  path (reversed model), the data were subjected 
to an analysis in which the increased negative mood served as intervening variable and 
the enhanced ruminative self-focus as outcome. If the results of this reversed model 
were also significant, caution would be warranted (Kenny, 2012). 
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To test the statistical significance of the indirect effect (path axb), according to 
Preacher and Hayes’ recommendations (2008) we adopted the nonparametric 
bootstrapping approach. Compared with the causal steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 
1986) or the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), bootstrapping is considered the most powerful 
approach and free from unrealistic assumptions, such as the multivariate normality in 
data distribution (Bollen & Stine, 1990; Hayes, 2009). Specifically, bootstrapping 
circumvents this problem by relying on confidence intervals (CIs) for the determination 
of the indirect effect instead of the traditional p-value approach that uses standard 
errors (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2002). According to Preacher and Hayes 
(2008), to test the significance of the indirect effect (path axb) we estimated 10000 
bootstrap bias-corrected 95% CIs, and if they did not contain zero they were considered 
significant. Crucially, to determine the significance of the indirect effect (axb path) we 
evaluated only the bootstrap CIs without considering the significance of path a and b, as 
recommended by Hayes (2009, 2012). Regressions weights for both path a and b were 
computed only to clarify the direction of the influence of the focal predictor over the 
intervening variable (path a) and the intervening variable over the outcome variable 
(path b).  
Furthermore, we put forward the indirect effect to vary across different levels of 
the moderator(s), either cognitive reactivity and brooding (Figure 1B) or mindfulness 
(Figure 1C). For both models, we estimated different conditional indirect effects of the 
focal predictor over the outcome variable at low (one SD below the mean), moderate 
(sample mean), and high (one SD above the mean) values of the moderator(s). 
Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), both the focal predictor and the 
moderator(s) were mean-centered prior calculating the interaction term(s). 
 
Additional Analyses 
We tested the reversed models, where increased negative mood acts as 
intervening variable and increased ruminative self-focus acts as outcome variable, by 
estimating the indirect effect. Specifically, we ruled out the statistical significance of the 
reversed models for both cognitive risk factors (TableS2, upper part) and protective 
factor (TableS2, lower part).   
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Self-generated thoughts and depression: 
From daydreaming to depressive symptoms1 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Human minds often engage in thoughts and feelings that are self-generated 
rather than stimulus-dependent, such as daydreaming. Recent research suggests that 
under certain circumstances, daydreaming is associated with adverse effects on 
cognition and affect. Based on recent literature about the influence of resting mind in 
relation to rumination and depression, this questionnaire study investigated 
mechanisms linking daydreaming to depressive symptoms. Specifically, an indirect 
effect model was tested in which daydreaming influences depressive symptoms 
through enhancing self-focus and ruminative thought. Results were in line with the 
hypothesis and several alternative pathways were ruled out. The results provide initial 
supportive evidence that daydreaming can influence depressive symptoms through 
influences on self-focus and rumination. Further research should use prospective or 
experimental designs to further validate and strengthen these conclusions. 
  
                                                 
1
 Based on Marchetti, I., Van de Putte, E., & Koster, E. H. W. (2014). Self-generated thoughts and 
depression: From daydreaming to depressive symptoms. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8:131. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00131  
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All the daydreams are ego-centred. *…+ 
 Each of the daydreams is like a little play, whose hero is the dreamer himself   
G. H. Green (1923, pp. 27-28) 
 
Introduction 
 
It often happens that one’s mind drifts away from what one is doing or that 
one’s attention fluctuates inward during rest. For instance, in everyday life it is a 
common experience, while reading a book, not to be able to recall the last page, or 
during a long train ride, to spend a large part of time being unaware of the other 
passengers. In other words, there is ample evidence that human mind often focuses on 
mental contents arising independently from the direct environment or the task at hand 
(Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Consequently, this specific process 
has been defined “self-generated thought” (SGT; Smallwood, 2013).  
Throughout decades, SGT has been operationalized in different ways (Callard, 
Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulies, 2013), by focusing either on its independence from 
the ongoing task (i.e., stimulus-independent thought; Mason et al., 2007) or the internal 
rather than external source of information (i.e., spontaneous thought; Christoff, Gord, 
& Smith, 2011). We here choose to operationalize SGT as “daydreaming” (Klinger, 
2013), which is a comprehensive phenomenon that, beyond (i) being based on SGT, 
gathers all the mental states sharing crucial characteristics, such as (ii) the same 
neurobiological substrate (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011), and 
(iii) similar subjective content (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). By doing so, we have 
multiple advantages, such as being allowed to capitalize on previous literature (Klinger, 
1971, 1990, 2009, 2013) and the related instruments of measurement (Giambra, 1980; 
Singer & Antrobus, 1970, 1972). 
Daydreaming is conceived as “nonworking thought that is either spontaneous or 
fanciful” (Klinger, 2009, pp. 226) and it is considered the default mode of the mind 
(Mason et al., 2007; Klinger, 1971). This definition includes SGT unrelated to the task at 
hand, also known as mindwandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), as well as instances 
when the mind wanders toward fanciful topics during rest (Klinger, 1971). The value of 
this definition has been confirmed recently by studies showing that daydreaming is 
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enrooted in a specific large-scale neurobiological network (Christoff et al., 2009; Mason 
et al., 2007) known as the Default Mode Network (DMN). The DMN is a neural network 
that is highly active during rest and less active, if not deactivated, during intense task 
engagement (Raichle et al., 2001). This network has been associated with a list of 
mental functions that are characterized by an internal focus, among which daydreaming 
seems to play a major role. Mason and colleagues (2007) have shown that when 
participants’ minds drifted away from a well-practiced task, high levels of DMN 
activation were observed. Interestingly, the activation levels of DMN hub areas were 
correlated with a well-established self-report measure of daydreaming, the 
Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS, Singer & Antrobus, 1970).  
As mental baseline, daydreaming is a frequent phenomenon. Estimates suggest 
that we spend 30-50% of our mental activity during waking hours in thoughts that are 
neither related to what we are doing at that moment nor to the immediate surrounding 
environment (Franklin et al., 2013; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger & Cox, 
1987/1988). In light of this ubiquity, it would be hard to believe that SGT does not serve 
specific functions, be it adaptive or maladaptive (Klinger, 1996, 2013). Although rarely 
studied until recently, the benefits of SGT are increasingly being reported in regard to 
different domains (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013), for instance creative thinking (Baird 
et al., 2012), autobiographical planning (Smallwood et al., 2011), and delaying 
gratification (Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013). Nevertheless, several costs of SGT have 
been documented as well. Daydreaming, and specifically the mindwandering subtype, 
has been shown to detrimentally impact on reading comprehension (Franklin, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011), sustained attention (Smallwood et al., 2004), and 
working memory (McVay & Kane, 2012).  
In line with these findings, daydreaming, especially if characterized by negative 
cognitions, has been associated with symptoms of psychopathology, such as 
depression, schizophrenia, anxiety, and dissociation (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & 
Spreng, in press; Klinger, Henning, & Janssen, 2009). What also confirms the potentially 
toxic role of daydreaming is that its neurobiological substrate has been consistently 
found to be affected in major psychopathology, such as schizophrenia and depression 
(Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). 
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Depression is an important context within which to investigate the clinical 
impact of daydreaming, as this disorder involves spending much time in inactivity, after 
which higher levels of depressed mood and lower levels of mastery and pleasure are 
shown (Martinsen, 2008). In line with this, many studies have indeed reported a clear 
and direct relation between daydreaming and depressive symptoms (Epel et al., 2012; 
Golding & Singer, 1983; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2012). 
For instance, Giambra and Traynor (1978) have shown that the frequency of and the 
tendency to be absorbed by daydreaming, especially if negatively valenced, correlated 
with three different measures of depression. Recently, Meyer, Finucane, and Jordan 
(2011) confirmed this finding, reporting that the tendency to engage in daydreaming 
was predicted by both the severity of current depressive symptoms and the likelihood 
of former depressive episodes. Furthermore, in a laboratory setting, individuals with 
subclinical levels of depression exhibited more accessible periods of mindwandering 
while encoding verbal material, greater attentional control failures, and higher 
physiological response than euthymic individuals (Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & 
Obonsawin, 2007).  
Nevertheless, other studies did not support this link between depression and 
daydreaming in the same clear way, but proposed a more specific relation. Deng, Li, and 
Tang (2012) reported that levels of depressive symptoms correlated only with the rate 
of episodes of mindwandering that occurred without the participant’s awareness of 
being off task (e.g. “zoned out”), but not with those episodes of which a participant was 
aware (e.g. “tuned out”). Moreover, Marchetti, Koster, and De Raedt (2012) showed 
that individuals’ levels of depressive symptoms were not correlated with 
mindwandering, but the former moderated the latter in predicting the accessibility of 
negative thinking. In keeping with this result, Smallwood, O’Connor, and Heim 
(2004/05) also reported that the rate of being off task correlated with individuals’ mean 
scores of depression, but only in high ruminators and not in low ruminators. 
This inconsistency in findings highlights the need to clarify the mechanism(s) 
through which daydreaming can lead to negative outcomes. Shedding light on the 
underlying process could indeed help understand what conditions increase the 
likelihood of negative outcomes related to daydreaming. Recently, Marchetti, Koster, 
Klinger, and Alloy (under review) proposed a comprehensive model that could explain 
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the depressogenic role of daydreaming via contribution of multiple cognitive risk 
factors, such as rumination. In keeping with this, Marchetti, Koster, and De Raedt 
(2013) demonstrated in a laboratory setting that higher levels of internal focus during 
resting state predicted increased levels of state rumination that, in turn, explained a 
temporary worsening in mood. This model specifically held in individuals at-risk for 
depression. The authors speculated that being internally focused during rest could 
facilitate the emergence of self-related material that is the ideal condition for 
rumination to occur (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Rumination, in 
turn, has been consistently found to enhance depressive symptoms (Aldao, Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). Literature consistently reports that during SGT external 
information is processed to a lesser extent (Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011; 
Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010), and the train of thoughts is largely insulated 
(Smallwood et al., 2012). Such reduced processing of external distractions could 
augment repetitive thinking (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
In the current study, we aimed to test the indirect effect hypothesis that: (a) 
during daydreaming, self-related material would be significantly present in individuals’ 
awareness; (b) being self-focused during SGT would spur ruminative processing of the 
emerged material; (c) a rigid and judgmental evaluation of internal material would lead 
to depressive symptoms. Given the inconsistent findings mentioned above, we did not 
make any a priori hypothesis about a direct association between daydreaming and 
depressive symptoms. Our study contributes to this research field in different ways. 
Importantly, by testing this model, we can further specify the mechanisms through 
which daydreaming is toxic and detrimental for mental health. Moreover, by relying on 
self-report questionnaires, our study may complement previous research that, although 
methodologically rigorous, suffers from suboptimal ecological validity, such as fMRI or 
specific laboratory contexts. 
Therefore, we administered several trait questionnaires to measure individual 
levels of daydreaming (vs. mindfulness), self-focus, rumination, and depressive 
symptoms. Importantly, the scale we adopted as a measure for spontaneous cognitions, 
the Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS), was previously used in both neurobiological 
and behavioral studies that confirmed its solid relation with the DMN (Mason et al., 
2007) and rest-related phenomena, such as mindwandering (Mrazek, Smallwood, & 
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Schooler, 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 2012). Moreover, in order to evaluate the specific 
role of daydreaming in predicting depressive outcomes, we controlled for dispositional 
level of mindfulness. Mindfulness has been defined in different ways, but here we 
focused on the perspective that defines mindfulness as sustained nondistraction from 
here and now (Brown & Ryan, 2003). By partialling it out, we could establish the specific 
role of daydreaming above and beyond the potential confound of mindfulness.  
 
Method 
Participants   
We recruited 117 native Dutch-speaking students at Ghent University (mean age 
21.51 ± 3.04, range: 20 – 46, F: 116 and M: 12). This study was approved by the Ethical 
Committee of the faculty of Psychology and Education of Ghent University. 
 
Design 
The questionnaires were completed in a group setting. The order of the 
questionnaires was counterbalanced3. 
 
Materials. 
Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS; Singer & Antrobus, 1970). The DDFS is one 
of the scales forming the Imaginal Processes Inventory. It consists of 12 items used to 
assess the frequency of daydreaming. Respondents rate each item on a 5-point Likert 
scale. Previous studies have reported good to excellent psychometric properties (Singer 
& Antrobus, 1970). For instance, both the English and the French version have been 
found to be unifactorial with substantial loading of each item (Singer & Antrobus, 1970; 
Stawarczyk et al., 2012). The instrument also has excellent six to eight years test-retest 
reliability (r = .76) and internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .91) (Giambra, 1980). In 
the current study, the original 12 items were translated from English to Dutch 
independently by two native Dutch speakers with excellent knowledge of academic 
                                                 
2
 All the analyses reported in this study did not substantially change after excluding the only male 
participant. 
3
 Another trait questionnaire of self-focus, the Private Self-Consciousness Scale (PrSCS, Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975), was also administered. The analysis did not change substantially when the PrSCS 
was used. For sake of brevity, these results were not reported.   
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English. Importantly, one of the translators was one of the authors of this study (E. K.), 
whereas the other translator was not involved in this research. Discrepancies between 
these two versions were discussed until a satisfactory version was found. In this study, 
excellent internal consistency was observed (Cronbach’s alpha = .91).         
Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS; Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002). The 
SRIS is a 20-item self-report questionnaire, consisting of two independent subscales, the 
Self-Reflection subscale (SRIS-SR) and the Insight subscale (SRIS-IN). The SRIS-SR scale 
includes 12 items and measures the tendency to self-focus, that is to think about one’s 
own thoughts, actions, and feelings and evaluate them. The SRIS-IN consists of 8 items 
that assess clarity of experience and self-knowledge. Each item is measured on a 6-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The SRIS has 
high internal consistency and internal validity (Grant et al., 2002; Roberts & Stark, 
2008). The Dutch version of the questionnaire had good psychometric properties 
(Sauter, Heyne, Blöte, Windenfelt, & Westenberg, 2010) and in the current sample, the 
SRIS-SR and SRIS-IN showed excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .94 for SRIS-
SR; α = .82 for SRIS-IN). 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). 
The RRS is a 22-item self-report questionnaire that measures habitual tendency to 
ruminate and consists of items that describe responses to depressed mood that are 
focused on the self, symptoms, or consequences of this mood. Participants rate to what 
extent they usually engage in such responding using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). Total RRS scores and subscale scores for 
reflection and depressive brooding were also calculated. The RRS has shown high 
reliability and validity and has good psychometric properties (Treynor et al., 2003). The 
Dutch version of the instrument also has good reliability and satisfactory validity (Raes, 
Hermans, & Eelen, 2003). Internal consistency of the RRS and its subscales in the 
current study was good (Cronbach’s α = .93 for the total score; α = .77 for the brooding 
subscale; α = .74 for the reflection subscale). 
Beck Depression Inventory 2nd Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The 
BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire, which assesses the severity of affective, 
somatic and cognitive symptoms of depressive phenomenology. Individuals rate each 
symptom on a scale ranging from 0 to 3. The Dutch version of the BDI-II we used has 
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acceptable reliability and validity (Van der Does, 2002). In our study, the BDI-II had 
excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha= .85). 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003). The MAAS is a 
self-report 15-item questionnaire. Participants are required to rate each item on a 6-
point Likert type scale, ranging from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never). The MAAS 
evaluates mindfulness as attention and awareness towards emotions, thoughts, 
sensations, and situations. Higher scores on the MAAS reflect higher levels of 
dispositional mindfulness. The Dutch translation of the MAAS was made available by 
the authors of the original instrument and in our study we found excellent internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha= .81). 
 
Data-analytic strategy. 
We first investigated the psychometric properties of the Dutch version of the 
Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS). Initially, we checked the single item features and 
internal consistency through item analysis and Cronbach’s alpha respectively. We then 
carried out an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) on the Pearson’s correlation matrix by 
means of Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with oblique rotation (Oblimin) to highlight the 
factorial structure of the instrument. According to established guidelines (Zwick & 
Velicer, 1986), we retained the number of factors suggested by the scree plot (Cattell, 
1966; see Figure 1), the Parallel Analysis (PA; Horn, 1965; see Figure 1), and the 
Minimum Average Partial Correlation statistic (MAP; Velicer, 1976). The analyses were 
carried out with IBM SPSS 19 and FACTOR 8.02 (Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006). 
We then checked the descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations among all 
the variables measured in this study. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was 
computed when necessary. Data were transformed to either obtain normally 
distributed variables or correct for outliers (z point > 3). No participants were excluded. 
According to our hypothesis (see Figure 2A), we first tested whether trait 
daydreaming could explain higher levels of self-focus (path a1), which in turn was 
expected to account for higher levels of brooding (path a3). The final output of this 
serial mediation model was individual levels of depressive symptoms (path b2). We did 
not have a specific hypothesis regarding either the total (path c) or the direct (path c’) 
effect of daydreaming with depressive symptoms. According to Mathieu and Taylor’s 
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(2006) guidelines, if the indirect effect was found significant, we could refer to this as an 
indirect effect model only if both the total and direct effect were null. If one or both of 
these two latter effects were found significant, we should speak of either full or partial 
mediation model (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Given that daydreaming and mindfulness 
are thought to represent negatively related constructs, with the former capturing the 
tendency of the mind to drift away and the latter the tendency to be aware of the 
present moment (Deng et al., 2012; Mrazek et al., 2012), we always included the 
mindfulness as a covariate in all the models in which daydreaming was the focal 
predictor in order to establish its contribution above and beyond mindfulness4.   
In our study, the total effect (path c) was computed as the regression 
coefficients of daydreaming and mindfulness predicting depressive symptoms, while 
none of the intervening variables were included in the model. According to the 
mediation theory (Hayes, 2013), it was possible to decompose the total effect in two 
main parts, that is the direct effect (path c’ with depressive symptoms being regressed 
on daydreaming, self-focus, brooding, and mindfulness) and the total indirect effect. 
The latter could, in turn, be decomposed into three specific indirect effects where 
daydreaming influenced depressive symptoms via: (i) self-focus (path a1b1); (ii) brooding 
(path a2b2); self-focus and brooding serially (path a1a3b2). By definition, the sum of the 
direct effect and the total indirect effect equates to the total effect of daydreaming on 
depressive symptoms. 
To test the significance of both the total and specific indirect effects, we 
adopted the bootstrapping approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Compared with the 
causal steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986) or the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), 
bootstrapping is considered the most powerful approach, to be free from unrealistic 
assumptions (i.e., normal distribution of the indirect effect), and to have better control 
on Type I error (Hayes, 2009, 2013). In line with Preacher and Hayes’ recommendations 
(2008), to test the significance of the indirect effects, we estimated 10000 bootstrap 
bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals (CIs), and if they did not contain zero they were 
considered significant. The core hypothesis we tested was the model whereby 
daydreaming influences depressive symptoms via self-focus and brooding serially (path 
                                                 
4
 All the analyses reported did not substantially change after excluding MAAS as covariate 
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a1a3b2). However, in order to rule out alternative paths belonging to the same statistical 
model, we also estimated the other specific indirect effects (Hayes, 2013), where the 
intervening variables were introduced one at a time, that is either path a1b1 or path 
a2b2. In order to clarify the direction of the indirect effects, we also estimated each 
single path (e.g. a1, a2, a3, b1, and b2) using an ordinary least squares regression. Finally, 
in adherence with Mathieu and Taylor’s guidelines (2006), we tested both the direct 
(path c’) and the total effect (path c). 
Given that our study was purely cross-sectional, we tried to rule out two other 
serial indirect effects that would work against our main hypothesis. In the first 
alternative model, we substituted brooding with the reflection subscale of the RRS as 
the second intervening variable. Although both reflection and brooding are essentially 
forms of self-focus and self-referential thinking, reflection is known not to lead to 
negative outcomes, such as depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). We 
thus expected the model, in which daydreaming influences depressive symptoms via 
self-focus and reflection, not to be significant. The second alternative model proposes 
that self-focus leads to increased daydreaming, which in turn could explain depressive 
brooding and depressive symptoms. Self-focus induction indeed has been reported to 
influence the tendency of the mind to drift away from external reality toward the inner 
mental world (Smallwood et al., 2011). However, it is difficult to explain how and why 
daydreaming, after being purged of its self-related component, could lead to 
rumination. Therefore, we anticipated this model would not be significant either.    
All the analyses were carried out with IBM SPSS 19 and the macro PROCESS 2.03 
(Hayes, 2013). 
 
Results 
Preliminary analysis: Psychometric properties of the Daydreaming Frequency 
Scale (DDFS) 
We evaluated the psychometric properties of the Dutch version of the DDFS on 
the total sample. The inter-item correlation matrix showed that all the DDFS items were 
positively correlated, mean r = .47 (range: .17 - .84), as well as the mean-corrected 
item-total correlation was r = .65 (range: .51 - .79). Cronbach’s alpha revealed excellent 
internal consistency (α = .91), which was not improved by item deletion. Before 
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conducting the Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) on the 12 items, we checked the 
assumptions through the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterion (KMO = .91) and the Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity (χ²[66] = 773.28, p < .001), which highlighted sufficient sample size and 
data quality (Gorsuch, 1983).  
The scree plot inspection (see Figure 1), the Parallel Analysis (PA; Figure 1), and 
the Minimum Average Partial Correlation test (MAP, average partial correlation = .331) 
strongly supported the one-factor solution, which explained 51.93% of the variance in 
the unrotated matrix. All the items loaded on the factor substantively, that is ≥ .54 
(range: .54 - .84). According to Stevens (2002), for sample sizes of 100 subjects, only 
loadings greater than .51 should be interpreted.  
 
Figure 1. Scree plot showing the eigenvalues derived from both the Principal Axis 
Factoring (PAF) and the Parallel Analysis (PA). PAF eigenvalues: 6.23, 1.10, .85, .71, .66, 
.57, .47, .41, .32, .29, .22, .15. Random PA eigenvalues (12 variables, n = 117, 1000 
replications): 1.56, 1.40, 1.28, 1.18, 1.09, 1.01, .93, .85, .78, .70, .62, .53.     
 
In sum, we confirmed that the Dutch version of the DDFS is unifactorial and all 
the items significantly represent the underlying factor. We thus adopted the sum of the 
12 DDFS items as our main variable in this study.     
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Descriptive statistics and correlational analysis 
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas and correlations between the 
questionnaire measures are reported in Table 1.  
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In line with our hypothesis, daydreaming frequency was positively correlated 
with self-focus measured with the self-reflection scale (SRIS-SF). Daydreaming was also 
correlated with rumination, and specifically with depressive brooding, but not with 
reflection. In line with a previous study and current theoretical perspectives (Marchetti 
et al., 2013; Marchetti et al., under review), daydreaming seems to be a phenomenon 
during which evaluative and judgmental self-referential thinking occurs. This was also 
supported by the negative relationship between the insight scale (SRIS-IN) and 
daydreaming. Daydreaming seems not to be beneficial with regard to the clarity of 
reflection and self-understanding; on the contrary, it may impair these processes. In 
sum, although daydreaming is focused on the daydreamer’s narrative self (e.g. action, 
feelings, past events, etc.), it is not associated with any immediate beneficial outcome, 
rather it is the ideal condition for detrimental ruminative self-focus to occur. Moreover, 
daydreaming was independent from depressive symptoms, whereas it was negatively 
correlated with being aware at the present moment. It is noteworthy that this modest 
negative relation between daydreaming and mindfulness has been reported previously 
in other studies (i.e. r = -.237; Mrazek et al., 2012). Importantly, not only does this result 
confirm a previous finding (Mrazek et al., 2012), but also it provides information about 
the divergent validity of the Dutch version of the DDFS. 
 
Mediation analysis 
In accordance with Mathieu and Taylor’s guidelines (2006), we first tested the 
significance of the main indirect effect of interest, namely that daydreaming would 
explain the levels of depressive symptoms via self-focus and brooding levels serially 
(path a1a3b2; Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Theoretical path diagram showing the multiple serial mediation model. Path c: 
total effect. Path c’: direct effect. Path a1a3b2: specific indirect effect of interest. 
 
Table 2 shows that this three-step indirect effect was indeed statistically 
significant (path a1a3b2 = .0014; boot 95% CI LL = .0004, boot 95% CI UL = .0036). 
Moreover, all the single paths of this effect were in the expected direction (Table 3).  
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Indeed, daydreaming positively predicted self-focus (path a1 = .036), which, in 
turn, positively predicted brooding (path a3 = .149). Finally, brooding positively 
predicted depressive symptoms (path b2 = .249). It is noteworthy that the simpler 
alternative indirect paths were both not significant. The indirect effect whereby 
daydreaming influences depressive symptoms only via self-focus failed to reach 
statistical significance (path a1b1 = .0005; boot 95% CI LL = -.0012, boot 95% CI UL = 
.0029). So did the other alternative path, whereby daydreaming predicts depressive 
symptoms via brooding levels (path a2b2 = .0019; boot 95% CI LL = -.0006, boot 95% CI 
UL = .0057). In sum, the three-step indirect effect was the only statistically significant 
effect, and, despite that it consisted of two intervening variables, it was parsimonious 
too, in that simpler models did not explain the data satisfactorily (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Statistical diagram with path coefficients. Total effect: c = .002. Direct effect: c’ 
= -.001. Specific indirect effect of interest: a1a3b = .036(.149).249 ≈ .0014. Bold paths are 
statistically significant, while dashed paths are not significant. 
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We then tested both the total (path c) and the direct (path c’) effect using the 
OLS regression approach. Table 3 shows that both unstandardized coefficients were not 
significant. We can thus conclude that the hypothesized serial (indirect) effect model 
was supported and that daydreaming seems to explain depressive symptoms only via 
the contribution of both self-focus and depressive brooding.   
 
Additional analysis 
We also explored two alternative models that were in contrast to our main 
hypothesis. We investigated whether the same three-step indirect effect was 
statistically significant, after removing brooding and including reflection as the second 
intervening variable. Given the unclear link between reflection and depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008), we expected this model would not be significant. In keeping 
with this, Table 4 shows that this alternative model was in fact not statistically sound 
(path a1a3b2  = .0005; boot 95% CI LL = -.0004, boot 95% CI UL = .0021).  
 
By capitalizing on the literature (Smallwood et al. 2011), we also put forward 
that self-focus could lead to a habitual tendency to daydream that in turn could explain 
depressive symptoms via the contribution of brooding. In contrast, our main hypothesis 
argued that daydreaming would lead to depressive brooding only via the self-referential 
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focus of task-free mental activity. Because of this, we expected that this alternative 
model would not reach significance. Table 5 shows indeed that self-focus fails to explain 
depressive symptoms via daydreaming and brooding serially (path a1a3b2 = .0028; boot 
95% CI LL = -.0003, boot 95% CI UL = .0113).  
 
 
Discussion 
SGT and mental phenomena that are based on it, such as daydreaming, are 
increasingly attracting scholars’ attention (Andrews-Hanna et al., in press; Klinger, 1971, 
1990, 2009, 2013; Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) given their 
ubiquitous impact on mental life. Interestingly, daydreaming has been associated with 
increased depressive symptoms and negative cognitions (Meyer et al., 2011; Smallwood 
et al., 2007), although findings are mixed. Here we sought to examine some of the 
pathways that could potentially explain why and how daydreaming leads to depressive 
outcomes and, in turn, account for the inconsistency reported in the literature. 
In our study, we found that levels of daydreaming and depressive symptoms 
were statistically independent. However, according to the previous studies and a recent 
theoretical framework (Marchetti et al., 2013; Marchetti et al., under review), 
daydreaming did predict depressive outcomes, but only to the extent to which self-
focus and brooding were involved too. In other words, during SGT, our attention tends 
SELF-GENERATED THOUGHTS AND DEPRESSION 
 
 
189 
to be focused on internal scenarios related to our self and self-related goals (Diaz et al., 
2013; Klinger, 2009; Northoff et al., 2006). This enhances the chance of ruminating on 
the (lack of) progress in salient goal-striving (Klinger, 2013; Koster, De Lissnyder, 
Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). Unfortunately, such a passive and self-critical evaluation 
has consistently been reported to be depressogenic (Aldao et al., 2010). It is also 
noteworthy that, in line with these results, daydreaming was negatively correlated with 
both mindfulness and the clarity of self-knowledge. That is, people who reported 
experiencing daydreaming generally did not benefit from being aware of the present 
moment nor did being self-focused lead them to a better understanding of themselves.     
On the one hand, these findings are important because they convey a plausible 
nomological model suggesting possible directional links between crucial constructs in 
depression, such as daydreaming, self-focus, and brooding. It is also noteworthy that 
the proposed model could bridge the gap between cognitive and neurobiological 
science, in that the hypothesis tested in this study is compatible with evidence derived 
from both research fields. As mental baseline, daydreaming is considered the 
quintessential outcome of the DMN (Mason et al., 2007), while self-focus has been 
robustly associated with a specific DMN subnetwork, Cortical Midline Structures (CMS; 
Northoff et al., 2006). Unsurprisingly, both rumination and clinical depressive status, 
too, have been linked with higher levels of DMN functional connectivity during resting 
state (Greicius et al., 2007; Berman et al., 2011, Zhu et al., 2012). Therefore, the model 
tested in this study holds promise for guiding future neuroimaging studies where trait 
rumination could be associated with specific dynamics of neural activation of DMN-
related brain regions (i.e., Granger causality test; Hamilton, Chen, Thomason, Schwartz, 
& Gotlib, 2011).     
On the other hand, we believe that our study not only replicated previous 
findings, but also complements these research lines that may suffer from suboptimal 
ecological validity. Both fMRI investigations and experimental studies usually require 
individuals to rest in conditions that are far from those usually experienced. For 
instance, recent methodological studies highlight the detrimental impact of the scanner 
background noise on the neural activation of DMN and resting state (Gaab, Gabrieli, & 
Glover, 2008; Hommel, Fischer, Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Cellini, 2012; 
Rondinoni, Amaro, Cendes, dos Santos, & Salmon, 2013). On the contrary, in our study 
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we did not impose any artificial condition, but we simply investigated stable and long-
term dispositions through self-report. By doing so, we may have been able to track 
specific mechanisms that are more likely to mirror what happens in everyday life, 
although future experience sampling studies are warranted.  
This study has several limitations that we want to acknowledge. First, the 
research design is totally self-report based and methodologically cross-sectional, so that 
no cause-effect claims can be made. Nevertheless, to partially mitigate this flaw, we 
ruled out four alternative models. Not only did this support our hypothesis, but it also 
confirmed the validity of the model, in that no redundant variable was detected. 
Apparently, both self-focus and maladaptive rumination were necessary components 
for daydreaming to impact on depressive symptoms. However, in order to be able to 
further validate the model, behavioral high-risk longitudinal designs are warranted 
(Alloy, Abramson, Raniere, & Dyller, 1999). Second, we acquired information only about 
the frequency of daydreaming and not on its specific content. According to recent 
perspectives on SGT (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), a factor implicated in the 
impacting of daydreaming on well-being is its specific content, either positive vs. 
negative, or past- vs. future-oriented (Klinger et al., 2009; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, & 
Singer, 2013). Accordingly, future studies should include additional significant variables 
in order to better specify under which circumstances daydreaming leads to depressive 
outcomes and, most importantly, when this is not the case. Third, according to our 
hypothesis aiming at clarifying the role of daydreaming in depression, we did not take 
into account the possibly positive effects of SGT. For instance, previous research has 
indeed reported that DDFS is positively correlated with creative thinking (Baird et al., 
2012) and neurobiological evidence suggests that SGT could facilitate social cognition 
(Schilbach et al., 2012; Schilbach, Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008). So, 
we cannot exclude that possible positive effects due to SGT did go unnoticed in our 
study.  
In sum, the clinical importance of resting state and rest-related phenomena is 
increasingly being stressed by both researchers and clinicians (Rosner, Lyddon, & 
Freeman, 2004; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012), with different models being proposed 
(i.e. Andrews-Hanna et al., in press; Marchetti et al., under review; Marchetti, Koster, 
Sonuga-Barke, & De Raedt, 2012). In our study, we confirmed a plausible mechanism 
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recently proposed by Marchetti and colleagues (2013), whereby daydreaming is 
supposed to impact on depression via contribution of both self-focus and rumination. 
However, we are not claiming here that daydreaming is negative per se. On the 
contrary, we have been able to clarify a specific mechanism where self-focus seems to 
be pivotal (Green, 1923). This also implies that, in individuals with a different style, 
daydreaming might have different effects, such as in those who tend to be more other-
focused than purely self-focused during free thinking (Mar, Mason, & Litvack, 2012; 
Marchetti & Koster, 2014).  
In conclusion, daydreaming is a very fluid and complex mental activity. 
Theoretical and empirical efforts are necessary to highlight both the negative and 
positive consequences of such a pervasive phenomenon that occupies a vast part of our 
mental life.   
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Wandering in the dark: 
Daydreaming and vulnerability  
to mood disorders1 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is increasing research interest in mental functioning that is unrelated to 
task activity, termed daydreaming. Daydreaming is an umbrella term for processes such 
as mindwandering, involuntary autobiographical memory, and fantasy. A substantial 
literature elucidates adaptive and maladaptive consequences of daydreaming. In this 
theoretical framework, we propose that, apart from its positive functions, daydreaming 
provides a crucial context for cognitive vulnerability in individuals who are at risk to 
develop mood disorders. Given that daydreaming tends to focus on unattained 
personal goals and evaluate the discrepancy between current and desired status 
(Klinger, 1971, 2013a), daydreaming potentiates in vulnerable individuals at least four 
cognitive risk factors for depression, including rumination, hopelessness, low self-
esteem, and cognitive reactivity, and reduces levels of protective factors, such as 
mindfulness. We also propose that stress could intensify the impact of daydreaming on 
depression. Finally, we describe how daydreaming could enhance the likelihood of 
developing mania. The evidence for this framework is reviewed and we discuss 
theoretical and clinical implications of our proposal. 
  
                                                 
1
 Based on Marchetti, I., Koster, E. H. W., Klinger, E., & Alloy, L. B. (2014). Wandering in the Dark: 
Daydreaming and Vulnerability to Mood Disorders. Manuscript submitted to publication. 
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“The fact that the body is lying down is no reason  
for supposing that the mind is at peace.  
Rest is *…+ far from restful” 
Lucius A. Seneca (∼60 A. D.) 
 
Introduction 
Daydreaming is a very frequent and ubiquitous phenomenon. Although modern 
life is considered busy and hectic with little spare time, estimates consistently suggest 
that we spend up to half of our waking hours thinking of and reflecting upon topics that 
are unrelated to the task at hand or the surrounding environment (Killingsworth & 
Gilbert, 2010). Moreover, daydreaming has been robustly associated with both 
emotional consequences, half of them negative ones (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010, for 
a critique see Klinger, 2013b), as well as personality traits that have been implicated in 
risk for psychopathology, such as neuroticism or openness to experience (Zhiyan & 
Singer, 1996-1997). Notwithstanding these findings, so far only a few theoretical efforts 
have attempted to understand whether and how daydreaming impacts mental health 
and what role it may play in major psychopathology (e.g., Klinger 1996a), such as mood 
disorders, including major depression and bipolar disorder.  
There are good reasons to examine daydreaming in relation to mood disorders. 
Negative self-evaluative thought is a hallmark characteristic of major depression, which 
most frequently arises when one is not fully engaged in a task. As depression has been 
associated with lower levels of behavioral activation (Mazzucchelli, Kane, & Rees, 2009), 
there is ample opportunity to engage in daydreaming. Indeed, rest or low demanding 
tasks are typical conditions known to induce daydreaming (Antrobus, Singer, & 
Greenberg, 1966; Klinger, 2013a). Moreover, considering that in the US more than 32 
million adult individuals have been estimated to be clinically depressed (Kessler et al., 
2003) for a total cost of about $83 billion to society (Greenberg et al., 2003), with 
similar estimates being reported for Europe (Gustavsson et al., 2011), it is timely to 
elucidate the mechanism through which daydreaming impacts mood, cognition, and 
depressive symptoms. 
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Daydreaming as a mental function that potentiates cognitive risk factors for 
depression 
In our framework (Figure 1), we propose that during daydreaming - defined as 
the mind drifting away from external reality in a spontaneous or fanciful way - 
individuals focus mostly on their unattained personal goals and evaluate the 
discrepancy between their current and desired status (Klinger, 1971, 2009, 2013a). 
Importantly, the same mechanism based on goal-discrepancy that is dominant during 
daydreaming is also extensively implicated in well-established cognitive risk factors for 
depression, such as (i) rumination, (ii) hopelessness, (iii) low self-esteem, and (iv) 
cognitive reactivity.  
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework – daydreaming and cognitive risk factors for depression 
 
Crucially, we propose that in individuals who are either dysphoric or vulnerable 
to depression, daydreaming potentiates the aforementioned risk factors which 
subsequently leads to depressive symptoms. According to early and recent perspectives 
on resting state (Harmelech & Malack, 2013; Varendonck, 1921), daydreaming is 
thought to recapitulate the habitual mindset of the daydreamer, such as the personal 
thinking style, and to maintain these habits. Consequently, we suggest that individuals 
with elevated levels of depressive thinking experience a depressogenic style of 
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daydreaming that ends up worsening both their mood and cognitions which, in turn, 
lead to concurrent and future depressive symptoms. On the contrary, in individuals who 
do not show this depressive style, daydreaming is not expected to be maladaptive, 
rather providing benefits, such as creative problem solving and autobiographical 
planning (Mooneyahm & Schooler, 2013).  
Importantly, the cognitive risk factors that we link to daydreaming emerged 
from independent theories of depression and are to a large extent investigated 
independently. In our view, these different cognitive risk factors can be associated with 
the mental state of daydreaming, which potentiates them and provides a prominent 
context in which these risk factors influence mental health. We also propose that 
daydreaming, especially when characterized by negative content, could reduce the 
individual’s ability to be attentive to the present moment and adopt a non-judgmental 
attitude with regard to his/her negative thoughts and emotions; that is, daydreaming 
could reduce mindfulness. Moreover, from a vulnerability-stress perspective, we 
highlight that daydreaming may interact with stress in a way that hinders emotional 
recovery and exacerbates negative outcomes. 
Resting state and daydreaming (i.e., mindwandering) are the focus of intense 
efforts at the level of both behavioral and neuroscience research (Broyd et al., 2009; 
Buckner, Andrews‐Hanna, & Schachter, 2008; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Therefore, 
our framework is informed by new developments in cognitive as well as neurobiological 
studies. The necessity to integrate these different perspectives has been stressed in the 
context of depression (e.g., Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011; Marchetti, Koster, 
Sonuga-Barke, & De Raedt, 2012). To do so, first, we describe the current 
understanding of daydreaming, and specifically its functional and neural characteristics. 
Second, we review the literature that links daydreaming to depression and depressive 
symptoms. Third, we propose theoretical and empirical links between daydreaming and 
the aforementioned risk factors (i.e., rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and 
cognitive reactivity) as well as its interaction with mindfulness and stress. Fourth, we 
discuss preliminary findings associating daydreaming and mania. Finally, we suggest 
future directions to guide new research and discuss the implications of our framework 
for clinical interventions.    
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Daydreaming 
Definition and methodological issues 
It is a common experience that the content of thought is often unrelated to the 
surrounding environment or any external stimulus. For instance, while reading a book, 
we may suddenly realize that we are unable to remember what we have been reading; 
or during a train ride, we may spend a large part of time in wandering thoughts, being 
unaware of what happens around us. As clearly emerges from these examples, the 
phenomenology of undirected thoughts is varied and quite difficult to define precisely. 
Consequently, different terms have been proposed across decades, such as 
mindwandering, spontaneous thought, stimulus-independent thought, task-unrelated 
thought, to mention some. Although tentative taxonomies have been proposed to 
account for subtle differences among these mental states (e.g., Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011), all of these phenomena are characterized 
by roughly similar subjective reports (Singer & McCraven, 1961; Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maj, et al., 2011) as well as by the same neural substrate (Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011). Here we use an umbrella term that represents all of 
these mental states, namely daydreaming (Singer, 1966; Smith, 1904; Klinger, 1971, 
1990, 2009; Varendonck, 1921).  
Daydreaming is defined as “nonworking thought that is either spontaneous or 
fanciful” (Klinger, 2009, pp. 226). Crucially, this definition suggests that daydreaming is 
a nonworking, noninstrumental type of thinking that does not intentionally serve any 
specific function, such as calculating. Furthermore, this definition of daydreaming 
encompasses different types of thoughts, such as spontaneous thinking that is 
unrelated to the current task at hand, or volitional fanciful thinking during periods of 
relaxed wakefulness. Although these phenomena share many features, an experience 
sampling study shows they can be differentiated and independent (Klinger & Cox, 1987-
1988). In sum, the adopted definition of daydreaming is a broad one (Klinger, 2009), as 
it maps on to different types of mental activity that are likely to switch from one to 
another in the normal flow of thoughts (Pope, 1977, as cited in Klinger, 2013a). Given 
this, to provide a comprehensive framework and strengthen the theoretical 
foundations of our model, we capitalize on and integrate different research lines, such 
as (i) mindwandering, (ii) involuntary autobiographical memories, and (iii) fantasy. 
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Mindwandering is probably the largest component of daydreaming (Klinger, 
2009), and is defined as “a shift of attention away from a primary task toward internal 
information” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, pp. 946), that is, attentional decoupling 
from external reality in favor of internal self-generated information. Although many 
ways have been proposed to capture this phenomenon, mindwandering mainly has 
been measured in relation to three functions: reading, working memory, and sustained 
attention (for a review, see Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). Of particular interest is the 
latter domain wherein the individual usually undergoes a slow-paced task (i.e., 
GO/NOGO), such as the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, 
Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). During the SART, the participant is asked to respond 
by pressing a button to frequent non-target stimuli and to withhold a response to 
infrequent target stimuli. Often the SART also involves intra-task thought probes about 
specific qualitative features, such as the type of attentional focus (off- vs. on-task) just 
before the probe.  
Involuntary autobiographical memories are personal memories that arise 
spontaneously without any attempt to intentionally retrieve them (Berntsen, 2009), 
and by definition, they belong to the superordinate category of daydreaming 
(Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010). In daily life, involuntary memories are experienced 
often, especially during periods of non-engagement and in response to either external 
or internal cues, such as casual stimuli from the external world or accidental thoughts 
(Berntsen, 2009). In cognitive research, two methods are used most often to investigate 
this phenomenon:  naturalistic diary studies and experimental paradigms of sustained 
vigilance (Berntsen, 2009).  
Fantasy is defined as “report of mentation other than orienting responses to, or 
scanning of, external stimuli, or operant activity, such as problem-solving in a task 
situation” (Klinger, 1971, pp. 9-10). This definition includes inner experiences, such as 
daydreams in layman’s terms and reveries, but it excludes intentional activities, such as 
writing or working. Fantasy has been investigated by means of different methodologies 
mainly developed in the 1960s and 1970s, which are still used today (for a review see, 
McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 2013). Here, we mainly focus on two methods that are of 
particular interest for us, that is, self-report questionnaire assessment and thought 
probing, either online or retrospective, during periods of relaxed wakefulness.  
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The principal self-report questionnaire for a comprehensive assessment of 
fantasy is the Imaginal Processes Inventory (IPI; Antrobus, Singer, Goldstein, & 
Fortgang, 1970). The IPI consists of 344 items comprising 28 scales measuring the 
frequency, the style, and the content of inner experience, such as emotional content, 
sexual content, visual imagery, acceptance, and distractibility. However, given its length 
and the time necessary for its administration, the 12-item subscale about the frequency 
of daydreaming (Daydreaming Frequency Scale, DDFS) is increasingly adopted instead 
of the long form of the IPI (Mason et al., 2007; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Van der Linden, & 
D’Argembeau, 2012). It is also noteworthy that the DDFS measures the frequency of 
daydreaming, but neither its content nor its emotional valence (e.g. “I daydream many 
different times during the day”). Factor analysis of the IPI revealed three second-order 
factors that could represent a reasonably comprehensive assessment of fantasies and 
daydreams, but in a shorter form. The Short Imaginal Processes Inventory (SIPI; Huba, 
Aneshensel, & Singer, 1981) consists of three 15-item scales measuring specific styles of 
daydreaming, such as positive-constructive daydreaming (i.e., “My daydreams often 
leave me with a warm, happy feeling”), guilty-dysphoric daydreaming (i.e., “In my 
fantasies, a friend discovers I have lied”), and poor attentional control (i.e., “I have 
difficulties maintaining concentration for long periods of time”). 
As an alternative to retrospective self-report assessment, more direct evaluation 
of inner experience during periods of relaxed wakefulness has been proposed, such as 
online thought probes. During resting periods, thought probes are administered to 
investigate the specific content of ongoing mental activity (Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 
2013) and its attentional focus (Marchetti, Koster, & De Raedt, 2013). Moreover, after-
rest retrospective methods have been proposed recently using self-report 
questionnaires (Diaz et al., 2013; Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2004-2005).  
In sum, daydreaming includes a variety of different mental activities that are 
differently conceptualized, but all share similar features, in which most of them arise in 
contexts with low or no task demands. We capitalize on these different research lines in 
order to increase the ecological validity of our model and provide a broad framework 
that can account for undirected mental activity in everyday life. 
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Daydreaming as mental baseline  
In his groundbreaking work in the 1970s, Klinger (1971) tentatively proposed 
that daydreaming is the mental baseline from which the mind departs every time a task 
must be accomplished, and to which it returns whenever not fully and actively engaged. 
In other words, daydreaming is supposed to be the mind’s default mode (Klinger, 2009). 
Later, this speculation turned out to be farsighted, as at least two major findings have 
converged on this point confirming its validity.   
First, daydreaming is thought be frequent and to occupy up to half of our mental 
activity during waking time (Franklin et al., 2013; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger 
& Cox, 1987-1988), with about 2000 out of 4000 daily thoughts dedicated to daydream-
like thoughts (Klinger, 1990). Second, daydreaming has been strongly associated with a 
specific neural network, the Default Mode Network (DMN; Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Spatial distribution of BOLD signal fluctuations at rest, representing major 
areas of the Default Mode Network (DMN). MPFC: medioprefrontal cortex; pACC: 
perigenual anterior cingulate cortex; PCC: posterior cingulate cortex; Rsp: retrosplenial 
cortex; MLTC: mediolateral temporal cortex; LPC: lateral parietal cortex. Reproduced 
and adjusted with permission from Wang, Norton, Hutchison, Ives, & Mirsattari (2012) 
(permission by Dr. Seyed M. Mirsattari). 
 
The DMN is a large-scale network that has been reported to be highly active 
during rest and less active (if not deactivated) during external attention-demanding 
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tasks (Raichle et al., 2001). It comprises different brain areas, such as the 
medioprefrontal cortex (MPFC), the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC), the 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), the retrosplenial cortex (Rsp), the precuneus, along 
with more lateralized areas, such as the lateral parietal cortex (LPC), the mediolateral 
temporal cortex (MLTC) and (para)hippocampal formation (Broyd et al., 2009; Buckner 
et al., 2008). These areas not only show a similar pattern of activation and deactivation, 
but also their low-frequency oscillations are usually temporally synchronized (i.e. 
functional connectivity; Buckner et al., 2008). Importantly, Mason et al. (2007) reported 
that when participants’ minds drifted away from a practiced task, high levels of BOLD 
signal were detected in the DMN. Moreover, the activation levels of the DMN hubs 
were correlated with daydreaming in daily life, as measured with the DDFS (mean of the 
mean correlations across six areas = .58; mean of the peak correlations = .72). 
In sum, cognitive, behavioral, and neuroimaging findings support Klinger’s 
(1971) hypothesis that daydreaming serves as a mental baseline. Undirected thinking is 
an extremely frequent phenomenon that occurs whenever the mind is not engaged in a 
task or drifts away during ongoing external activity.  
 
Basic properties of daydreaming 
Daydreaming is characterized by several features, some of which are of crucial 
interest for their clinical impact, in that daydreams are usually (i) self-focused, (ii) 
sensitive to temporality, and (iii) emotionally valenced.  
Daydreams mostly tend to be focused on the daydreamer’s self. This feature 
was already highlighted by a classic study, as Green (1923) maintained that “*…+ all the 
daydreams are ego-centred. *…+ Each of the daydreams is like a little play, whose hero is 
the dreamer himself” (pp. 27-28). This claim has been confirmed by recent studies. For 
instance, Diaz et al. (2013) demonstrated that self-focused thinking is an important 
component of internal mentation during a 5-minute resting state phase, in both 
ecological (i.e. at home) and fMRI contexts. Moreover, a recent experience sampling 
study in an Asian sample highlighted two important features of daydreaming (Song & 
Wang, 2012). First, daydreaming is likely to be a universal phenomenon (Klinger, 2009), 
as similar results in terms of frequency, triggers, and contents were reported in a non-
Western sample. Second, they found that daydreaming provided a context in which the 
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self-concept is actively processed (Song & Wang, 2012). Finally, at the neurobiological 
level, specific DMN areas lying on the brain midline, such as the MPFC and the PCC, 
have been directly involved with self-processing (for a recent meta-analysis, see Qin & 
Northoff, 2011). 
Daydreaming also appears to be sensitive to time and temporal self-projection. 
Most studies report a prospective bias toward the future (Baird, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2011; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). 
Interestingly this tendency is sensitive to manipulation, as both self-reflection and 
personal goal processing can strengthen this propensity for future-related thoughts 
(Smallwood et al., 2011; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011), whereas negative 
mood induction leads to self-projection in the distant past (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 
2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). However, a closer look at the data also indicates 
that about 40% of daydreaming centers around the present, that is the very recent past 
or immediate future (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Interestingly, Spreng and Grady (2010) 
showed that autobiographical memory and future prospection share the same 
neurobiological substrate, such as the ACC, the PCC, and hippocampal and 
parahippocampal formations.  
Emotionality and daydreaming have been shown to influence each other 
reciprocally and in a complex way (Varendonck, 1921). Experimental manipulations for 
increasing negative mood enhance levels of mindwandering (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, 
Miles, & Phillips, 2009; but see Seibert & Ellis, 1991), whereas an experience sampling 
study suggested that being off-task might enhance future levels of unhappiness 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010, but see Klinger, 2013b, and Poerio et al., 2013). 
Moreover, although people mostly tend to think about positive things during 
mindwandering (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Song & Wang, 2012), they nevertheless 
on average report concurrent lower levels of positive mood (Franklin et al., 2013). 
Importantly, these mood effects have been confirmed cross-culturally in a Chinese 
sample (Song & Wang, 2012). Finally, a recent experience sampling study reported that, 
although mindwandering is usually triggered by prior negative mood (i.e. sadness), only 
negatively valenced mindwandering predicts subsequent negative mood, and not 
mindwandering per se (Poerio et al., 2013). Interestingly this finding held even after 
controlling for mood prior to mindwandering. In other words, negative mindwandering 
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seems to potentiate and amplify previous negative mood. Although more research is 
needed, (negative) daydreaming often appears to lead to negative short- and long-term 
emotional consequences. From a neurobiological standpoint, a recent meta-analysis 
compared brain activity in tasks involving emotional and socio-cognitive processing as 
well as task-related BOLD signal decreases in the DMN (Schilbach et al., 2012). The 
analysis provided compelling evidence that these three domains are all subserved by 
the DMN, mainly the dorsal MPFC (DMPFC) and the PCC. Thus, the mental functions 
subserved by the DMN are likely to be emotional in nature.   
 
Daydreaming as a default goal reminder mechanism 
What is the function of daydreaming? As an answer to this question, Klinger 
(2009) proposes that daydreaming is the residue of prospective goal-directed actions 
that are as yet uncompleted, especially if they are blocked but not yet relinquished. Let 
us explain this in greater detail. Goal pursuit is the key factor on which individual action 
is based. This process begins with commitment to a specific goal (e.g., finding a new 
job) and it ends with either its attainment or relinquishment (i.e., getting a new job vs. 
giving up looking for new employment). The time between the beginning and the end of 
goal pursuit is where current concerns arise (Klinger, 1971, 2009). This is a latent state 
(i.e. “having a goal”; Klinger, 2009, pp. 229) that sensitizes the individual to any 
information that could result in advancement of the goal-striving process (Figure 3). In 
other words, the current concern is the representation of the discrepancy between the 
actual state and the desired outcome state, and it promotes the processing of 
information relevant to moving toward the latter.  
 
Figure 3. Current concerns theory (Klinger, 1971) 
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From these ideas, it follows that daydreaming serves as a default reminder 
mechanism regarding an individual’s agenda of goals (Klinger, 2013a, b). The benefit 
derives from the fact that, when not engaged in immediate and pressuring tasks, one’s 
mind gravitates overtly or covertly toward unaccomplished goals that (i) have not been 
relinquished, and (ii) are still relevant. Without a mechanism based on prospective 
memory, it would be impossible to advance long-term goals, as they imply a long and 
time-based sequence of rather complex actions. As individuals are usually committed to 
multiple and sometimes opposite goals,  no particular current concern consistently 
influences and dominates mental activity, but rather the plethora of current concerns 
do so (Klinger, 1971). Moreover, different goals are organized into hierarchies, in which 
the higher-order goals are more central for the self (Carver & Scheier, 1998). 
Consequently, highly emotionally pressing and self-salient current concerns are posited 
to compete for mental space and hence hinder full engagement in tasks— the 
phenomenon of mindwandering (Klinger, 2009). 
It is now comprehensible why daydreaming is self-focused, temporally sensitive, 
and emotionally valenced. Current concerns are likely to gravitate towards higher-order 
and self-salient goals, as suggested also from cognitive and neuroimaging literature (Qin 
& Northoff, 2011; Song & Wang, 2012). Moreover, current concerns are posited to be 
relevant here and now, as they are likely to be related to the immediate present or the 
upcoming future. In keeping with this, the temporal focus of undirected thought is 
indeed the present time (i.e., recent past and immediate future) along with a 
prospective bias for the future (Baird et al., 2011). Finally, although the content of 
daydreaming often depicts positive and desirable events (i.e., desired state), this is 
frequently associated with a worsening in mood (Song & Wang, 2012), as daydreaming 
reminds one of what has not yet been attained. Nevertheless, as a consequence of this 
hypothesis, if specific daydreams are helpful for reaching goals, the associated emotion 
should be positive as a marker that the attainment of the goal is likely. Franklin et al. 
(2013) recently reported that, although mental drifting is characterized by concurrent 
lower positive mood, off-task periods classified either as “interesting” or “useful” are 
associated with more positive mood. This clearly supports the conclusion that the 
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content of mindwandering can lead to different outcomes and effects, either positive or 
negative. 
In support of these proposals, a large literature directly links current concerns to 
daydreaming (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Antrobus et al., 1966; Klinger, 1971, 2009; Poerio 
et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). Gold and Reilly (1985-1986) 
showed that 64.5% of daydreaming clearly reflected individuals’ current concerns. In 
line with this finding, Johannessen and Berntsen (2010) reported that about half of the 
involuntary (and voluntary) memories were related to one or more of five current 
concerns previously listed by the experimental participants. Finally, at the neural level, 
Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and Schooler (2009) reported that task-unrelated 
thoughts during the SART were not only supported by higher levels of DMN activation, 
but also by increased activity of areas that are usually responsive to task engagement 
and goal pursuit, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Although the DLPFC 
contribution was present only during off-task periods that occurred unnoticed by the 
individuals (i.e., zone-out), this may represent effort, perhaps unconscious, to address 
unresolved issues and unattained goals during task-unrelated thoughts (Christoff et al., 
2009; see Discussion).  
In sum, daydreaming is vital as it reminds and maintains active in the mind 
important goals in order to increase the chance to attain them (Klinger, 2013a). 
Daydreaming also has been associated with other positive functions, such as future 
planning, creative incubation, memory consolidation, self-awareness, and moral 
reasoning, to mention some (for two excellent reviews, see McMillan et al., 2013; 
Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). Nevertheless, even highly adaptive mechanisms may 
sometimes trigger and support maladaptive functions, and daydreaming is no exception 
(Klinger, 1996a). Given the reduced mental control exerted and the focus on unattained 
goals, undirected thinking is the ideal context in which pre-existing negative cognitions 
can be recapitulated and impact mental functions and mood (Klinger, 2009; 
Varendonck, 1921).      
 
Daydreaming and Major Depression 
Throughout decades, the clinical impact of daydreaming did not go unnoticed. 
For instance, Beck (1971/2004) claimed that “*…+ the pathognomonic [day]dream 
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dramatizes the way the individual sees himself, his world, and his future” (pp.31). It is 
not surprising that the link between depression and daydreaming has been highlighted 
by several authors (Segal, 1996; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), given the fact that 
undirected thoughts are intertwined with self-focus, emotions, time perspective, and 
motivation. All these factors have been found to be abnormal in depression; for 
instance, increased self-focus has been strongly associated with negative mood and 
depression (Mor & Winquist, 2002).  
Consistently, the literature reports a marked association between daydreaming 
and depression (Deng, Li, & Tang, 2012; Epel et al., 2013; Golding & Singer, 1983; 
Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010; Meyer, Finucane, & Jordan, 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 
2012). For example, higher levels of depressive mood have been associated with a 
greater rate of commission errors during the SART (Farrin, Hull, Unwin, Wykes, & David, 
2003) and more accessible periods of mindwandering while encoding verbal material 
(Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007). Furthermore, Johannessen and 
Berntsen (2010) showed that the proportion of involuntary memories with reference to 
current concerns was highly correlated with levels of depression (r = .61). Finally, 
depressed patients compared with healthy participants have higher levels of DMN 
functional connectivity during rest, specifically at the level of subgenual cortex (i.e., a 
ventral part of the MPFC [VMPFC]), thalamus, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the 
precuneus (Greicius et al., 2007; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). 
 
Daydreaming and Cognitive Risk Factors 
In our framework, we propose that in individuals who are at-risk for depression 
(i.e., characterized by high levels of cognitive risk factors and/or subclinical depressive 
symptoms), daydreaming maintains and exacerbates four major cognitive risk factors 
for depression, namely rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive 
reactivity (Figure 1). As described above, daydreaming has been convincingly linked to 
depression and depressive symptoms; nevertheless, a comprehensive theoretical 
explanation that accounts for this relationship is lacking. We suggest here that, given its 
focus on emotionally toned goal-discrepancy, daydream content influences and is 
influenced in turn by depressive risk factors, thus forming   positive feedback loops. This 
upward spiral between undirected thought as a forum and cognitive vulnerability that 
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supplies depressive content and expands the space for undirected thought is likely to 
account for both concurrent and future depressive symptoms.  
The proposal is that daydreaming per se is not depressogenic but, given its 
specific content (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), it can potentiate pre-existing 
vulnerability to depression. Empirical research supports our hypothesis. On the one 
hand, in individuals who are at risk for depression, frequent daydreaming is likely to 
carry and maintain depressive content. In line with this, , Giambra and Traynor (1978) 
reported that the frequency of daydreaming and mindwandering correlates positively 
with scores on three different questionnaires for depression. Additionally, significant 
positive correlations were found with absorption in and frightened reactions to 
daydreaming as well as with the tendency to experience daydreams characterized by 
feelings of guilt and fear of failure. This supports our hypothesis that in individuals who 
already are vulnerable to depression, daydreaming maintains and probably worsens 
this condition. On the other hand, in individuals who are at low risk for depression, 
negative consequences related to daydreaming are not expected to occur. For instance, 
Marchetti, Koster, and De Raedt (2012) reported that off-task thoughts (i.e., 
mindwandering) predicted subsequent increased accessibility of negative thoughts only 
in individuals with medium or high levels of depressive symptoms, whereas euthymic 
individuals did not show this toxic effect. Moreover, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2013) 
recently reported that the content and the features of everyday thoughts are 
specifically related to well-being. Depression and negative affect seem to be associated 
with thoughts characterized by self-salience and negative valence, whereas mindful 
individuals define their everyday thoughts as more concrete, less personally salient, and 
more positive. Thus preliminary evidence converges on the idea that daydreaming 
tends to be characterized by negative mood and depressogenic cognitions only in those 
who already show vulnerability to depression.  
We start by discussing empirical evidence for the proposed link between 
daydreaming and cognitive risk factors for depression. Moreover, in order to increase 
the nomological validity of our framework, we will also highlight the negative 
relationship between (negatively toned) daydreaming and mindfulness, a well-
established protective factor against depression. Finally, by adopting a vulnerability-
stress perspective, we propose that daydreaming is a phenomenon sensitive to stress 
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and stressful life events, in that higher stress leads to enhanced and more detrimental 
daydreaming. 
 
Rumination 
Rumination is a form of repetitive self-focus that leads to and exacerbates 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomisrky, 2008; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). 
Despite its major role in emotional disorders, rumination has been conceptualized in 
different ways, such as trait vs. context-dependent, process vs. content, or triggered by 
negative mood vs. goal nonattainment (Smith & Alloy, 2009). 
The most influential theory is the response styles theory (RST), which defines 
rumination as “behaviors and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive 
symptoms and on the implications of those symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema 1991, pp. 
569). According to this theory, individuals react to negative mood by initiating 
ruminative processing with the aim to enhance their self-understanding. Unfortunately, 
rather than providing beneficial effects, rumination leads to a paradoxical increase of 
negative mood that perpetuates repetitive negative thought (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995). The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) is the principal tool for the 
assessment of rumination according to the RST (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), 
and factor analysis highlighted two ruminative subtypes that are worth mentioning 
(Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). First, reflective pondering is considered 
the more adaptive form of rumination as it reflects the extent to which individuals try 
to improve their mood by engaging in active problem-solving. Second, depressive 
brooding is considered the more detrimental form of rumination, as it represents 
passively focusing on symptoms of distress and their meaning. 
Daydreaming has been proposed as a context in which rumination can freely 
occur and detrimentally impact mental functioning (Klinger, 2013a). First, daydreaming 
is characterized by higher levels of self-focus (Song & Wang, 2012) and, second, it 
seems to be associated with higher likelihood of negative mood and less positive mood 
(Franklin et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2009). According to the RST, both self-focus and 
negative mood are pivotal elements that trigger the ruminative spiral.  
Several empirical findings indicate a direct link between daydreaming and 
rumination. In a questionnaire study, it has been reported that a higher frequency of 
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daydreaming, as measured with the DDFS, predicted increased levels of depressive 
symptoms via mediation by both self-focus and depressive brooding serially (Marchetti, 
Van de Putte, & Koster, under revision). In other words, during daydreaming individuals 
tend to focus on themselves and this is the ideal condition for depressive brooding to 
occur, which, in turn, is a well-established antecedent for depression. Such a toxic effect 
of daydreaming was not found when reflective pondering served as mediator. 
Moreover, Marchetti, Koster, et al. (2013) recently showed that higher levels of internal 
focus during rest predicted increased levels of ruminative self-focus and negative mood 
in individuals at risk for depression. Finally, Berman et al. (2011) reported that during 
the resting state, the strength of functional connectivity between the subgenual cortex 
and the PCC correlated with the total score on the RRS (r = .68) in both depressed and 
healthy individuals. Interestingly, this effect was mainly driven by depressive brooding 
(r = .41) and not by reflective pondering (r = -.12).  
Compared with the RST, rumination is conceptualized in a broader way by 
control theories, such as the goal progress theory (GPT), that defines ruminative 
thinking as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a common theme and 
occur in the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts” 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996, pp. 7). This definition shares many similarities with 
daydreaming, as both entail that thinking gravitates towards a common theme (i.e., a 
current concern) and it does not serve any immediate function in relation to the 
external world (i.e., nonworking and noninstrumental thought). Additionally, GPT 
speculates that rumination is triggered and maintained by contextual factors, such as 
the lack of or too slow progress toward goal attainment. Interestingly, Martin, Shrira, 
and Startup (2004) point out that rumination results from failure to achieve higher-
order goals, thus suggesting that individuals ruminate on personally relevant and self-
salient themes as is true for current concerns.  
Although no attempt has been made to directly investigate the relationship 
between the GPT’s type of rumination and daydreaming, a recent study tried to 
integrate different theories of rumination and mindwandering (Roberts et al., 2013). 
Participants were cued about either important unresolved or resolved goals and then 
underwent a task conducive to mindwandering, that is a SART with specific thought 
probes modified for capturing rumination-like thoughts on personal goals. Consistent 
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with GPT, cueing unresolved goals led to more frequent mindwandering on personal 
issues than focusing on personally-relevant but resolved goals (17.5% vs. 3.4%). 
However, RST was also supported, as reporting ruminative task-unrelated thoughts was 
a function of the trait tendency to engage in rumination, as measured with the RRS. 
Specifically, the interaction between the type of manipulation (i.e., cueing resolved vs. 
unresolved goals) and brooding explained a significant amount of variance in 
ruminative thoughts during SART (18.9%), whereas reflection did not contribute to this 
interaction. Interstingly, cueing unresolved goals led to an increase of daydream-like 
state rumination only in individuals with high levels of brooding. In contrast, those with 
low levels of brooding did not report any increase of state rumination after focusing on 
unresolved goals and, in turn, were immune from any toxic effect related to 
daydreaming.  
Consistently, the reviewed studies permit the inference that negatively toned 
daydreaming is strongly related to rumination. In fact, daydreaming provides cognitive, 
emotional, and motivational effects that are the ideal context for rumination to occur. 
The theory of current concerns (Klinger, 1971, 1977, 2013a; Klinger & Cox, 2011) 
provides an explanation for the emergence of rumination. First, thematically 
homogeneous daydream segments are usually brief, with a median estimated duration 
of 5 s and a mean estimated duration of 14 s (Klinger, 1978), meaning that content 
keeps shifting. Ordinarily, these shifts are toward content that may be associated with 
the previous segment but can run the gamut of an individual’s more pressing goals. 
There is reason to believe that these shifts are directed by emotional reactions to 
external and internal cues (Klinger, 1996b, 2013a). Certainly the extent to which a cue is 
related to a current concern is strongly correlated with the extent to which it elicits 
emotional responses (e.g., Bock & Klinger, 1986; Nikula, Klinger, & Larson-Gutman, 
1993). It is therefore easily inferable that when an individual has emotionally highly 
potent concerns and has mentally wandered into processing one of them, the 
subsequent associated segments that these mental cues elicit will have a high 
probability of remaining in the same or closely related content area, whether that is, for 
example, bereavement over a major actual loss or fear of such a loss, or problems with 
self-regard. Such strongly emotional concerns would have the capacity to lock the train 
of thoughts into a thematically narrow content channel— i.e., rumination. 
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There are also contextual factors that facilitate the ruminative component of 
undirected thought. For example, during rest or task-unrelated thought, the 
information coming from the external world is processed to a lesser extent (Barron, 
Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011), so that the chance to be distracted from the 
ruminative train of thoughts is reduced. Distraction has been suggested as a possible 
way to decrease repetitive thinking and reduce its negative effects (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008). 
In sum, we hypothesize that daydreaming frequency in interaction with 
rumination, especially brooding, will predict concurrent and future depressive 
symptoms. We also hypothesize that negatively-valenced daydreaming (i.e., guilty-
dysphoric) will have a more detrimental impact on mental health (see, Klinger, Henning, 
& Janssen, 2009). 
 
Hopelessness 
Hopelessness is considered a proximal sufficient cause of depression (Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Abramson et al., 2002), as high levels of this risk factor have 
been associated with both concurrent and future depressive symptoms (Alloy & 
Clements, 1998; Alloy, Abramson, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 2006; Metalsky & Joiner, 
1992). Hopelessness is defined as “an expectation that highly desired outcomes will not 
occur or that highly aversive outcomes will occur coupled with an expectation that no 
response in one's repertoire will change the likelihood of occurrence of these outcomes” 
(Abramson et al., 1989, pp. 359). Although this definition suggests that the perceived 
likelihood of negative future scenarios is a key feature of hopelessness, only a specific 
type of future negative outcomes is believed to lead to depression. The nonoccurrence 
of desirable scenarios impacts mental functioning and mood only to the extent to which 
the individual is committed to reach those outcomes and thinks they are “in the realm 
of possibility”. This specific feature clearly mirrors the current concerns theory (Klinger, 
1971, 1975, 1977; Klinger & Cox, 2011), as both theories suggest that people commit 
themselves to specific goals and remain “concerned” until either reaching or 
abandoning them (Abramson et al., 1989). It is noteworthy that the process of 
abandoning goals entails a gamut of negative consequences, ranging from negative 
affect (i.e., disappointment) to major depression. While missing a goal that is not 
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central for the self likely leads to minor consequences, abandoning important goals may 
be perceived as a stressful life event.  
In our framework, we propose that during daydreaming one is constantly 
reminded of current concerns. This discrepancy between actual and desired states of 
goal pursuit, especially if emotionally-pressing and negatively valenced, can easily lead 
to (i) expectations about negative future scenarios and (ii) the belief that one has no 
control over the expected outcomes (i.e., helplessness; Seligman, 1975). Several 
findings support this hypothesis. First, a diary study investigated the relation between 
involuntary mental time travel, such as autobiographical memories and future 
projection, and daydreaming style (Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2013). In that study, 
involuntary negative future projections were correlated with guilty-dysphoric 
daydreaming (r = .46), whereas positive-constructive daydreaming was correlated with 
involuntary positive autobiographical memories (r = .47). Consistent with this finding, 
increased rest-related activity in the VMPFC, a key area of the DMN, has been found to 
be correlated with scores on the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, 1988) in both 
depressed and healthy individuals (Grimm et al., 2008; Wiebking et al., 2011). It is 
noteworthy that most of the items of the BHS specifically measure an individual’s 
tendency to envision a negative and hopeless future (i.e., “My future seems dark to 
me”, “All I can see ahead of me is unpleasantness rather than pleasantness”). Second, 
research has robustly associated learned helplessness and mindwandering (for a 
review, see Mikulincer, 1996). Learned helplessness, introduced in the learned 
helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975) and later incorporated into the hopelessness 
theory (Abramson et al., 1989), deals with performance deficits induced by unsolvable 
problems (a helplessness induction) (Seligman, 1975). Mikulincer (1989) reported that 
being exposed to unsolvable problems leads to worse performance in a search task in 
individuals who habitually engage in mindwandering or in those who show more 
mindwandering after the helplessness induction.  
In sum, daydreaming provides a key context for thoughts and feelings of 
hopelessness. Negative daydreaming often consists of negative future scenarios, as is 
true for persons with high levels of hopelessness. Moreover, facing unsolvable 
problems has been consistently reported to be conducive to mindwandering, in that 
during off-task thought individuals are likely engaged in processing self-generated 
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thoughts (Mikulincer, 1996). Consequently, in our model, we propose that self-reported 
and behavioral measures of daydreaming are, for vulnerable individuals, significant 
predictors of both concurrent and future depressive symptoms. We expect this effect to 
be moderated by hopelessness/helplessness. Finally, we anticipate this effect to be 
stronger for guilty-dysphoric daydreamers. 
 
Low Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem is defined as a positive or negative attitude toward the self 
(Rosenberg, 1965) and it has been found to predict subjective well-being over time 
(Schimmack & Diener, 2003). Low self-esteem is considered a key feature in depression 
(for a review, see Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998) and therefore a crucial component in 
the cognitive theory of depression (i.e., negative self-schemata; Beck 1967; Clark et al., 
1999). The evaluative component of self-esteem is thought to stem from a comparative 
process between the “actual self”, that is the current self-representation, and the “ideal 
self”, that is the representations of the personal characteristics that an individual 
aspires to have (Higgins, 1987). The underlying assumption of this model is that the 
ideal self serves as both a motivational incentive for future behavior (i.e., a goal) and as 
the standard to be attained, relevant to judging goal-progress (Zentner & Renaud, 
2007). From this, it follows that individuals with low levels of self-esteem are expected 
to show larger actual-ideal self-discrepancy, in that the current self is far removed from 
the desired self. Consistent with this, research shows that depressed or dysphoric 
individuals report larger self-discrepancy on both explicit and implicit measures 
(Moretti & Higgins, 1999; Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, & De 
Raedt, 2013). 
In our framework, we propose that during daydreaming the comparative 
process influencing self-esteem is active. In other words, the ideal self would represent 
a higher-order goal (i.e., having a better self-concept) to which individuals are 
powerfully committed. The larger the discrepancy between the current state and 
desired state (i.e., actual-ideal self-discrepancy), the more pressing and probably more 
negatively valenced daydreaming about it becomes in turn.  
For decades, this idea has been supported. In his pioneering work, Rosenberg 
(1965) reported that in a sample of about 3000 adolescents, only 13% of individuals 
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with high self-esteem defined themselves as frequently engaged in daydreaming. On 
the contrary, 60% of individuals with low self-esteem reported being habitual 
daydreamers. In other words, self-esteem and daydreaming are negatively correlated. 
Interestingly, this notion was supported by a recent study in which both behavioral and 
self-reported measures of mindwandering were negatively correlated with a 
questionnaire on self-esteem (r ranging from -.16 to -.29; Mrazek et al., 2013). 
Moreover, higher levels of self-discrepancy have been associated with negatively 
valenced daydreaming. Gough, Fioravanti, and Lazzari (1983) reported that individuals 
with larger self-discrepancy were characterized by high levels of daydreaming, self-
concern, and persistent ruminative thoughts, as measured with the California Q-Set 
(Block, 1961). Recently, Klinger et al. (2009) showed that mismatch between the 
current and the ideal self correlates with the guilty-dysphoric daydreaming style. 
Finally, at the neurocognitive level, Disner et al. (2011) proposed that, among other 
areas, the MPFC plays an important role in supporting negative self-schemata that likely 
result in negative self-esteem. In keeping with this, Frewen, Lundberg, Brimson-
Théberge, and Théberge (2013) reported that the VMPFC is associated, perhaps 
uniquely, with negative self-esteem in women. 
In sum, the reviewed literature suggests that individuals with low self-esteem 
are more likely to daydream as an attempt to address the discrepancy between their 
current and desired self-image. In our model, we propose that daydreaming frequency 
could predict both current and future depressive symptoms with moderation by self-
esteem (i.e.. when self-esteem is low). Complementary to this hypothesis, we anticipate 
that guilty-dysphoric daydreaming could predict depressive symptoms synchronously 
and over time.  
 
Cognitive Reactivity 
Cognitive schema theory has been one of the dominant models of depression 
during the last forty years (Beck, 1967; Clark et al., 1999). This theory proposes that 
information processing is guided by individual’s schemata, conceived as memory 
structures that represent information about the self, the world, and the future. 
Depression is hypothesized to be characterized by negative schemata that lead to 
specific ways of misprocessing information, such as attentional, interpretation, and 
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memory biases (Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). However, mere presence of 
depressive schemata is not expected to significantly impact mental functioning, unless 
schemata are activated by relevant stimuli (Beck, 1967).  
This vulnerability-stress perspective with negative schemata as a vulnerability 
factor has been addressed under the notion of cognitive reactivity. Teasdale (1988) 
proposes that after multiple depressive episodes, the strength of the associative 
network between the self, negative thinking, and negative mood is intensified. 
Consequently, priming any element of the network will putatively activate the network 
itself. Cognitive reactivity therefore represents the fluctuations of negative self-
attitudes in reaction to stressors, even if these are mild (Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 
1994). Typically, priming negative mood has been shown to efficaciously activate 
negative schemata (for a review see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005); however, inducing 
self-focus has also been found to activate them (Hedlund & Rude, 1995). Importantly, 
several longitudinal studies have shown that the interaction between stress and 
cognitive reactivity predicted depression (Hankin, Abramson, Miller, & Haeffel, 2004; 
but see Barnett & Gotlib 1990), and Segal et al. (2006) reported that mood-induced 
cognitive reactivity could predict relapse in remitted depressed individuals over 18 
months (but see, van Rijsbergen et al., 2013). It is worth highlighting that, although 
originally developed to account for depressive recurrence, cognitive reactivity recently 
has been conceptualized as a fundamental mechanism present also in non-clinical 
populations. For instance, Van der Does and Williams (2003) developed the Leiden 
Index for Depression Sensitivity – Revised (LEIDS-R) that investigates the tendency to 
engage in negative self-attitudes in response to low mood, rather than depressed 
mood, in both clinical and non-clinical individuals.  
How is cognitive reactivity linked to daydreaming? These two phenomena share 
many similarities. For instance, manipulations involving either negative mood or self-
focus can trigger both daydreaming (Smallwood et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011) 
and cognitive reactivity (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Scher et al., 2005). Moreover, Segal 
(1996) speculated that intensity and intrusiveness of negative mindwandering (i.e. 
depressive cognitive interference) is a function of associative strength of the depressive 
network. In other words, the tighter the depressive network is, the more negative and 
more difficult to control daydreaming becomes (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). In line with 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
224 
this, it is reasonable to expect that an individual with high levels of cognitive reactivity 
experiences daydreaming as more ruminative and hopelessly focused on goal-
discrepancy. Confirming this hypothesis, a recent study showed that higher levels of 
internal focus during rest predicted increased levels of state rumination and negative 
mood in individuals with medium or high levels of cognitive reactivity (Marchetti, 
Koster, et al., 2013). However, as we predict in our model, the rest-related toxic effect 
was not detected in individuals at low risk for depression, that is with low levels of 
cognitive reactivity.  
At the neurobiological level, a recent theoretical proposal directly linked the 
DMN with cognitive reactivity (Marchetti et al., 2012). Confirming this association, 
Zamoscik, Ebner-Priemer, Huffziger, Kirsch, and Kuehner, (2013) documented that 
individuals characterized by high levels of cognitive reactivity (i.e. remitted depressed 
individuals) reported increased functional connectivity between the PCC and the 
parahippocampal gyrus during recall of a negative autobiographical memory compared 
with healthy controls. The increased connectivity predicted increased ruminative 
daydreaming during daily life. 
In sum, daydreaming and cognitive reactivity share many theoretical similarities, 
as both seem to be triggered by the same factors, such as negative mood and self-
focus. Nevertheless, only a few studies have investigated this relationship and more 
efforts in this regard are warranted. We propose that the habitual tendency to 
daydream could predict concurrent and future depressive symptoms, but moderated by 
individuals’ levels of cognitive reactivity, whereas a main effect is expected for guilty-
dysphoric daydreaming.  
 
Mindfulness 
Mindfulness is considered a powerful protective factor against depression (Ma & 
Teasdale, 2004). Despite the lack of agreement about its definition (Grossman & Van 
Dam, 2011), two key features of mindfulness are  (i) sustained attentiveness to the 
present moment (Wallace & Shapiro, 2006) and (ii) receptive and non-judgmental 
attitude toward inner experience (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Considering the features of 
daydreaming, the relationship between undirected thought and mindfulness are worth 
examining. First, daydreaming per se implies by definition a mental drift from the here-
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and-now reducing awareness of the surrounding environment (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). Thus, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that daydreaming and mindfulness 
represent divergent constructs, although not fully opposite as both rely on self-
awareness to a certain extent. In fact, research showed that mindful observing of inner 
experience is positively correlated with self-awareness (Evans, Baer, & Segerstrom, 
2009). Second, both daydreaming and mindfulness imply that the individual frequently 
attends to his/her own inner experience, but the relative attitude toward mental events 
seems crucial in leading to either positive or negative consequences. Whereas 
mindfulness requires a non-judgmental experiencing of thoughts and emotions, such 
acceptance is not an intrinsic feature of daydreaming. We here speculate that during 
daydreaming, the pre-existing attitudes toward mental events are recapitulated and 
maintained during undirected thought. Consequently, individuals characterized by one 
or more of the aforementioned cognitive risk factors are likely to actively maintain 
these detrimental cognitions during mindwandering and, in turn, report lower levels of 
mindfulness. In line with this, we also suggest that during guilty-dysphoric daydreaming 
the mental attitude is strongly evaluative and judgmental.      
Evidence deriving from questionnaire, experimental, and neuroimaging studies 
confirms our hypothesis that daydreaming and mindfulness are negatively related. 
Mrazek, Smallwood, and Schooler (2012) reported that multiple markers of 
mindwandering during the SART were negatively correlated with dispositional 
mindfulness (r ranging from -.18 to -.22). Interestingly, the same negative relation also 
was reported between dispositional mindfulness, as measured with the Mindful 
Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), and the tendency to engage in 
daydreaming (r = -.23). These findings have been replicated by several researchers. For 
instance, Deng et al. (2012) reported that mindfulness was negatively related with the 
rate of commission errors during the SART, whereas Stawarczyk et al. (2012) and 
Marchetti, Van de Putte, et al. (under revision) confirmed the small to moderate 
negative correlation between the DDFS and the MAAS. Finally, Way, Creswell, 
Eisenberger, and Lieberman (2010) have shown that increased resting state activity in 
the MPFC and PCC was negatively correlated with individuals’ MAAS scores.    
In sum, findings confirm that daydreaming and mindfulness are contrasting 
constructs, with higher levels of daydreaming implying lower levels of mindfulness and 
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vice versa. Nevertheless these two constructs are not opposite as they are negatively 
correlated with only small to moderate magnitude. This modest link could be accounted 
for by the fact that both phenomena seem to partially rely on the same functions, such 
as self-awareness (Evan et al., 2009). However, whereas mindful awareness is 
characterized by a non-judgmental attitude toward the self, guilty-dysphoric 
daydreaming is likely to stimulate a ruminative tendency to process self-salient goal 
discrepancy. Future research should clarify the exact relation between different styles 
of daydreaming, and not only its frequency, and mindfulness.  
 
Stress as negative daydreaming amplifier 
The interaction between stress and cognitive risk factors is of importance for 
theories that focus on the etiology of depression. Stress is thought to activate negative 
schemata that would otherwise remain dormant (Beck, 1967; Clark et al., 1999). Stress 
can initiate a domino effect that leads to negative affect and depressive symptoms. In 
line with the vulnerability-stress model, the interaction between cognitive 
vulnerabilities and stress predicts future depressive symptoms (Metalsky & Joiner, 
1992). 
It has been proposed that daydreaming increases by stress, as the latter could 
potentiate the processing of current concerns (Klinger, 2013a). Confirming this point, a 
study showed that frequency of current concern-related thoughts is influenced by 
stress in the form of blocked goals (i.e., unexpected difficulties in pursuing the goal; 
Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980). More recently, two recent cross-sectional studies 
reported a significant correlation between mindwandering and perceived stress, as 
measured with the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983). 
Epel et al. (2013) found that the tendency to engage in mindwandering was highly 
correlated with perceived stress (r = .53). Although with smaller magnitude, Mrazek et 
al. (2013) also found significant correlations between self-reported mindwandering, 
task-unrelated thoughts during SART, and the PSS (r range between .20 and .30). 
However, we propose that stress not only enhances the frequency of 
daydreaming but also influences the content of daydreaming by making undirected 
thought gravitate towards negative and depressogenic topics. In other words, stress is 
thought to induce and/or magnify negative daydreaming (i.e., guilty-dysphoric style) 
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even in individuals who generally do not engage in this detrimental type of 
daydreaming. This, in turn, hinders post-stress emotional recovery. Thus, the 
occurrence of (negative) daydreaming is a maladaptive way to cope with stress. In line 
with our hypothesis, Stawarczyk, Majerus, and D’Argembeau (2013) demonstrated that 
an increase of stress-related negative mood correlated with task-unrelated thoughts in 
a subsequent SART. More importantly, that study found that the amount of stress-
focused thoughts during the experimental paradigm predicted persistence of negative 
mood, suggesting that negative mindwandering hinders adaptive adjustment. Similarly, 
Poerio et al. (2013) reported that prior negative mood leads to negatively valenced 
mindwandering, that predicted negative mood after 15 minutes, even after controlling 
for negative mood at baseline. Finally, a couple of early studies documented that 
engaging in daydreaming as a form of coping strategy leads to undesirable 
consequences. Tanck and Robbins (1979) reported that the habit of daydreaming in 
reaction to stress correlated with depressive symptoms, while Pytkowicz, Wagner, and 
Sarason (1967) showed that, after anger induction (i.e., insults), being allowed to 
engage in fantasy led to reduced anger toward the experimenter but increased self-
awareness and self-recrimination. This effect was particularly evident in individuals who 
habitually engage in daydreaming. 
In sum, we propose that stress interacts with daydreaming in two ways. First, 
stress increases frequency of daydreaming. Second and more importantly, stress 
influences content of undirected thought, in that it introduces negative and 
depressogenic elements into one’s train of thoughts, which hinder emotional recovery 
from stress. Moreover, we speculate that stressful life events, in contrast with mild and 
transitory negative emotions, play a key role in powerfully impacting one’s thinking 
style.   
 
Daydreaming and Bipolar Disorder 
Bipolar disorder (BD) is a severe mental illness characterized by recurrent 
episodes of depression and (hypo)mania (Goodwin & Jamison, 2007). Interestingly, BD 
and mania have been associated with highly ambitious, or even unrealistic, goals as well 
as with an increased engagement in goal-striving (Alloy, Urosevic, et al. 2012). 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
228 
Moreover, life events related to goal-striving and achievement can trigger manic 
symptoms (Nusslock, Abramson, Harmon-Jones, Alloy, & Hogan, 2007). 
According to our model, it is reasonable to suggest that daydreaming supports 
this risky goal-striving mechanism in individuals who suffer from or are at risk for 
bipolar disorder. Under certain circumstances, constant reminders of highly ambitious 
goals during daydreaming could enhance efforts for their achievement and, in turn, 
result in a hypomanic or manic episode. 
Although understudied, the relation between daydreaming and mania is 
supported by early and recent studies. For instance, Smith (1933) showed that 11 out of 
26 BD patients reported daydreaming frequently and 17 of them claimed that the topic 
of their daydreams was about improbable events. More recently, an 11-year 
longitudinal study investigated a large sample of 559 unipolar depressed individuals 
who later developed bipolar disorder (Akiskal et al., 1995). In that study, the tendency 
to engage in daydreaming by unipolar patients predicted those who later developed a 
manifest bipolar disorder. Finally, a study (Meyer et al., 2011) of a non-clinical sample 
documented that higher levels of habitual daydreaming were predicted by higher 
scores on the Hypomanic Personality Scale, a measure of BD-related risk (Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1986). 
We propose that, in individuals at risk for mania, daydreaming triggers and, 
perhaps, contributes to maintaining manic phases. In more detail, we expect this effect 
to be driven by both high frequency of undirected thought and a specific daydreaming 
style envisioning grandiose success and the attainment of unrealistic goals.    
 
Discussion 
Daydreaming is a complex neurocognitive phenomenon that serves essential 
functions in goal pursuit during periods of low or no engagement in external tasks 
(Klinger, 1971, 2009). By doing so, daydreaming plays an important role in maintaining 
plans for non-immediate goals (Klinger, 2013a). Nevertheless, the very same 
mechanism also is associated with undesirable side-effects (Klinger, 1996a). Based on 
the extant literature deriving from questionnaire, behavioral, and neuroimaging studies, 
we argue that frequent daydreaming is a process potentiating cognitive risk factors for 
mood disorders in vulnerable individuals. The continuous goal-discrepancy addressed 
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during daydreaming ends up perpetuating and probably boosting rumination, 
hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity in individuals who already show 
these traits (Figure 1). We also propose that high levels of (negative) daydreaming 
reduce the tendency to mindfully attend to the present, a mental attitude known to 
protect from psychopathology (Ma & Teasdale, 2004). Moreover, stress is expected to 
interact with daydreaming by intensifying its occurrence, imbuing it with negative and 
depressive content, and hindering subsequent emotional recovery. In sum, our 
framework predicts that daydreaming may help account for both concurrent and future 
depressive symptoms. This effect is expected to be potentiated in reaction to stressful 
life events.  
However, daydreaming is a complex phenomenon, comprising different 
characteristics and styles that we want to discuss in relation to our framework. 
Consistent findings strongly support that the guilty-dysphoric type of daydreaming is 
likely to lead to psychopathological consequences. When characterized by feelings of 
guilt, hostility, fear of failure, grandiose success, and frightened reactions to it, 
daydreaming has been robustly associated with a variety of psychopathological 
symptoms (Klinger et al., 2009), among which depression plays a major role (Giambra & 
Traynor, 1978). These findings may account for the association between guilty-
dysphoric daydreaming with depressive symptoms.  
It is perhaps less intuitive that frequent daydreaming per se represents a 
condition potentially enhancing the likelihood of developing depression in those who 
are vulnerable to mood disorders. In our view, during daydreaming depressogenic 
themes are recapitulated and magnified in those who already have a thinking style 
prone to depression, whereas this is not the case for individuals who are less disposed 
toward depression. Preliminary findings support this idea, as negative consequences 
related to daydreaming are consistently reported in individuals who already show a 
predisposition to depression (Andrews-Hanna, et al., 2013; Marchetti, Koster, et al., 
2012, 2013; Roberts et al., 2013). In sum, a novel hypothesis that we propose in our 
framework is that excessive engagement in daydreaming potentiates and probably 
accelerates a depressogenic spiral in those who are already at risk for depression. 
Finally, although positive-constructive daydreaming is not the main focus of this 
article, it is worth briefly discussing its possible impact on mental health as well. This 
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specific style of undirected thought is characterized by a feeling of playfulness, wishful 
imagery, creativity, and planning, and it has been proposed as the quintessential 
adaptive form of daydreaming (McMillan et al., 2013). Unfortunately, several findings 
render doubtful that this form of daydreaming is always adaptive. The literature on the 
relationship between positive-constructive daydreaming and depressive symptoms is 
mixed. On the one hand, Giambra and Traynor (1978) reported both negative or non-
significant relationships between this daydreaming style and depressive symptoms. On 
the other hand, both positive and negative associations have been documented when 
gender was taken into account (Golding & Singer, 1983), and a study reported that 
positive-constructive daydreaming was positively related to depressive symptoms (r  = 
.28) (Segal & Lynn, 1992-1993). Finally, positive-constructive daydreaming can lead to 
serious health consequences in cancer patients. Jensen (1987) showed that positive-
constructive daydreaming positively predicted neoplastic growth in women with breast 
cancer at follow-up about 600 days after first assessment. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that indulging in positive daydreaming can, under certain 
circumstances, enhance the likelihood of developing mental distress, such as when 
positive fantasies are unrealistic and characterized by low expectations of reaching the 
fantasized goal (Oettingen, 2012). Hence, more thorough investigation of the clinical 
impact of positive daydreaming is warranted. 
In our model, we also briefly described the possible role of habitual 
daydreaming with regard to mania. We propose that frequent daydreaming, especially 
if characterized by positive emotionality and topics of unconstrained and grandiose 
success, could trigger (hypo)manic phases in individuals who are already at risk for 
bipolar disorder. In line with current theorizing (Alloy & Abramson, 2010; Holmes, 
Geddes, Colom, & Goodwin, 2008), we argue that in individuals with a dysregulated 
tendency to engage in goal-striving, the constant reminder of (unrealistic) goals could 
spur an upward spiral that leads to mania.     
 
Clinical Implications  
Our theoretical framework of daydreaming and its role in mood disorders points 
to a number of clinical implications. First, daydreaming could be useful diagnostically. 
Daydreaming has been proposed to recapitulate the behavioral, cognitive, and 
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emotional repertoire of the daydreamer (Varendonck, 1921). Interestingly, a similar 
hypothesis has been proposed recently with regard to resting brain. That is, patterns of 
spontaneous correlations in the DMN are believed to represent a priori cognitive 
patterns active in daily life (Harmelech & Malach, 2013). Taken together, these theories 
consider daydreaming (and the related neural substrate) as highly informative about 
the daydreamer’s functioning, rather than as random and meaningless mental activity. 
Therefore, such a valuable source of information could be used for individual’s 
assessment. For instance, by measuring the frequency of daydreaming as well as its 
specific style/content, it would be possible to acquire useful information concerning the 
person’s cognitive-emotional structure. Indeed, the informativeness of daydreaming 
has not gone unnoticed, as both psychodynamic therapy and cognitive therapy have 
supported its use (Beck, 1971/2004; Shedler, 2010). 
Given the data provided, it is clear that excessive levels of daydreaming should 
be the target of clinical interventions for individuals who are at risk for or already show 
a mood disorder. To do so, several therapeutic tools are available, such as mindfulness 
training (Mrazek et al., 2012), behavioral activation (Mazzucchelli et al., 2009), and 
SSRIs (Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009). We also propose that daydreaming could reduce 
well-being by allowing and intensifying distressing thoughts. In this regard, standard 
psychological therapies, by addressing and confronting personal goals, are probably 
capable of modifying the content of maladaptive undirected thought. For instance, 
cognitive therapy directly addresses personal core themes, such as feelings of guilt and 
unworthiness, and challenges related assumptions and beliefs (Beck, 1967). By doing so, 
cognitive therapy manipulates the salience of maladaptive current concerns and 
reduces their likelihood to be recapitulated in daydreams. Moreover, specific 
therapeutic tools have been developed to target maladaptive motivational patterns 
with the aim to reduce commitment to unrealistic and self-destructive goals and 
redirect the person toward more realistic and adaptive goals (Cox & Klinger, 2011). This 
motivational change is likely to lead to more adaptive forms of daydreaming that are 
less susceptible to foster depressive outcomes. 
In the context of depressive disorders, several additional interventions may 
exert beneficial effects through reducing the amount of daydreaming or the salience of 
negative thoughts during daydreaming. Provided that depression is often associated 
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with inactivity and reduced levels of engagement in activities (Martinsen, 2008), 
interventions aimed at re-engagement and activation are crucial to reduce the amount 
of time spent daydreaming. There is extensive evidence for the efficacy of behavioral 
activation and other forms of re-activating individuals (e.g., physical exercise; 
Mazzucchelli et al., 2009). Another class of interventions is aimed at reducing the 
salience of negative self-evaluative thoughts. Well-known therapies include 
mindfulness based cognitive therapy (Ma & Teasdale, 2004) and acceptance and 
commitment therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) where individuals learn to relate 
differently to their negative thoughts. Similarly, specific treatment has been developed 
to reduce levels of ruminative thought that include reducing levels of evaluative 
thinking (Watkins et al., 2012). 
 
Limitations   
Notwithstanding the consistency of the reviewed literature, we acknowledge 
several limitations that should be the focus of further study. First, studies associating 
daydreaming and cognitive risk factors for depression are mostly correlational, with 
neither experimental manipulation nor longitudinal tracking being used. So, although 
we propose a bidirectional link in the form of positive feedback between undirected 
thought and vulnerability to mood disorders, it should be noted that this mutual 
influence is tentative. To the best of our knowledge, no study so far has directly ruled 
out the possibility of causation between daydreaming and cognitive risk factors. 
Therefore, future studies should clearly address this issue and explore whether any 
direct causal link can be highlighted. Furthermore, it is also possible that the 
relationship between the tendency to engage in undirected thought and vulnerability to 
mood disorder could be influenced, if not caused, by a third factor, such as a genetic 
predisposition or personality factors.     
Second, daydreaming shares some features with other clinically relevant 
constructs, a fact that might make it difficult to identify its specific contribution. For 
instance, daydreaming and dissociation are both characterized by the tendency to 
ignore the surrounding environment to focus internally. However, important 
differences should be noted between these constructs. For instance, during dissociative 
states the boundaries between fantasy and reality are substantially weakened and the 
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sense of a coherent self is somewhat reduced. On the other hand, these features are 
not representative of daydreaming. Notwithstanding this, the current 
operationalizations of these two constructs tend to partially overlap. Klinger et al., 
(2009) demonstrated that different measures of daydreaming, including the SIPI, are 
significantly correlated with a standard measure for dissociation, namely the Curious 
Experiences Scale (Goldberg, 1999). Importantly, all the daydreaming styles correlated 
significantly with dissociation scores, with positive-constructive daydreaming 
surprisingly playing a leading role (r = .47). Thus, a limitation of our model is that the 
reviewed findings might partially map onto the undesired contribution of dissociation. 
The available psychometric ways to acquire information on daydreaming are probably 
not sufficiently precise to draw final conclusions. Experience sampling methods using 
probes are probably superior but also more labor-intensive. This research area would 
benefit from future efforts to develop unconfounded methods that are both valid and 
cost-effective.     
 
Future research 
We believe that our framework paves the way to several future studies. First, a 
powerful method to test our longitudinal predictions is the behavioral high-risk design 
(Alloy et al., 2006; Alloy, Bender, et al., 2012). This specific longitudinal design entails 
recruiting individuals who do not show significant levels of the criterion of interest (i.e., 
depression) and show either high or low levels of a vulnerability factor (i.e., 
daydreaming frequency plus cognitive vulnerability and/or guilty-dysphoric style of 
daydreaming). By doing so, the hypothesized influence of daydreaming and cognitive 
vulnerability to lead to depressive symptoms could be evaluated by means of multiple 
assessments across time.  
Second, a possible further theoretical integration could be proposed with regard 
to psychobiological motivational systems. The Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral 
Activation System (BIS/BAS) model suggests that two main dimensions account for 
human functioning (Gray, 1994). The BAS system is proposed to regulate approach-
/reward-related behavior, whereas the BIS system is thought to be triggered by 
inhibition- and withdrawal-related stimuli (Gray, 1994). Interestingly, these two 
dimensions have been found to correlate with lateralized frontal alpha rhythm 
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asymmetry during resting state (Coan & Allen, 2003). It is also noteworthy that BIS/BAS 
imbalance has been implicated in both depression and mania (Abramson et al., 2002; 
Alloy & Abramson, 2010). Thus, future studies should explore the possible interplay 
among the DMN, frontal alpha asymmetry, and daydreaming in individuals with mood 
disorders. 
Third, both theoretical considerations and recent findings have associated 
daydreaming with a variety of psychiatric symptoms (Klinger, 1996a; Klinger et al., 
2009). Nevertheless, a broader model that could account for the role of daydreaming in 
major psychopathology, including also anxiety, emotional, psychotic, and personality 
disorders, is lacking. Future studies should shed light on this intriguing topic.   
 
Conclusion 
Daydreaming is considered the mental state from which we depart for engaging 
in activity and to which we return after completing or abandoning a task. During this 
period of inattentiveness for any task or the surrounding environment, the mind is far 
from just calmly resting. Solid empirical findings and theorizing based on them suggest 
that, while daydreaming, the mind actively processes unattained personal goals toward 
which the daydreamer is powerfully committed. Although this mechanism provides 
clear advantages in terms of enhanced likelihood of reaching important goals, 
daydreaming also perpetuates cognitive risk factors in individuals who are already 
vulnerable to depression. By reviewing the extensive literature we have highlighted 
what we could term the “dark side” of daydreaming and mindwandering. Many findings 
indeed report that well-known mechanisms leading to depression, such as rumination, 
hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity, are consistently associated with 
daydreaming and are likely to exacerbate negative mood. In conclusion, although 
consistent findings highlight its fruitful role, daydreaming is not immune from leading to 
twisted effects in individuals already vulnerable to mood disorders. Hence, we argue for 
considering daydreaming and the individual's dominant daydreaming style as important 
factors for both research and clinical practice. 
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Brain and intersubjectivity:  
A Hegelian hypothesis on the  
self-other neurodynamics1 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Human beings live in a social context, where interacting with others is crucial for 
survival, and having a clear representation of both the “self” and the “other” is needed 
(Baumeister, 2011). Interestingly, neuroscience has traditionally adopted a Cartesian 
perspective by which the self is a solipsistic and self-sufficient unit, fundamentally 
unrelated to the other individuals’ representation. Since the last decade, however, 
neuroscience is increasingly promoting research about how the “self” and the “other” 
are processed and represented at both intra- (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Denny, 
Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Molnar-Szakacs & Uddin, 2013; Wagner, Haxby, & 
Heatherton, 2012) and inter-brain level (Dumas, Martinerie, Soussignan, & Nadel, 2012; 
Dumas, Nadel, Soussignan, Martinerie, & Garnero, 2010). Nevertheless, the specific way 
whereby neural self-other representations co-occur and exert influence on each other 
in order to promote higher-order functions necessary for social functioning remains 
largely unclear. We propose that the philosophical theory of intersubjectivity (Hegel, 
1807/1977) could integrate neuroscience findings and, in turn, shed new light on the 
self-other dynamics at neurobiological and cognitive level.  
 
                                                 
1 Based on Marchetti, I., & Koster, E. H. W. (2014). Brain and intersubjectivity: A Hegelian hypothesis on 
the self-other neurodynamics. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8(11). doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00011  
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Hegel and self-other dynamics 
Philosophy has intensively studied the interaction between the self and other, 
terming sometimes their interplay as intersubjectivity. In 1807, the German 
philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, published the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Hegel, 1807/1977), where he thoroughly investigated the progressive steps that from a 
relatively simple form of thinking, such as consciousness, lead to higher-order functions, 
such as self-consciousness.  
According to Hegel, consciousness is the mental function that accounts for 
ordered experience and which provides us with a unified experience of reality, instead 
of a chaotic flow of meaningless information. By means of consciousness, we are 
therefore able to represent and process in a meaningful way the stimuli that fall in our 
phenomenal space. Recent theoretical efforts have associated this crucial mental 
function with specific brain dynamics: rest-stimulus interaction at the level of cortical 
and subcortical midline regions (Northoff, 2012).  
Compared with earlier philosophers, Hegel took the notion of consciousness one 
step further. In line with his idealistic assumptions, he proposes that the mind actively 
“constructs” the objects of our knowledge, with no need for the latter to rely on 
cognitively inaccessible external entities. Earlier thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant, had 
indeed argued that these founding external entities were not comprehensible to our 
mind (i.e. thing-in-itself or noumenon) (Kain, 2005). Although his theory probably 
qualifies Hegel as one of the first radical constructivists, it also raises a fundamental 
question. If neither based on external reality nor on itself, on what is our self-
consciousness based? Hegel (1807/1977) clearly answers that “Self-consciousness exists 
in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only 
in being acknowledged” (paragraph 178) (Hegel, 1807/1977). Three elements are 
noteworthy here. First, Hegel proposes a condition of necessity in the self-other dyad, 
with each pole needing to be recognized by the other one (i.e. mutual recognition or 
intersubjectivity). Second, both the self and the other maintain their specific identity 
without merging into an undifferentiated matrix (Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003), in that 
the other is recognized as a separate subjectivity with whom a shared subjective state is 
possible (i.e. recognition of the other). Third, the self, at least in part, exists insofar as 
being constructed by the other that recognizes it back (i.e. recognition of the self). 
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Without the other, the self lacks a fundamental reference to contrast itself with, and, in 
turn, it is bound not to emerge in the biological and psychological context (Baumeister, 
2011). Importantly, a simple object fundamentally lacks self-consciousness and as such 
it is not eligible to recognize one’s self as this would lead the latter to become “a 
motionless tautology of I am I” (paragraph 167) (Hegel, 1807/1977). In other words, if 
the other’s recognition is lacking, I can experience events and objects (i.e. 
consciousness), but I cannot experience myself as a self-conscious agent (i.e. self-
consciousness).  
From the intersubjective perspective, the “other” is necessary. Not only must 
the other be physically present with its own body (Mead, 1934/2009; Russon, 1997), 
but the other must also recognize the subject as an intentional and self-conscious self 
(Kain, 2005). In order to process such fundamental but complex input, the brain is 
expected to be properly equipped to detect recognition by others.  
 
Intersubjectivity, Default Mode Network, and Mirror Neuron System 
How may Hegelian intersubjectivity inform our knowledge of the brain and, in 
turn, account for our social functioning? Intersubjectivity could shed light on recent 
neuroimaging findings by integrating two of the most active research lines in 
neuroscience, the Mirror Neurons System (MNS) and the Default Mode Network 
(DMN). 
In the social context, the perception of a meaningful and goal-directed action 
leads to specific neural activation, regardless whether the action is performed by the 
subject itself or it is observed being performed by another actor (Iacoboni et al., 1999). 
The MNS has indeed been consistently associated with this function whereby the 
other’s instrumental behavior is neuronally represented in the observer by means of a 
motor resonance mechanism. In other words, a significant gesture is encoded also in 
the observer’s brain within its own motor schemata and this helps qualify the person of 
the observer as a (potentially) active and goal-directed actor. On the contrary, immobile 
objects or aimless actions do not elicit a similar response in the MNS (Preston and De 
Waal, 2002). Interestingly, already in the 1930’s George Herbert Mead, a sociologist 
deeply influenced by Hegel’s theory, stressed the importance of this “conversation of 
gestures” between individuals as the first step leading to higher levels of self-
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consciousness (Markova, 1990; Mead, 1934/2009). The MNS can therefore be 
considered as a neural tool that bridges the gap between the self and the other at the 
level of lower-order physical representation (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010).   
The DMN, a neural network highly active during rest, has been associated with 
psychological representing of others, that is mentalizing (Schilbach et al., 2012; Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). This cognitive ability to adopt someone else’s perspective 
and internally represent mental states of others (i.e. beliefs, intentions, and goals) 
implies that we subsume the cognitive representation of other’s mental activity into 
ours to some extent. Interestingly, while the MNS relies on the perception of other’s 
embodied actions, mentalizing requires the ability to extract and understand goals and 
intentions of others. The latter implies that the other is recognized as an agent. 
Therefore, the DMN seems to subserve the mechanism through which the other 
psychologically resonates into one’s mind as an intentional being (Molnar-Szakacs & 
Uddin, 2013).  
As intersubjectivity is emerging as a promising perspective in neuroscience 
(Allen & Williams, 2011), we contend that it can meaningfully integrate these findings. 
Our Hegelian model suggests that it is the long-term interaction between the pre-
reflective “I” (i.e. consciousness) and the other’s representation, both at physical 
(Mead, 1934/2009; Russon, 1997) and psychological (Kain, 2005) level, that gives rise to 
a self-reflective “I” (i.e. self-consciousness). Hence, a self-conscious individual is capable 
not only of processing internal/external stimuli, but also of actively reflecting upon 
herself, which creates a network of information related to the self, such as attributes, 
beliefs, and traits (Baumeister, 2011). 
In neurocognitive terms, we could say that self-awareness is the product of 
interactions between both lower- and higher-order functions, such as motor resonance 
and mentalizing subserved by the MNS and DMN, respectively. Crucially, this neural 
cooperation has been recently confirmed by a meta-analysis showing that self-specific 
activity emerges as interaction between the DMN (i.e., perigenual anterior cingulate 
cortex [pACC] and posterior cingulate cortex [PCC]), and MNS (i.e., left anterior insula 
[lAI] and right inferior frontal gyrus [rIFG]) (Qin & Northoff, 2011). Moreover, 
mentalizing about the self and other is associated with similar neurocircuitry, yet, the 
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brain seems to be capable of distinguishing between them without equating one to the 
other (Lombardo et al., 2010).  
In sum, Hegel’s model of mutual recognition converges with neuroscience 
findings in that in order to understand ourselves we must rely on the same mechanisms 
that we use for understanding others. Self and other representations are strictly bond 
without one dissolving into the other (Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003; Lombardo et al., 
2010). Notwithstanding this, the representation of others’ minds and actions shapes 
our own mind, as both motor resonance mechanism (i.e., MNS) and mentalizing (i.e., 
DMN) are necessary to support and maintain the self-reflective self (Lombardo et al., 
2010; Qin & Northoff, 2011, Sandrone, 2013). It is noteworthy that a similar hypothesis 
has been recently proposed by Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, and Cleeremans 
(2012). The authors propose that a set of neurobiological prediction-based mechanisms 
support our constant attempt to model other’s mind and the related social interaction. 
Importantly, the very same mechanism is proposed to be crucial for developing self-
consciousness too.    
 
The master-slave dynamics in the brain 
Representation of the self and other is associated to a large extent with the 
same neural circuitry (Lombardo et al., 2010), and mutual recognition of self and other 
is required (Hegel, 1807/1977; Kain, 2005). However, this double bind implies a fragile 
equilibrium between the two components of the dyad. What if, for instance, the self 
fails to recognize the other? What if mutual recognition is deficient (Williams, 1997)?  
Hegel (1807/1977) addresses this point by introducing the famous literary 
example of the master-slave dynamic, as follows. Given a couple of peers, one of the 
two could desire to undermine equilibrium by overpowering the other. Hence, one 
would become the “master” while the other becomes the “slave”. However, the 
situation is bound to turn out paradoxical. By not considering the other a full self-
consciousness (i.e. objectification), the master prevents the slave from recognizing it 
back. Consequently, the master hinders the process of mutual recognition upon which 
it itself relies in order to emerge as a self-conscious individual. In cognitive terms, we 
could say that the individual enhances the threshold to receive the recognizing input 
that could structure it as self-conscious.  
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From this, several hypotheses derive. First, objectifying the other (i.e., negating 
its status of human being) leads, to a certain extent, also to a self-objectification, as the 
source of recognition is now lacking. Second, objectifying the other is expected to 
impact on the DMN and/or the MSN, the neurobiological systems maintaining self-
consciousness. Preliminary findings support these hypotheses. First, being subjected to 
ostracisim (i.e., seeing the status of human being negated) leads the victims to judge 
both themselves and the ostracizer(s) less human (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). Second, 
actively engaging in ostracism makes the ostracizer feel less related to human beings 
(Legate, DeHaan, Weinstein, & Ryan, 2013). Third, a recent study showed that inducing 
participants to consider other human beings as objects leads to decreased activity of 
the DMN (Jack, Dawson, & Norr, 2013). 
 
Concluding remarks 
Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity seems capable of shedding new light on the 
complex interaction between the self and the other at both neural and cognitive level. 
The interplay between the DMN and the MNS in supporting self-awareness may indeed 
be interpreted fruitfully by reintroducing the concept of mutual recognition.  
Importantly, new hypotheses can be derived from the classic work of Hegel in 
order to better account for the interaction between DMN and MNS in both healthy and 
clinical samples. For instance, major psychopathologies characterized by abnormal self-
other dynamic, such as schizophrenia, autism, and depression (Billeke, Boardman, & 
Doraiswamy, 2013; Crespi & Badcock, 2008; Gallese, Rochat, & Berchio, 2013; Mehta, 
Basavaraju, Thirthalli, & Gangadhar, 2012; Northoff, 2007), represent key areas to test 
the explanatory power of the intersubjective theory. Finally, our neurophilosophical 
framework could be fruitfully integrated in a new branch of social neuroscience, namely 
the two-person neuroscience (Schilbach et al., 2013). By focusing on the neurocognitive 
basis of the interaction between two individuals, two-person neuroscience is 
developing new experimental paradigms and innovative methods to analyze real-time 
two-brain interplay, such as simultaneous neuroimaging recording or, so-called, 
hyperscanning (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2012; Dumas, 2011). In sum, we argue that the 
integration of our Hegelian neurophilosophical approach and two-person neuroscience 
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holds promise to convey innovative future perspectives in the field of social 
neuroscience.   
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General discussion 
 
 
 
 
Although the layman’s perspective often contrasts task engagement with resting 
state (i.e., daily business vs. time of leisure, or negotium vs. otium), rest is far from 
being a passive state. In fact, current research highlights that (i) the resting mind is 
actively engaged in generating streams of information not related to external stimuli 
(i.e., self-generated thought [SGT], Smallwood, 2013), and (ii) the brain at rest 
consumes about 20% of all the energy of the body, whereas task-evoked brain activity 
accounts for just an increased 2% compared with baseline (Clarke & Sokoloff, 1999). 
  SGT is increasingly considered as a cornerstone of human thought, in that it 
shows specific characteristics that impact the (healthy) functioning of the mind, such as 
its contents tends to be (i) centered on the daydreamer’s self (Diaz et al., 2013), (ii) 
sensitive to temporality (Smallwood et al., 2011), and (iii) emotionally valenced 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Moreover, SGT is (iv) extremely frequent (Killingsworth 
& Gilbert, 2010), and (v) it is mostly supported by the Default Mode Network (DMN; 
Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007). Notwithstanding all these specific features, 
SGT has rarely been investigated in relation to psychopathology (i.e., Klinger, 1996), and 
only recently this topic has attracted systematic research (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, 
& Spreng, in press). Considering that aberrant self-focus, time perspective, and negative 
mood are all hallmarks of negative mood disorders (i.e., Nolen-Hoeksema, Lyubomirski, 
& Wisco, 2008), depression seems be the ideal context where to investigate the 
plausible contribution of SGT and DMN to increase pathogenic risk. 
In this doctoral project, we aimed at highlighting the plausible contribution of 
SGT in promoting, maintaining, and supporting vulnerability to depression, by adopting 
a neurocognitive and neurophilosophical approach.  
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Main contributions and findings of the doctoral research project 
This doctoral research project mainly focused on two research lines that 
influenced and inspired each other, that is (i) the theoretical development of models 
and hypotheses on the clinical role of both SGT and DMN, and (ii) the empirical 
evaluation of those models. 
 
Theoretical contributions 
Three theoretical models have been developed at the beginning and end of the 
PhD research. In chapter 2 we proposed a neurocognitive framework where specific 
DMN-related aberrations, such as hyperconnectivity and aberrant rest-to-task 
transition indexes (i.e., TN-persistence and TP-deficiency), are proposed to account for 
recurrence in depression via contribution of well-established cognitive risk factors, such 
as rumination, cognitive reactivity, and impaired attentional control. This framework 
has several strengths that we would like to stress. For instance, it integrates two 
extensive literatures, namely psychological (cognitive) vulnerability to depression and 
neural networks in depression. Moreover, it specifically focuses on the still 
understudied field of recurrent depression, where the key component to tackle is the 
mechanism leading to resurgence of depressive symptoms, rather than the first onset 
of depressive disorder. Finally we proposed that taking into account multiple cognitive 
risk factors could be an optimal way to address the topic of vulnerability to depression.  
In chapter 8, we extended the perspective on the depressogenic role of resting 
state by shifting the main focus from neurobiology to cognitive psychology. In this 
chapter, we argued that SGT could represent a phenomenon, surprisingly 
underestimated, that could not only prevent the extinction of depression, but also 
promote and accelerate the depressive downward spiral in those who are already 
susceptible to depression. In this novel theoretical framework, by relying on an 
extensive literature that spans many decades, we intensified our efforts to include 
multiple cognitive risk factors simultaneously. We indeed considered rumination, 
cognitive reactivity, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and low mindfulness. We also more 
explicitly included the impact of stress in heightening the risk to depression. Finally, 
preliminary, but promising, evidence for the role of SGT for mania has been 
summarized.  
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Finally in chapter 9, a short and preliminary model is described where, by 
adopting a Hegelian perspective (Hegel, 1807/1977), we proposed that the 
neurocognitive representation of the self-other dyad is necessary for the development 
of higher-order functions, such as self-consciousness. Within the new direction of two-
person social neuroscience (Schilbach et al., 2013), we proposed possible interaction 
between the DMN and the Mirror Neurons System (MNS) in supporting self-
consciousness. Moreover, by applying the philosophical master-slave paradigm (Hegel, 
1807/1977), we derived specific hypotheses and preliminary supporting evidence was 
reviewed.        
 
Empirical contributions 
In chapter 3 to chapter 6, we showed a series of multiple studies where we 
highlighted the depressogenic role of SGT. In chapter 3, we reported that 
mindwandering, a specific type of SGT defined as “a shift of attention away from a 
primary task toward internal information” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, pp. 946), 
predicts increased negative (relative to positive) thought after a long period of 
mindwandering, whereas no direct link between mindwandering and worsening in 
mood was reported. Interestingly, the negative effect of mindwandering was significant 
only in individuals with medium or high levels of depressive symptoms, whereas 
individuals with low levels of depression were immune from this toxic effect. 
In chapter 5, we tested the specific role of rest in leading to momentary 
negative effects. By capitalizing on the hypothesis developed in chapter 2, we 
investigated whether internal focus during resting state could lead to state negative 
effects in individuals with high levels of both brooding and cognitive reactivity. The 
analysis revealed that resting state does lead to worsening in mood via contribution of 
increased state rumination, as measured with the Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus 
Inventory (MRSI) that we developed in chapter 4. Interestingly, in line with the 
hypothesis, the negative effect of resting state was significant in individuals with 
medium or high levels of cognitive reactivity, or medium or low levels of mindfulness, 
whereas this was not the case in individuals at low risk for depression (i.e., low levels of 
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cognitive reactivity or high levels of mindfulness). Brooding appeared to contribute only 
to a limited extent. 
In chapter 6, we reported a cross-sectional questionnaire study where we 
investigated the possible depressogenic role of the habitual tendency to engage in 
daydreaming. In this study we have been able to test a multiple serial mediation model 
where daydreaming explained depressive symptoms, but only to the extent that also 
trait self-focus and brooding were involved too. Importantly, daydreaming per se was 
not related to depression.  
 
Theoretical implications 
 The main theoretical implication of this doctoral research project is that resting 
state per se is not depressogenic, but that, under certain circumstances, it may lead to 
depressive symptoms. Both our theorizations (Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, & Alloy, under 
review; Marchetti, Koster, Sonuga-Barke, De Raedt, 2012) and empirical findings 
(Marchetti, Koster, De Raedt, 2012, 2013; Marchetti, Van de Putte, Koster, 2014) 
support the claim that high levels of SGT and high levels of DMN activity could facilitate 
the development of major depression and depressive symptoms, but only in those who 
are already at risk to experience depression.  
We indeed documented that mindwandering and internal focus during resting 
state conveyed negative outcomes, but only in individuals who were vulnerable, that is 
characterized by noticeable levels of depressive symptoms, cognitive reactivity, 
brooding, and low levels of mindfulness. It is important to mention that, although SGT 
was often found to predict depression (i.e., “main effect”), we always found that 
specific individual differences could modulate the main effect of SGT (i.e., 
“interaction”). A similar interpretation can be proposed for our questionnaire study 
(i.e., chapter 6) where daydreaming influenced concurrent levels of depressive 
symptoms, but only via both self-focus and brooding, whereas daydreaming could be 
associated with other non-depressogenic paths not taken into account in the study.  
At the neurobiological level, we proposed that abnormally elevated levels of 
DMN could enhance the likelihood of developing future depressive episodes in remitted 
depressed individuals. Interestingly, this hypothesis has been substantially confirmed by 
two recent studies (Nixon et al., 2014; Zamoscik, Huffziger, Ebner-Priemer, Kuehner, & 
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Kirsch, 2014). For instance, Zamoscik et al. (2014) showed that, during sad mood 
provocation, increased PCC-PHG connectivity was found in the at-risk group and not in 
the healthy groups and this index correlated with state measures of rumination and 
negative mood and follow-up measures of depression and brooding after 6 months. 
Importantly, these findings held only in the vulnerable group (i.e., remitted depressed 
individuals), and not in the healthy group. 
In sum, this doctoral project highlighted that individual differences are crucial 
factors that must be considered in order make meaningful claims on the adaptive or 
maladaptive role of both SGT and DMN. Consequently, it is not in line with the empirical 
findings to affirm that SGT and resting state always lead to psychopathological 
outcomes1. By adopting the same perspective, it is questionable to claim that SGT is 
always positive and constructive (McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 2013). To our 
knowledge, no attempt has been made to validate the absence of any possible 
moderator that could either mitigate or nullify, if not revert, the documented positive 
outcomes of SGT and DMN, such as increased creativity and empathy (Baird et al., 
2012; Rabinowitz & Heinhorn, 1984). Future studies should address this issue. 
Finally, although the list of possible moderators is virtually infinite, recent 
theoretical efforts have shed light on the crucial factors responsible for adaptivity and 
maladaptivity of SGT and DMN, such as time perspective, intrapsychic intersubjectivity, 
and psychological vulnerability to mood disorders (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & 
Spreng, in press; Marchetti & Koster, 2014; Marchetti et al., under review; Mason, 
Brown, Mar, & Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Future studies 
should validate these theory-driven hypotheses in order to better specify which 
individual differences modulate the impact of both SGT and DMN on individual well-
being.  
    
Clinical implications 
Several clinical implications can be derived from this research project. As we 
have already described them extensively in chapter 7, we will here report the two 
major clinical aspects of our project.  
                                                 
1
 For instance, Cronbach (1963) warned future teachers that excessive charges could induce psychosis in 
their students via frequent engagement in daydreams. 
CHAPTER 9 
 
 
270 
First, there is a quite unanimous consensus that when SGT is characterized by 
negative and depressogenic cognitions (i.e., rumination), it should be the target of 
specific clinical interventions aiming at changing its content (Marchetti et al., under 
review; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). In line with our theoretical papers and 
previous empirical findings (Giambra & Traynor, 1978; Marchetti et al., 2014; Klinger, 
Henning, & Janssen, 2009), it is very likely that individuals characterized by vulnerability 
to depression experience more negative, self-defeating, and hopelessness-focused SGT 
compared to resilient individuals. In other words, the content of SGT is recognized to 
play a major role in leading to either positive or negative outcomes (Poerio, Totterdell, 
& Miles, 2013). Accordingly, specific therapeutic interventions should be adopted to 
modify the depressogenic core of SGT, to reduce commitment to unrealistic and self-
destructive goals and redirect the person toward more realistic and adaptive goals (Cox 
& Klinger, 2011). 
Second, in individuals who are prone to develop depression, excessive 
daydreaming could represent a factor magnifying the vulnerable status. In turn, the 
therapeutic goal should be not only the change maladaptive cognitive content (see 
above), but also to reduce the frequency of SGT. In other words, high levels of SGT 
could represent in vulnerable individuals a condition of risk that should be avoided. 
However, we fully acknowledge that this point is controversial in the literature with 
opposite positions being taken. For instance, Watkins (2008) claimed that “*…+ the goal 
of therapy for people with unconstructive repetitive thinking should not be to reduce 
their repetitive thinking but rather to shift them to more constructive forms of repetitive 
thinking” (pp. 194), and more recently Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna (2013) proposed 
that “*…+ mind-wandering is a heterogeneous, rather than a homogeneous state, and 
thus it might not make sense for intervention studies to seek to reduce self-generated 
thought per se. Instead techniques could focus on changing the content of the 
experience that is disruptive to an individual's health and well-being without impacting 
upon the obvious benefits that self-generated thought conveys to the individual” (pp. 4). 
On the other hand, a recent study showed that high levels of SGT is positively 
correlated with the number of specific steps generated in the context of social problem 
solving, but negatively correlated with the overall efficiency of the solution proposed 
(Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 2013). The authors interpret these findings by 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
271 
suggesting that the relation between SGT and social problem solving may take the form 
of a Yerkes-Dodson relationship, with high levels of SGT being detrimental to 
individual’s well-being.  Finally, they suggest that “*b+y restraining the mind’s habitual 
tendency to wander, interventions that emphasize being in the moment may help 
individuals gain a degree of control over SGT which may in turn allow them to employ 
this basic capacity for conscious thought to generate solutions in a more efficient 
manner” (pp. 8). 
In sum, SGT is a pervasive and very frequent phenomenon. However, whether 
its frequency should be targeted by specific clinical interventions, is still topic of debate 
and future studies should explicitly address this issue, with both experimental and 
longitudinal studies. 
 
    
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to this doctoral research project that deserve 
some consideration. To begin with, almost all the findings reported in this dissertation 
mainly rely on introspection, as only information accessible to consciousness has been 
acquired. For instance, in chapter 5, the paradigm adopted to measure attentional 
focus during resting necessarily relies only on the introspective skills of participants, 
which have been questioned about their validity and reliability. It is indeed possible that 
individual differences in regard to their access to internally generated information could 
have impacted self-reports. In order to partially mitigate this aspect, we preferred 
probe-based state measures rather than retrospective measures. Although usually 
adopted, the latter have been found to distort the frequency of recollections in 
thinking, especially in regard to negatively valenced thoughts (Hurlburt & Melancon, 
1987). Moreover, we preferred a probe-caught methodology (i.e., random thought 
probes delivered by the experimenter) over self-caught methodology (i.e., information 
being reported when the individual is meta-aware of being off-task), in order to reduce 
the impact of meta-awareness on individual self-reports (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
However, future studies should prefer a multi-method approach where self-reported 
information is corroborated with neurophysiological indexes, such as BOLD signal, alpha 
rhythm, or pupil dilation (Schooler & Schreiber, 2004). 
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Second, in our project we focused mostly on specific SGT-related characteristics, 
such as self-focus, while other important features have not extensively taken into 
account. Recently, the content regulation hypothesis has indeed stressed a primary role 
played by time perspective in regard to SGT-related affective consequences, where 
retrospective bias is mainly associated with negative consequences and prospective 
bias leads to positive outcomes (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). In our project, 
we mainly included time perspective in chapter 7, where we put forward the self-
projections in gloomy and dreadful future scenarios is a hallmark of hopelessness. So 
contrary to the content regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), we 
suggest a more nuanced interpretation of the contribution of time perspective in 
leading to either costs or benefits. 
Third, the main focus of this dissertation is the impact of SGT and DMN on 
depression, while related psychopathological constructs have not been taken into 
account, such as anxiety. It is indeed well-established that both depression and anxiety 
share important characteristics, such as general distress (Clark & Watson, 1991). This 
implies that future studies and theoretical ponderings should clarify to what extent the 
reported findings are specifically attributable to (the “pure” contribution of) depression 
and to what extent they are due to a general common factor. However, this research 
intention raises conceptual and methodological obstacles, in that the most often used 
measures for depression and anxiety tend to substantially co-vary and, in turn, hinder 
any statistical attempt to distinguish one factor above and beyond the other one.     
 
Future challenges and research directions 
Although the field of resting mind and brain is exponentially burgeoning, this 
research line is still at its very infancy. For instance, there is no consensus on the 
terminology to adopt with different taxonomies being proposed (Smallwood, 2013). 
This lack of established boundaries and methodologies, on the other hand, implies that 
there is still much room for theoretical and empirical exploration. In what follows, we 
will provide some avenues for new studies that might contribute to a better 
understanding of SGT, DMN, and their impact on mental functioning and well-being. 
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First, a promising future direction for the study of SGT and DMN is considering 
resting state as intrinsically social. Several pieces of evidence indeed support this claim. 
At the cognitive level, a huge community-based survey (n>17000) reported that about 
75% of daydreams involve mental social interaction (Mar, Mason, & Litvack, 2012). 
Moreover, a recent experimental study reported that the other-referential processing is 
a fundamental mechanism of SGT, perhaps even more than self-referential processing 
(Ruby et al., 2013). Finally, at neurobiological level, two meta-analyses confirmed that 
the DMN substantially overlaps with the neural network active during social cognition 
(Schilbach et al., 2012; Schilbach, Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008). In 
sum, it is plausible to speculate that the human mental baseline is intrinsically social 
(i.e., intrapsychic intersubjectivity; Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003), where the processing of 
the self-other dynamic is vital. Recently, we indeed proposed that the balance of the 
self-other representation is a crucial mechanism, whereas its disequilibrium could 
represent an important and still understudied mechanism for psychopathology 
(Marchetti & Koster, 2014).  
Second, considering its intrinsically private nature, SGT seems to be the ideal 
candidate for an in-depth Husserlian phenomenological analysis, where the specific 
characteristics of consciousness during SGT are considered. According to the most 
recent directions in phenomenology and philosophy of mind (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012), 
at least five core features of any perceptive processing are worth being evaluated 
carefully, namely (i) its intentionality, (ii) its gestalt character, (iii) its perspectival 
incompleteness, (iv) its phenomenal and (v) temporal character. To our knowledge, this 
specific investigation on the phenomenology of SGT has never been carried out, 
although it could plausibly provide meaningful elements for the understanding of 
resting state in both healthy and non-healthy individuals. In regard to depression, 
Northoff (2012) recently claimed that “One question in this context [depression] may 
also be how the resting state’s spatiotemporal structure and its alterations may be 
mirrored in and correspond to the changes in the spatial and temporal features of the 
patients’ consciousness of themselves and the world including of time and space. That 
though requires a much more detailed phenomenological in-depth analysis and a 
corresponding neuroscientific investigation” (pp. 9). We fully agree with this position. 
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Third, although SGT (and the underlying neurobiological substrate) is a 
phenomenon located in time, little attempts have been made so far to capture this 
temporal unfolding. Most of the studies indeed elaborate the general pattern of 
performance (i.e., average and standard deviation), whereas a specific framework that 
could account for this feature of SGT is still lacking. In this regard, we think that a 
promising and viable option is adopting the theoretical and analytical framework 
termed Dynamical System Theory (DST). In DST, the values of the variables at one time 
(t) are modeled as functions of the same variables earlier (t-1) (Vallacher, Coleman, 
Nowak, Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010), and, by doing so, it is possible to benefit from important 
analytical tools, such as “trajectory” (i.e., time-series), “attractor” (i.e., convergence of 
time-series in a specific state), and “entropy” (i.e., absence of attractor) (Granic & 
Hollenstein, 2003). This could provide us with information about the structural and 
temporal unfolding of SGT (Koster, Fang, & Marchetti, in press).  
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Onderzoek geeft aan dat we een groot gedeelte van de tijd niet mentaal bezig 
zijn met taakgerichte activiteiten of de ons direct omringende informatie: vaak zijn we 
aan het dagdromen, fantaseren en aan het nadenken over onszelf (Killingsworth & 
Gilbert, 2010). Dit type gedachten die ongerelateerd zijn aan onze directe omgeving 
wordt benoemd als Zelf-Gegenereerde Cognitie (ZGC; Smallwood, 2013). Het afgelopen 
decennium is er een sterke interesse ontstaan in ZGC vanuit cognitief en 
neurowetenschappelijk onderzoek. Deze interesse is voor een groot deel te wijten aan 
de boeiende ontdekking (Raichle, 2001) dat wanneer mensen zich in een “rusttoestand” 
bevinden er een specifieke activatie plaatsvindt van een netwerk van verschillende 
hersengebieden die gedeactiveerd zijn wanneer mensen bezig zijn met taken (o.a. 
mediale prefrontale cortex en posterieure cingulate cortex). Dit netwerk noemt men 
Default Mode netwerk (DMN) of het rustnetwerk. Hierbij is er een grote interesse 
ontstaan naar de functies van dit rustnetwerk waarbij theorieën stellen dat dit netwerk 
geassocieerd is met mentale processen zoals autobiografisch geheugen, zelfprojectie en 
zelfreflectie (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). 
 De afgelopen jaren is er toenemende aandacht voor cognitie in rust en 
DMN bij psychopathologie (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwoord, & Spreng, in press). Met 
name bij majeure depressie, een belangrijke en veelvoorkomende vorm van 
psychopathologie, lijken er verstoringen van cognitie tijdens rust. In hoofdstuk 2 
presenteer ik een nieuw theoretisch kader omtrent heroptredende depressie, cognitie 
in rust en cognitieve risicofactoren voor depressie. Het centrale idee van dit hoofdstuk 
is dat het DMN een belangrijke rol kan spelen bij verschillende cognitieve risicofactoren 
voor depressie, zoals ruminatie (depressief piekeren), aandachtsproblemen en 
cognitieve reactiviteit (verhoogde toegankelijkheid van negatieve gedachten). Er is 
uitgebreide evidentie dat elk van deze cognitieve risicofactoren een rol kunnen spelen 
bij de etiologie en instandhouding van depressie. Echter, het huidige theoretische kader 
is het eerste model waarbij deze risicofactoren geïntegreerd worden en gekoppeld aan 
de neurobiologische bevindingen bij depressie. Dit hoofdstuk speelt een belangrijke rol 
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bij het genereren van specifieke voorspellingen die in het vervolg van het doctoraat 
werden getoetst. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 gingen we na of én op welke wijze ZGC gerelateerd is aan 
negatieve stemming. Op grond van het model in hoofdstuk 2 ontstond de hypothese 
dat ZGC ofwel een directe invloed heeft op stemming of dat dit effect verloopt via een 
verhoogde toegankelijkheid van negatieve cognities (cognitieve reactiviteit). Bij een 
studentenpopulatie (n = 79) bevroegen we emotionele gedachten gedurende een 
Sustained Attention to Response Taak (SART, een volgehouden aandacht taak) die ZGC 
induceert en we onderzochten de toegankelijkheid van negatieve cognities middels de 
Scrambled Sentences Taak (SST). De resultaten toonden dat bij proefpersonen met 
verhoogde depressie scores, een sterkere aanwezigheid van ZGC tijdens de SART 
geassocieerd was met een verhoogde toegankelijkheid van negatieve cognities. 
In de daaropvolgende studie (Hoofdstuk 5) beoogden we de relatie tussen 
interne aandacht, ruminatie en negatieve stemming verder na te gaan. In een 
rustsituatie in het lab bestudeerden we de relatie tussen rust-gerelateerde interne 
aandacht, cognitieve reactiviteit, ruminatie en negatieve stemming in een steekproef 
van studenten (n = 80). Hierbij testten we de voorspelling van het model dat in 
aanwezigheid van cognitieve risicofactoren, interne aandacht leidt tot verhoogde 
niveaus van toestandsruminatie wat een leidt tot een meer negatieve stemming. Om 
toestandsruminatie te meten werd in Hoofdstuk 4 een nieuwe vragenlijst gevalideerd. 
De voorspelde relaties werden getoetst binnen een indirect conditioneel model en 
werden bevestigd. Deze relaties gingen niet op wanneer er geen verhoogd cognitief 
risico was op voorhand of wanneer mensen hoog in mindfulness waren. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 werd nagegaan of we dezelfde relaties terugvonden wanneer de 
studie niet in het lab werd uitgevoerd maar wanneer proefpersonen bevraagd werden 
middels vragenlijsten.  Opnieuw vonden we grotendeels dezelfde relaties in een 
indirect effect model waarbij dagdromen (als proxy van ZGC) een invloed heeft op 
depressieve symptomen via het verhogen van zelf-gerichte aandacht en ruminatie 
(brooding). Verder onderzoek met prospectieve en experimentele designs is 
aangewezen om deze relaties en conclusies en verder te valideren en te verstevigen. 
Op basis van de bevindingen uit de eerdere hoofdstukken, biedt Hoofdstuk 7 
een nieuwe theoretische visie op ZGC. In dit hoofdstuk stellen we dat ZGC de ideale 
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context vormt waarbinnen cognitieve factoren bij at-risk populaties de ruimte hebben 
om een negatieve invloed uit te oefenen. Aangezien dat ZGC veelvuldig gericht is op 
onbereikte persoonlijke doelen en de discrepantie tussen de huidige en gewenste 
toestand (Klinger, 1971, 2013), kan dit direct gerelateerd worden aan vier gekende 
cognitieve kwetsbaarheidsfactoren: ruminatie, hopeloosheid, laag zelfwaarde gevoel en 
cognitieve reactiviteit. Eveneens kan stress de invloed van ZGC op depressieve 
symptomen versterken. Deze nieuwe conceptualisatie van de relatie tussen ZGC, 
cognitieve risicofactoren en depressie heeft belangrijke theoretische en klinische 
implicaties. 
Tot slot, wordt in Hoofdstuk 8 de koppeling gemaakt tussen Hegel’s concept van 
intersubjectiviteit - waarbij de relatie tot de ander een cruciale status heeft bij de 
vorming van ons zelfbewustzijn – en verschillende neurobiologische onderzoekslijnen 
naar de verwerking van observaties van anderen (binnen het mirror neuron systeem) 
en het proces van mentalisatie binnen het DMN. Vanuit deze koppeling wordt de 
hypothese afgeleid dat cognitie tijdens rust op onszelf in relatie tot anderen gericht is. 
Deze conceptualisatie leidt tot interessante nieuwe onderzoeksmogelijkheden naar het 
bestuderen van cognitie in rust bij depressie waar interpersoonlijke problemen een 
belangrijke rol spelen bij een substantieel deel van de depressieve populatie. 
  
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
284 
Referenties 
 
Andrews-Hanna, J. R., Smallwood, J., & Spreng, R. N. (in press). The default network and 
self-generated thought: component processes, dynamic control, and clinical 
relevance. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. doi: 
10.1111/nyas.12360 
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). The brain's default 
network: anatomy, function, and relevance to disease. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences   1124, 1-38. doi: 10.1196/annals.1440.011 
Killingsworth, M. A., & Gilbert, D. T. (2010). A Wandering Mind Is an Unhappy Mind. 
Science, 330(6006), 932-932. doi: 10.1126/science.1192439 
Klinger, E. (1971). Structure and functions of fantasy. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Klinger, E. (2013). Goal Commitments and the content of thoughts and dreams: basic 
principles. Frontiers in Psychology, 4: 415, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00415  
Raichle, M. E., MacLeod, A. M., Snyder, A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A., & Shulman, 
G. L. (2001). A default mode of brain function. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 98(2), 676-682.  doi: 
10.1073/pnas.98.2.676 
Smallwood, J. (2013). Distinguishing how from why the mind wanders: a process–
occurrence framework for self-generated mental activity. Psychological bulletin, 
139(3), 519-535. doi: 10.1037/a0030010 
 
 
